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Three prose works are of central importance to an understanding of Traherne's
practice as "a Philosopher, a Christian and a Divine": the as yet unpublished Select
Meditations, the Centuries of Meditations and the Christian Ethlcks. Unpublished
manuscript notebooks, particularly the Early Notebook, the Ficino Notebook and the
Commonplace Book are closely related to these. Focussing on the two most interesting
and productive periods of his life, the years spent at Oxford (1653 - possibly
l66l) and in London as Chaplain to the Lord Keeper of the Seal, Sir Orlando Bridgeman,
(1669 - 1674), this study analyses Traherne's published and unpublished writings in
relation to specific aspects of the contemporary world from which they issue and to
which they relate.
The vigorous expatiation achieved in Traherne's prose and the intellectual
ambitions revealed in his notebooks reflect an insatiable capacity for knowledge and
experience. He rejects what he is aware of as the world of "Invention" only in order
to idealise the world of "Nature". It is through observation and understanding
("Enjoyment") of this, the physical world, that "Felicity" is sought. This doctrine
includes "Practical Happiness" and seeks fulfilment in "Perfect Life" in all senses
in the "true Estate of this World". The rejection of the world of invention can be
seen as a conscious reaction against "the Customs and Maners of Men" in a society in
which the theories of Hobbes, for example, had serious ideological purchase. As a
younger contemporary of Pepys and Dryden, Traherne can be seen in relation to the
society in which they too lived and wrote. As Chaplain to the holder of the highest
state office in Charles II's government he has a natural place in Restoration London.
He suggests that he was "admitted to the society and friendship of Great Men". His
patron Bridgeman was associated, through his involvement with the Comprehension Bill
of 1668, with the Duke of Buckingham and John Wilkins, among others. Burnet suggests
that Andrew Marvell can be associated with the cause that Bridgeman sought to promote.
In 1673 when, as Burnet observes, "Popery was everywhere preached against", Traherne
published Roman Forgeries, an attempt to discredit the authority of the Roman Catholic
church.
Traherne expressed particular interest in "Natural Philosophy". This contributes
to "Felicity" through "Enjoyment" of God's creation and the "Thanksgiving" that issues
from this. The Webster-Ward Debate and the meetings of John Wilkins' experimental
philosophy club In Oxford in the 1650's suggest Traherne's proximity to an
increasingly significant pursuit. The Early Notebook shows that Traherne read Bacon's
De Augmentis Scientiarum at this time. His later writing is haunted by images
reflecting preoccupations of contemporary natural philosophy, and his "Divine
Philosophy" celebrates the "Common Things" of the physical world. In London the
Bridgeman household lived at Essex House in the Strand when the Royal Society was
meeting in the neighbouring Arundel House. Richard Cumberland, in a book dedicated to
Bridgeman in 1672, describes the Society's "Natural Philosophy" in such a way as to
suggest close correspondence between this and Traherne's "Divine Philosophy". Thomas
Sprat's The History of the Royal Society (I667) and other works by contemporary natural!
philosophers, particularly Robert Boyle, emphasize this. As, for Traherne, "Felicity"
is achieved through "contemplation of GODs Works", so, for Sprat and the Royal Society,
"contemplation of God's visible Works" leads man to millenial fulfilment.
In this study, analysis of the notebooks and their sources, and of aspects of the
contemporary milieu from which they and the prose writings issue and to which they
relate, is complemented by an exploration of each of the prose writings in an attempt
to show the extent and seriousness of Traherne's purpose and his intellectual
accomplishment as a major writer of the Restoration period.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1. Thomas Traheme, 1637-167^-
"An Empty Book is like an Infants Soul, in which any Thing
may be Written. It is capable of all Things, but containeth
Nothing" (C I.l). In the opening of the Centuries of Meditations
Traheme proposes the familiar idea of the tabula rasa.^ For
Locke, some twenty years after Traheme was writing, this was a
valid epistemological propositions there are no "native Inscriptions"
in the infant's mind, and only experience will "furnish the . . .
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empty Cabinet" of the mind. Hobbes had already asserted that
"there is no conception in a man's mind, which hath not at first,
totally, or by parts, been begotten upon the organs of Sense''.
The "organs of Sense" merely respond to "the motion of externall
things"?
The "Enriching Truths" Traherne seeks to communicate in the
Centuries (C I.l) are "unattainable by Book" (£ III.l), so he will
"teach them by Experience" (C III.l). This is the function of the
parable of his childhood ("I will open my Mouth in Parables", C I.3)
offered in the early part of the third Century. There, he "desired
to see those Principles which a Stranger in this World would covet
to behold upon his first appearance" (C IV.3^)- He uses his own
life as a model. The parable explores the relation of the individual
to the world, perceived first through the "Infant Ey" (M 11.86-87),
later through the "Ey of Reason" (C 1.25). The "motion of externall
things" is seen to "furnish the . . . empty Cabinet" of the mind.
"Capable of all Things", the empty book and the infant's mind are
2
filled and fulfilled as they trace and react to "externall things".
The element of autobiography in the Centuries, then, has a
definite purpose. The autobiography is absorbed into and
subordinated to the effort to teach by "Communicating most
Enriching Truths" (C I.l) known and articulated from individual
experience. Traherne's three major prose works — Select Meditations,
Centuries of Meditations, Christian Ethicks — share an educative
purpose. This is formally announced in Christian Ethicks, the one of
the three works that Traherne sought to publish: "The design of this
Treatise is . . . to . . . guide Men ... in the Way of Vertue . . .
and so at last to lead them to true Felicity" (CE 3). Felicity is
"the Perfect fruition of a Perfect Soul, acting in perfect Life by
Perfect Virtue" (CE 19)! it is an ideal form of "perfect Life". In
"the true Estate of this World" (C IV.20), "the rules of Virtue and
Reason" (CE title page, lvi), part of a whole "Divine Philosophy"
(C IV.3) leading to Felicity, can be offered only as "hard lessons
in a pervers and Retrograde World to be practiced" (C IV.54). Man
must strive, in "This Life" which "is the most precious Season in
all Eternity" (C IV.93), for the "perfect Life" of Felicity. "Here
therefore is the Place of Trial" (C IV.60). In his striving, man
"should be all Life and Mettle and Vigor and Lov to evry Thing"
(C 11.68). "Practice and Exercise is the Life of all" (£ IV.95)»
and "Philosophers are not those that speak, but Do great things"
(C IV.2). The perfect life of Felicity is sought and achieved in
"this World", "This Life", by the radical practice of "Divine
Philosophy". "The reality of Religion consists in the solid practice
of it among the Sons of men that are daily with us" (CE 246).
It is in "a pervers and Retrograde World", then, that Felicity
3
is sought. "Experience" is crucial, "both as a source and means of
"Enriching Truths" and their communication. The furnishing of "the
empty Cabinet" of the mind, response to "the motion of externall
things" — to every influence to which the writer's mind is open —
is vital. The books are written as part of and issue from the life
of the "Soul". "Capable of all Things", both book and "Soul" achieve
a definite realisation through "Experience" and its articulation in
"this World", "This Life", the one actual and particular life of
Thomas Traherne, 1637-167^.
2. Traherne and the critics, 1900-1978
Before outlining the materials and method of this thesis, some
account can be given of the critical attention Traherne's work has
received. Traherne was "discovered" by Bertram Dobell at the turn
of this century, some 225 years after his death. The first public
L\.
announcement of his existence as a poet in fact appeared in 1900,
followed in 1903 by Dobell's edition of the thirty-seven poems in
the folio manuscript he had purchased from Alexander Grosart's
library.-' At the same time he had acquired a small octavo manuscript
containing the Centuries of Meditations, which he published in
1908.^ His attribution of these two manuscripts to Traherne took at
least three years to reach certainty and involved a considerable gift
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for detection: the full story is told by Gladys Wade. Traherne's
name and a vague biographical identity were established by way of
his connection with Sir Orlando Bridgeman and, with the help of a
reference in Anthony Wood's Athenae Oxoniensis, through his
authorship of Roman Forgeries, Christian Ethicks and the Thanksgivings.
Confirmation rested largely on the correspondence of a certain verse
passage in the Centuries (C III.21; see M I.2?4) with that in
Christian Ethicks (CS 181). In 1910 H. I. Bell published the
sixty-one Poems of Felicity which had remained unrecognised in
a manuscript in the British Museum until Dobell's edition of some
of the same poems in somewhat different versions identified them
8
as Traherne's. Details of the manuscripts and their contents will
be found elsewhere in this thesis. The material used by Dobell in
tracing Traherne's identity is reprinted, together with almost all
the known biographical facts and their sources, in H. M. Margoliouth's
now standard edition of the Centuries, Poems and Thanksgivings (M I.
xxiii-xxxviii).
Had Alexander Grosart not died in 1899 and the two manuscripts
not been sold to Dobell, the thirty-seven poems of the "Dobell Folio"
would probably have appeared in Grosart's projected edition of the
poetry of Henry Vaughan as newly discovered work by Vaughan himself.^
Only Dobell's conviction that this attribution was wrong guaranteed
the discovery of Traherne as an independent writer. It was as a poet,
however, and a poet very much in the manner of Vaughan, that Traherne
was at first regarded in the articles that appeared both before the
prose of the Centuries became public, and in those written when the
Centuries were more widely available.^ Traherne's work was
identified with a particular type of "religious" or "spiritual"
poetry, and comparisons and contrasts were drawn with Herbert or
Vaughan. His work began to appear in anthologies and selections of
11
a kind from which it has since rarely been absent. From "religious"
and "spiritual" to "mystical" was no great step in critical
terminology, and these three adjectives, together with the
identification of a certain type or even genre of poetry held in
• J
common with Herbert and/or Vaughan, dominated criticism of Traherne
then as they often have since.
Dobell's conviction of Traherne's individuality and originality
remains valid, however, and is reinforced when attention focusses
on the Centuries. The early impulse was to use these as "background"
to the poetry and its themes and ideas, but, often through the
examination of Traherne's "mysticism", the combined study of poetry
and prose issued in an approach inclined more to philosophical
12
speculation than purely literary discussion and evaluation. If the
first theme in Traherne criticism was, and often remains, to
borrow the title of an early article, "Thomas Traherne and the
Religious Poetry of the Seventeenth Century", the next to emerge,
and one that subsequent events may have proved to have more staying
13
power, is that of "Thomas Traherne: A Divine Philosopher". For
commentators in this latter tradition Traherne is predominantly a
prose writer, and prose, due to a revival of interest in the
Christian Ethicks and the discovery in 1964 of the Select Meditations,
now forms a more significant part of his extant work. It is also now
widely argued that it is the prose that has the stronger claim to
literary distinction.
Two articles by T. 0. Beachcroft, appearing in 1930> sought
more explicitly defined areas for discussion of Traherne's prose
14
and of his thought. An anonymous article had previously
characterized Traherne as "A 'Student of Felicity'", thus introducing
what was to become another theme of Traherne criticism. Beachcroft
attempted to establish the notion of "Felicity" as a "Doctrine"
but also, more valuably, introduced for the first time an extended
consideration of Traherne's relation to the Cambridge Platonists.
6
Both of these discussions have been taken up again by other
writers, but to surprisingly little positive effect until, perhaps,
the last ten or fifteen years and the work of Carol Marks in the
i960's.^ The importance of Felicity to Traherne and the similarity
of much of his work to that of the Cambridge Platonists is now
obvious but remains undefined.
The most sensitive, and in many ways the most rigorous, early
study of Traherne is that by Q. Iredale.^ This book still claims
the attention of the student of Traherne: its factual discussion
is more extensive than several more recent studies and it is in
comparison with these that it might be said to gain rather than lose
by the avoidance (for at least part of its course) of more subjective
evaluation. Although her book can claim to be no more than a concise
survey, Iredale was among the first critics to approach Traherne's
writing, verse and prose (including Christian Ethicks), as a whole
and to let each take its own weight and emphasis within a more
general discussion. Her central thesis concerns Traherne's notion of
the expression of the divine in the works of nature, this being,
she says, the central "truth" of all his work: "The poet's passion
for beauty, the philosopher's search for truth, and the moralist's
devotion to goodness were avenues beginning in different places,
17
but ending in one reality". This is reinforced by a genuine
examination of numerous aspects of Traheme's thought and writing:
his interest in philosophical, theological and metaphysical
questions and, indeed, his intellectual curiosity as a whole. The
assertion of a central inclusive truth or reality to which all
knowledge and experience contributes means, Iredale claims, that,
for Traherne, the world, man's life in it and discovery of it, is
7
always a revelation, and that it is through seeing, feeling and
thinking more thoroughly and clearly that man's Felicity, his
complete fulfilment, is best sought: everything can lead to
Felicity. Traherne is allowed by Iredale a new intellectual
dimension in her definition of his debt to the Bible, to Plato
and Aristotle, to Plotinus, the Hermetica and Francis Bacon, while
the possible connections of his work with that of Descartes (his
arguments for the necessary existence of God from the knowledge
of his own existence and that of the world) and that of Berkeley
(his emphasis on the need for subjective sympathy in the
appreciation of the objective) are also mentioned. Iredale points
the possibility of Traherne's interest in contemporary issues —
in controversies between the English and Roman Churches (Roman
Forgeries), and between monarchy and parliament (C 1.4, 61 etc.),
and in science (C III.44) which could be valuable as an "expression
18
of the divine". The Cambridge Platonists, she suggests, are
interesting in their tendency, comparable to Traherne's, to deal
in questions of material beauty rather than the more obscure
imagery and symbolism of other neo-platonists, and in their
belief that "A man cannot open his eye, nor lend his ear, but
19
everything will declare more or less of God". Iredale complements
these observations by more subjective remarks about Traherne's
interest in childhood, education, psychology and perception.
During the same period Gladys Wade published her first work
20
on Traherne. Two articles pursued by now familiar themes, but
her mention of Traherne in her article on Susanna Hopton suggests
the biographical emphasis that was to culminate, in 1944, in the
21
first major book on Traheme. In 1932 Wade had produced an
g
edition of the poems including, for the first time, both those
of the "Dobell Folio" and the Poems of Felicity with the poems
22
from the prose writings. This and subsequent work equipped her
to write the first, and still the only, biography of Traherne.
Painstaking research into Herefordshire parish registers and many
other sources was not, however, rewarded by major discoveries
sufficient to fill out a complete biographical portrait of
Traherne. Nor did Wade avoid falling back on conjecture where the
known facts are slight. Some important details were brought to
light, and some of the conjecture can perhaps be forgiven in so
far as Traherne does seem to take on an independent life while
what little is known is rehearsed in a biographical context.
For Traherne's real biography, though, the reader can now turn
only to the fragmentary material reprinted by Margoliouth (M I.
xxiii-xxxviii) where the facts (rather, the contemporary records
and related dateable events) are not obscured by an author's
claim to draw a complete biographical portrait. Wade herself
admits that for some periods of Traherne's life documentary
evidence is practically non-existent. Her biography survives this
handicap by her sometimes over-inventive resourcefulness. Traherne's
possible connection with Philip Traheme, Mayor of Hereford during
the Civil Wars, can have nothing of the certainty that Wade claims
for it, while the sentimental and entirely speculative possibility
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of his adolescent love affair is wholly unfounded. Wade can be
illuminating, however, in reflecting that Traherne's position as
Sir Orlando Bridgeman's Chaplain might be "an appointment far more
important both in its powers of influence and as a stepping stone
frWft, 214.
for ambition that one might at first realise".
9
Wade's discussions of Traherne's writings are as scholarly
as her biographical research. She includes a chapter on Roman
Forgeries as evidence of "the intellectual quality and austerity
25
of Traherne". Assuming that all three parts of the 1?17 Collection
are by Traherne and Susanna Kopton writing jointly, she quotes the
Preface to the Daily Devotions as characterising Traherne's writing:
"very Rational, Comprehensive, and Emphatical". Wade's discussion
of Christian Ethicks notes both the debt to Platonic and Aristotelian
traditions and Traherne's relation to Jeremy Taylor, Hobbes and
other seventeenth century writers. Christian Ethicks and the
Centuries both emphasize Traherne's quality and individuality as
a prose writer, Wade claims: he is said by her to anticipate by
twenty-five years "the triumph of [a^J new style" of prose writing
achieved by Dryden in the Preface to the Fables (1700) and to
demonstrate a significant process of change "in our manner of
. , 27
writing English between 1660 and 1710. The Centuries, Wade claims,
have no literary ancestry despite some similarity with Augustine's
Confessions (397-^-01). For all their uniqueness, Traherne's writings
have, for Wade, definite points of contact with the time at which
he lived. For her he saw himself as a philosopher imparting a new
and significant philosophy to meet an urgent human need. She notes,
however, Traherne's "minor rank . . . as a poet" despite the high
intellectual quality of his poetry. For Wade, finally, Traherne is
"Christian, Platonist, Mystic".^
For its time, and despite a certain amount of conjecture and
personalized reading, Wade's study might be called definitive. Yet
it did not establish a starting point for other studies, which still
sought their own terms for discussion. Traherne as a poet had been
initiated into the "metaphysical" school, and Wade's reservations
about his "minor rank . . . as a poet" have not prevented the
appearance of his work in anthologies and discussions focussing
on poetry written, in many instances, at least half a century
before Traheme's: both Donne and Herbert, for example, died
29
before Traherne was born. Philosophical and poetic aspects
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might occasionally be combined. The anthologising and discussion
of Traherne as poet, metaphysical or otherwise, need not
necessarily be questioned, but it can need to be counteracted by
drawing attention to the prose. Wade, in 19^4, the author of,
for its kind, a definitive study of Traherne, involving much
considered reading of his own and contemporary work, asserted his
original and individual achievement as a prose writer, an
achievement which, by comparison, puts his poetry in a "minor
rank". Wade was also the editor of the then standard edition of
the poems. Yet, over thirty years later, it is reasonable to
assume that for a majority of readers Traheme is in the first
instance a poet. The origins of this somewhat anomalous
situation cannot be adequately traced here, but they are apparent
simply in the fact that it is impossible to discuss previous
Traherne criticism without considerable mention of the poetry.
There has been extensive criticism of the prose but this is
probably outweighed, in effect if not in quantity, by that
concentrating on the poetry.
There is a further irony in the critical history of Traheme's
poetry and prose. One of the most highly regarded essays on the
Centuries is that in Louis Martz's The Paradise Within (196*0.^
More influential still, however, has been Martz's earlier book,
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The Poetry of Meditation (195*0 • This study included no
discussion of Traherne, but its influence is such that it
demands attention in any study of seventeenth century religious
literature. Martz proposes a "poetry of meditation" rather than
"metaphysical poetry" as a common tradition. His thesis of the
"poetry of meditation" is, he claims, "among the several necessary
methods of approaching a full understanding of English literature
33
in the seventeenth century". Further, "methods of religious
meditation . . . lay at the heart of the century's spiritual life
and provided a radiant center for religious literature of every
34kind". The art of meditation is, he also claims, close to the art
of poetry in any age. He cites Coleridge, D. H. Lawrence and
Wallace Stevens as examples of this. His theories have had
considerable influence. Despite Traherne's absence from The Poetry
of Meditation, the book does seem to characterize what has become
a common view of Traherne, a common critical image. This includes
involvement with recondite medieval theories and theorists (Martz
discusses Jean le Charlier de Gerson, Luis de Granada, Lorenzo
Scupoli and Luis de la Puente among others), a meditative tendency
towards various means of withdrawal from the world, and a concern
for gradations of mystical experience.
The relevance of Martz's earlier study to Traheme is
therefore tenuous but might nevertheless be traced. The book
remains useful in characterizing a certain, perhaps dominant,
attitude to Traherne, whether originally intended to relate to
him or not, This attitude envisages Traherne as the withdrawn
mystic in meditation, communing silently and inwardly with a
transcendent deity. By 1958, for example, John Wallace had found
in the thrity-seven poems of the "Dobell Folio" a "complete five
part meditation which fulfils all the major conditions of a
3 3Jesuit exercise". J Emphasizing once again that Martz himself
does not specifically apply his theories to Traherne, it must be
said that many of his basic ideas and assumptions about the
"poetry of meditation", in the cogent and extensive expression
they are given in the book, seem to be very attractive to other
readers and critics of Traherne. It should not be inferred that
Martz's book is responsible for all other comment applying
"meditative" terms to Traherne, but it remains the best and most
thorough expression of those terms.
Turning to Martz's essay on Traherne in The Paradise Within,
however, his earlier theories still seem to permeate the new book's
background. The "paradise" sought by Traherne, as by Vaughan and
Milton, is again, Martz claims, an internal one, partaking of many
of the characteristics of withdrawn introspective meditation if
not so strictly organised on the principles of the spiritual
handbooks Martz had previously discussed. The earlier claim for
the "poetry of meditation" being "at the heart of the century's
spiritual life" should clearly be taken as read, for, in The
Paradise Within, "meditation" is, for Martz, something to be
expected of any seventeenth century religious writer: "the
Centuries may be seen as Augustinian, in theme, in style, in
method of meditation". Martz's study seeks to illustrate ways
in which Traherne sought in his writing "the Augustinian vision
of a paradise within".3? He is indebted, Martz believes, to
Augustine's idea of "illumination" and "inner light" and the
desire to bring out the image of God in man. Platonic thought,
Martz claims, enjoyed a powerful revival after the middle of the
seventeenth century as men sought ways towards God outside the
ecclesiastical establishment, but, for Traherne, he says, it is
only in "a central Augustinian view" that his "strong Platonic
and Hermetic interests cohere": "the principles of Augustine seem
to have formed the nucleus around which all the literature of
Platonism, pagan and Christian, gathered to help Traherne create
38
his own original exploration of the mind".
Martz's essay gains its impressive unity by focussing on the
Centuries and offering an approach based on theological and
philosophical analogy, and on literary technique. For Martz, the
Centuries are consciously organized in a manner similar to that
of Augustine's Confessions: he speaks of a "technique, so
deliberately, so relentlessly pursued by Traherne", a "literary
technique" and a "central characteristic of style" that is
39
throughout strongly reminiscent of Augustine. Martz's tone of
assurance is rare among critics of Traheme: his central and unified
view rests on the conviction that "in theme, in style, in method"
the Centuries show Augustinian influence and can be analysed, as
Martz does analyse them, in terms of an Augustinian work:
Bonaventura's Itinerarium Mentis in Deum (1472), "an influential
older synthesis, available to Traherne^
Gladys Wade's critical biography of Traherne had been
followed by a number of articles reflecting a continuing desire to
establish detailed factual information about his life. The search
for information culminated in the still definitive edition of
the Centuries, Poems and Thanksgivings by H. M. Margoliouth which
reprints all the known materials from which Traherne's biography
14
can be constructed. The appearance of this authoritative edition,
the first to attempt to give the Centuries in original spelling
and preserve Traherne's characteristic punctuation and
capitalisation, marks the beginning of a new period of Traherne
studies.
The Paradise Within, of course, belongs in this recent
period and in fact included an appendix on the Select Meditations,
then (in 1964) recently discovered by James Osborn. ^ The appearance
of this manuscript in print is still awaited, but the authors of
several studies of Traherne have since been allowed some access to
the manuscript. Martz maintained that the Select Meditations
confirmed his Augustinian interpretation. In the same year the
whole ground of Traherne's work was again surveyed in what remains
a useful general introduction to the work as a whole, Konnoth
Salter's Thomas Traheme: Mystic and Poet (1964). Salter gives
some account of all Traherne's writings and mounts a general
discussion. Bacon, Browne, Hobbes and Locke feature in his
introduction, but the context is not entirely historical. Salter
seeks to define Traherne's thought, his insistence that the studies
of God and nature cannot be separated, and that reason is the light
of God within man, by comparison with other writers. He thus quotes
from Shakespeare (Hamlet's "What a piece of work is a man . . . ")
to introduce Traherne's sense of wonder. His biographical chapter
suggests a "background": Brasenose was a Puritan college, Susanna
Hopton's religous circle may be compared to Nicholas Ferrar's
at Little Gidding, Sir Orlando Bridgeman was a friend and
correspondent of Henry More. The chapter on "Traherne and his Times"
places Traherne in a general, mainly literary, context ranging from
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Shakespeare to Addison with some mention of the Cambridge Platonists
who, like Traherne, observes Salter, were assured that God is not to
be reached by abstract theoretical discourse but by immediate
experience.
Salter's central theme is indicated by his sub-title: Traherne
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is for him "Mystic and Foet". J Major chapters of the book deal with
"Limitations of Traherne's Mystical Experience" or "The Illumination
of Traheme", while Salter defines the three stages of what he calls
Traherne's "Spiritual Progress": 1. Immediate and intuitive
experience; 2. Fall, the "Apostasie" of C III.2; 3- Progress to
Felicity by the "Highest Season" (C III.2). Aristotle, Aquinas and
scholasticism aire, for Salter, the essential clues to Traherne's
thought. He uses Evelyn Underbill's Mysticism (1912) as a guide in
charting Traherne's "mystical" experience and the expression of it.
The Centuries, like the recently discovered Select Meditations, are
valuable to Salter, but his title places these as, albeit essential,
background to his portrait of Traherne as "Mystic and Poet".
Four articles dealing with specific aspects of Traherne's work
may be considered as representative of the more consise comment of
recent years. Margaret Bottrall examines Traherne's view of the
natural world and, allied with this, his insistence on the need for
/|J|
man's expression of gratitude and thanksgiving. Traherne's
"passionate intellectuality", she says, urged him, like Aquinas,
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to see man related at once to God and the whole of creation. To
achieve this, man must attempt to understand the world, and, in
ft
understanding it, return praise for it. Traherne's notions of
perception also receive attention: "Not things, but thoughts of
things are what he values; for what, he asks, would the works of
16
the Creator mean without the intelligence of man to respond to
them? . . . Traheme is the equal of Blake in his insistence on
the paramount importance of this power of imaginative
46discernment".
G. H. Cox, writing soon after the appearance of Martz's
The Paradise Within, questions Martz's assumptions and his use
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of Bonaventura's Itinerarium Mentis in Deum. His conclusions are
based on some work on Traherne's manuscript notebooks: "Traherne's
notebooks tell us a great deal about his reading, and these reveal
indebtedness not to Bonaventura but to Renaissance commentaries on
Plato . . . Traherne followed a different principle of order
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altogether: one that was Platonic rather than Augustinian". This
study is limited to the Centuries and concentrates on particular
aspects of Traherne's "Divine Philosophy" (C IV.3) without clearly
identifying or distinguishing the "Renaissance commentaries on
Plato" or offering an overall view of Traherne's own synthesis.
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A valuable article by S. Sandbank is more explicit. 7
Concentrating almost exclusively on the poetry, Sandbank derives
Traherne's thought directly from Ficino's versions of Plato. This,
for him, is the solution to the sense of confusion that he honestly
notes as the experience of many critics of Traherne: "One tends to
get lost, on a first reading of Thomas Traherne's poetry and prose,
in what looks like an effusive overflow of vague pantheistic
emotion. God, man and the world seem to interweave and intermingle
until they become hardly distinguishable from one another". ^ He
concludes, after an examination of the correspondences between the
thought of Traherne and Ficino (with closest reference to the poetry),
that Traherne's work "may be regarded as a re-affirmation of the old
integrated world-picture, as against the notorious removal of
faith from the realm of nature".-^ In almost direct contrast to
this view is that of Robert Ellrcdt.-' In his study of the poetry
he concludes that "the spirit of the new age is not merely
reflected in [Traherne'si passion for the infinite, in the joy
and wonder evoked by the prospect of a plurality of worlds or the
anatomical perfection of the human body: it is also secretly
responsible for a utilitarian emphasis, transfigured yet discernable
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in the mystic's doctrine of felicity". It may be noted that,
despite his use of scientific imagery, and Ellrodt's emphasis on
a utilitarian aspect to Felicity, Traherne remains a "mystic".
Science and the imagery associated with it was central to
Marjorie Hope Nicolson's remarks on Traherne in The Breaking of
the Circle (1950), one of a number of general studies making some
ej±
illuminating comment on Traherne.-' "We know now that Traherne was
deeply affected by the discoveries of the new science and the
implications of the new philosophy. When he saw eternity in a
grain of sand, he was speaking not only mystically but
microscopically".^ Nicolson does not say exactly how "We know"
that Traherne was "deeply affected" by the "new science" and
"new philosophy" but she makes an initial attempt to demolish
some of the traditional barriers between seventeenth century
"literary" and "scientific" writing: "The greatest exponents of
aspiration were scientists who, in prefaces and conclusions to
their scientific works, spoke a language as enthusiastic as
Traheme's".^ She particularly mentions Henry Power in this
context. Again, although Traheme speaks "microscopically" about
the grain of sand he is also said to speak "mystically".
In another general study of seventeenth century literature,
Rosalie Golie considered a particular aspect of contemporary
science in relation to Traherne: "the idea of infinity informs
his style, his psychology, his cosmology, his metaphysics, and
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his theology". For Golie, Traherne found that Renaissance
Platonism (represented, she says, by Ficino and Pico della
Mirandola) was ultimately inadequate to Traherne's own vision
and his personal synthesis of theology and metaphysics. In
contemporary platonism and science, however, she sees
correspondence with Traherne's own view: "For Traherne infinite
cosmological space demonstrated by the new astronomy offered a
CO
proper habitation for a God long recognized as infinite".
"Traheme found that the old images of a contained infinity, the
sphere, the circle, the globe, and the ring, would not do: his
concept of infinity forced itself beyond the 'circle of perfection'
CO
to communicate to men the idea of a limitlessly abundant Deity".~^
Colie also offers a brief consideration of the essential features
of Traherne's style. She well defines the spontaneous,
enthusiastic and often-repeated sense of understanding and
assurance that issues from the outgoing and overflowing prose:
Traherne, she says, "has caught the full and filling plenitude
of things . . . [in^] . . . the very process of writing, in which
the true meaning of all things is revealed as revealing itself".^
Also among general studies of contemporary literature should be
mentioned Maren-Sofie R^stvig's The Happy Man (195^0She too
emphasizes the dominance of Platonic ideas in Traherne's notion
of Felicity and speaks of the Platonic purification of sensory
experience that overlays Traherne's attitude to life and the world.
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While the most recent studies of Traherne reveal an increase
in the amount of criticism being produced, little new ground has
been covered. Perhaps the most detailed study of Traherne's ideas
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and thought is an unpublished dissertation by Brian Connolly.
Basing his study on an aphorism in Christian Ethicks — "Knowledge
and Love are so necessary to Felicity, that there can be no
Enjoyment or Delight without them" (CE 36) — Connolly does not
hesitate to portray Traherne as a philosopher, and suggests that
"Knowledge" and "Love", two essential aspects of the ultimate good,
Felicity, are philosophically and rationally conceived: "with the
curiosity of a psychologist fTrahernel explores the nature and
degrees of knowledge", for "an intellectualist like Traherne never
ignored the fact that all love has its roots in cognition". ^ From
the intellectual and psychological exploration of knowledge and
love Connolly suggests that Traherne can be said to have evolved
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a "theory of knowledge" that is "greatly original". He concludes,
however, that while this theory of knowledge is more than "a mosaic
of philosophical reminiscences", it cannot be seen as "a
systematized philosophy".^
The first of the two most recent studies of Traherne is
contained in a survey of seventeenth century prose by Joan Webber,
The Eloquent 'I' (1968).^ She finds in the Centuries "the writer's
crucial and unremitting awareness that he is the subject of his own
6*7
prose". Traherne is, for Webber, a complete man and thinker: "his
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mind is originally philosophical, his conclusions self-tried".
She suggests that he recognizes in all existence a sense of
discontinuity, and that he takes upon himself the task of overcoming
this. Webber claims that in his prose "I", "you", "thou" and "he"
all represent a divided humanity which strives to achieve unity
with God. This striving is reflected, she suggests, in Traherne's
autobiographical account of his own progress from isolation to
communion. In his prose he seeks to overcome the fragmentary and
discontinuous nature of all things by endowing them with meaning
and reality and sustaining them in his own mind, seeing them as
aspects of the unified wholeness towards which he strives.
Ultimately the prose achieves a unity: "I", "you", "thou" and "he"
all becoming one. The characteristically highly charged, effusive
and out-going prose of Traherne is seen by Webber to seek an
"interpenetration of meaning" that will lead to all things
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achieving rest in communion and oneness. In the energetic process
necessary to this, however, Webber suggests that Traherne in his
70
writing is "better described as overflowing than as meditating".
"He belongs", however, "with the earlier Anglican writers,
stylistically, in his whole emotional outlook, and in his basic
71beliefs"/
Stanley Stewart's full length study of all Traherne's writings,
The Expanded Voice (1970),^ also concerns itself with what Stewart
calls Traherne's "strategies" of authorship — in the Centuries, an
authorship which is in a sense shared with Susanna Hopton, he
suggests. Stewart treats the Centuries as autobiography, comparing
Traherne's method with that of Pepys, Evelyn and the fictional
Tristram Shandy, pointing the "literary" nature of the Centuries
by showing that the writing is determined by Traherne's own
"Apprehensions" and his generalisations of his own life rather than
by the desire for factual narrative: he speaks of "Adam in
Paradice" (C III.l) rather than his own father, for example.
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Traherne's identity is said by Stewart to be permeated and
extended and his style to be in contrast to that of diarists
recording a univocal single life. Further, Traherne's autobiography
is, in the Centuries, dispersed and allegorical: "The sphere of the
speaker's being is always expanding, as times and places are
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swallowed up by eternity and the infinite". ^ Stewart's study
of the poems extends John Wallace's theory that the poems of the
"Dobell Folio" are arranged in sequence as a Jesuit meditation:
Stewart applies a similar analysis to the Burney manuscript of the
Poems of Felicity, based on the assumption that there is again
a particular structural intention behind the order in which the
poems appear in the manuscript. He also sees the poems as a reply
to and reaction against the "metaphysical school" and quotes "The
Author to the Critical Peruser" (M II.2-3) as evidence for his
view. Stewart also offers an answer to the many critics who have
supported Margaret Bottrall's observation that Traherne has "a
strong tendency to offer a list of objects or epithets rather than
7L\.
a distinctive impression" in his poems. Stewart compares this
tendency with a Renaissance rhetorical figure, "Sinathrismus",
"the heaping figure", in which, according to Puttenham, the
writer is motivated to "go it by heapes as if [^he^ would winne the
game by multitude of words and speeches, not all of one but of
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divers matter and sence". This, for Stewart, is part of the
syntactical shifting and dislocation that characterizes the prose
of the Centuries and is part of Traherne's method of undermining
verbal boudaries in seeking some utterance that is really beyond
words.
Three other recent studies of Traherne restrict themselves to
particular aspects of the writing, and all, as is indicated by
their titles, emphasize the importance of mystical thought and
awareness in the work. These are A. L. Clements' The Mystical
Poetry of Thomas Traherne (1969); A. J. Sherrington's Mystical
Symbolism in the Poetry of Thomas Traherne (19?0); and R. D.
Jordan's The Temple of Eternity (1970). In contrast, the main
impulse of Carol Marks' work on Traherne has been factual and
bibliographical. Apart from a speculative article on "Thomas
rprp
Traherne and Cambridge Platonism" (1966) her publications have
been wholly bibliographical or editorial. In her co-operation with
George Guffey on the extensive critical apparatus of the first
modern scholarly edition of Christian Ethicks (1968) she has
established a new and more objective basis for consideration of
?o
Traherne. Recent studies, however, show little inclination to
accept this basis or to pursue the numerous avenues of research
that Marks' work suggests. This edition of Christian Ethicks
and Marks' bibliographical analyses of the unpublished manuscript
notebooks, which appeared in Papers of the Bibliographical Society
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of America between 1964 and 1969. suggest possibilities for the
recognition of Traherne as a major writer of the Restoration period,
a writer no longer isolated from the contemporary intellectual
milieu. He is in fact unique in that the majority of his writings
survive in manuscript, together with a substantial body of
unpublished manuscript notebooks: this is true of no other
comparable seventeenth century writer. Both writings and notebooks
can be regarded as essential reflections not only of Traherne's
own mind but of the age in which he lived. It is from this
substantial material that a more thorough and coherent portrait
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of Traherne's life and work may be drawn. Whether his work is
Augustinian (Martz) or Platonic (Cox), "a re-affirmation of the
old integrated world picture" (Sandbank) or a reflection of "the
spirit of the new age" (Ellrodt) — or whether it adheres, more
or less, to any other of the many critical paradoxes his work has
inspired — there does exist a large body of material for a more
empirical study of Traherne. It is on the particular and peculiar-
unity of text and context — of original work and notebook material
and the specific historical circumstances from which they issue —
that this study may be based.
3. Text and context, 1653-167^
Very little, then, is known of Traherne's life in any
straightforward biographical sense. He was born, probably in
Hereford, in 1637, and matriculated at Brasenose College in 1653*
He gained the Oxford degrees of B.A. (1656), M.A. (l66l) and B.D.
(1669). He was appointed Rector of the village of Credenhill in
Herefordshire both under the Commonwealth (in 1657) and under the
restored monarchy (in 1661). In I669 he became Chaplain to Sir
Orlando Bridgeman, Charles II's Lord Keeper of the Seal. Until
his death in 167^ he lived either at Essex House in the Strand,
Bridgeman's London mansion, or at the Bridgeman home at nearby
Teddington. He was buried in Teddington in October 167^.
As Carol Marks' work in the 1960's showed, however, Traherne's
written remains are extensive and of unique interest. It is
remarkable that so few critics have made thorough use of the wealth
of material available. This thesis seeks a comprehensive view of
Traherne and his writing through contextural analysis and discussion
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of three major prose texts — the Select Meditations, Centuries of
Meditations and Christian Ethicks — and of two substantial
unpublished notebooks — the Early Notebook and Commonplace Book.
The aim is to establish the credibility of the three prose works
as major and integral contributions to Restoration writing and to
contemporary apprehension of "the true Estate of this World" (C IV.20),
of the particular historical world in which Traherne lived and wrote.
It is an assumption implicit in the thesis that writing is, in some
form and at whatever apparent distance, a way of looking at and
relating to a known human world shared with other people. It is an
opening onto historically shared experience, onto all the activity,
the whole life and thought, doubts, assumptions and beliefs, of real
people in specific places at particular times.
The essential features of the suggested reading of Traherne's
work are threefold. Vital to all aspects of this is the idea that
Traherne may have fully deserved the title of "Philosopher" that he
claimed for himself (C IV.3) and that his "Divine Philosophy" (C_ IV.3)
is a real philosophy, with direct bearing upon "the true Estate of
this World". In one notebook he writes of the "Sweet Methods of
Meditation" (CYB 75V), but elsewhere he asserts that "There is a
Glory in the Work which the silent Habit is uncapable of" (CE 191) !
his writing, like his "Thoughts", must "expaciate without Limit or
Restraint" (C V.2) over "All Things", the "Objects of Felicity"
(C II.IOO). He was "a concerned person in all Transactions . . . ever
present with all Affairs" (£ IV.69). If he does "Contemn the World"
(£ 1.7) it is crucial that "there are two Worlds" (C 1.7) ! one, "a
Prison" (£ I.36), to be condemned, the other "a very Paradice"
(C 1.20) "made to be Enjoyed" (C 1.10), in which "We should be all
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Life and Mettle and Vigor and Lov to evry Thing" (£ 11.68). The
"two Worlds" can be seen not as two separate worlds, but simply
as two ways of looking at the one real world: "the World is both
a Paradice ana a Frison to different Persons" (C_ I.36). The world
is "Enjoyed" by "Meditation" (C_1.8), but "Meditation" is only
"thinking Well" (C 1.8): it is all the complexity and "Difficulty
of thinking Well" (C 1.8) that Traherne's writing demonstrates,
questions and finally celebrates in the realisation, through
"Enjoyment of the World" (C 1.25)» that the world is "a very
Paradice" and that it is in this paradise that man may achieve
Felicity.
It is also important to recall Traherne's genuine historical
situation. It is, in large part at least, consideration of his
poetry as a manifestation of the metaphysical or meditative manner
that has obscured this. Both Donne (1572-1631) and Herbert (1593-
1633)» tor example, died before Traherne was born; they belong,
almost, to another world. All of Traherne's original writing dates
from after the national experience of revolution and restoration:
the regicide of 1649 and the return of Charles II in 1660 are
indices, if limited ones, of the changes that took place in
England during Traherne's early life. Hobbes (1588-1679), Milton
(1608-1674), Marvell (1621-1678) and Vaughan (1622-1695) survived
as Traherne's older contemporaries — Leviathan (I65I) was published
just before he went up to Oxford — while Traherne is more truly a
contemporary of Boyle (1627-1691), Dryden (1631-1700), Locke (1631 —
1704), Pepys (1633-1703), Stherege (16347-1691?), Kooke (1635-1703),
Sprat (1635-1713), Wycherley (1640-1716), Newton (1642-1727) and
Rochester (1648-1680). "No reader of the 'Select Meditations'
could ever conceive of calling this author a 'poet of felicity'"."
No: "but so easy a phrase dies hard. If it seems difficult to
reconcile Traherne's "Divine Philosophy" with the world of Hobbes
and Rochester, for example, a quotation from Rochester's "A Satyr
against Reason and Mankind" (c.l675) might help. Rochester imagines
himself berated by "some formal band and beard", a clergyman, thus:
What rage ferments in your degenerate mind
To make you rail at reason and mankind?
Blest, glorious man! to whom alone kind heaven
An everlasting soul has freely given,
Whom his great Maker took such care to make
That from himself he did the image take
And this fair frame in shining reason dressed
To dignify his nature above beast;
Reason, by whose aspiring influence
We take a flight beyond material sense,
Dive into mysteries, then soaring pierce
The flaming limits of the universe,
Search heaven and hell, find out what's acted there
And give the world true grounds of hope and fear.^
The clergyman celebrates a "supernatural gift, that makes a mite /
Think he's the image of the infinite": "each heavy sot can pierce /
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The limits of the boundless universe". There could be no more
thorough recognition of the real contemporary presence of clerics
espousing a "Divine Philosophy" clearly very thoroughly analogous
to Traherne's own. There are, Rochester says, "modern cloistered
coxcombs who / Retire to think, 'cause they have nought else to
Qo
do". Is Traherne among these? To the idea of cloistered
retirement Rochester opposes precisely that concept of philosophical
action that Traherne also emphasized when he said that "Philosophers
are not those that speak, but Do great things" (C IV.2): "thoughts
are given for action's government; / Where action ceases, thought's
O J.
impertinent. / Our sphere of action is life's happiness"." Other
contemporaries — Robert Boyle, for example — sought an attitude
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to "Blest, glorious man!" and his life in the world very similar
to that of both 'Traherne and Rochester's cleric. If Traheme was
a "cloistered coxcomb" a good many contemporaries — "scientists"
among them —shared this retirement.
"Your reason hinders, mine helps to enjoy", Rochester says
O r
to his imaginary cleric. D "Enjoyment" is an important word for
Traherne. In Milton's Paradise Lost (1667; revised edition 167*0,
Michael says to Adam:
thou hast attaind the summe
Of wisdome; hope no higher, though all the Starrs
Thou knewst by name, and all th'ethereal Powers,
All secrets of the deep, all Natures works,
Or works of God in Heav'n, Aire, Earth, or Sea,
And all the riches of this World enjoydst,®°
this will be of little profit without "Deeds to thy knowledge
answerable".®''' With these, and with "Faith, . . . vertue, Patience,
Temperance, . . . [and-! . . . Love, By name to come call'd
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Charitie", Adam will possess "A paradise within . . . happier
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farr": he should therefore descend from the "top of Speculation".
Adam should renounce "enjoyment" of "all the riches of this world"
in favour of a "paradise within". For Traherne, in contrast, it is
precisely by "Enjoyment of the World" (C 1.25) that Felicity will
be achieved: it is "this World" that is his "Paradice" (C IV.20, 1.20).
"The Articles of our faith are the objects of Enjoyment proposed to
Speculation" (SM 111.58). "By studying felicity we are brought to the
Delineation of God's kingdom" (SM III.9), so man must "enjoy this
Adspectable world" (SM III.9) to the full. It is thus that, by
"Right Reason", man will "discover all the Mysteries of heaven"
(C IV.81). Traherne celebrates the "top Of Speculation" rather than
the "paradise within" and, through the discoveries of "Right Reason",
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seeks to establish man's Felicity, the full realisation of his
"Activ" and. "Contemplativ" "Happiness" (C IV.l), by "Enjoyment
of the World". For Traherne, as for Rochester, "Cur sphere of
action is life's happiness".
Firstly, then, it can be shown that Traherne, and his
"Divine Philosophy", was "concerned in all the World" (C III.23).
"This Life is the most precious Season in all Eternity" (£ IV.93).
Felicity demands "Activ" as well as "Contemplativ" "Happiness"
(C IV.l): the philosopher must act, philosophy must help men in
all their activity. Felicity is "perfect Life", the perfection of
man's whole existence and living practice, the thorough exercise
of his whole Capacity. As the ideal of a whole philosophy
Felicity is a guide to both active and contemplative happiness in
"the true Estate of this World": both a real and viable moral ideal
based on virtue and reason and a reflection of a reaction to "the
true Estate of this World".
Secondly, the extent of Traherne's intellectual achievement
and ambition should be realised. "Knowledge" (C III.42), "the
Learning of all Universities" (C 1.54), is essential to Felicity.
Traheme's own learning was extensive: it permeates all his
writing and is particularly evident in his notebooks. The
Commonplace Book, for example, demonstrates his acquaintance with
the work of Aristarchus, Aristotle, Bacon, Boyle, Brahe, Copernicus,
Democritus, Echphantus, Epicurus, Galileo, Kepler, Leucippus,
Parmenides, Plato, Pythagoras, Xenophanes and Zeno among many others,
and is alone indicative of only one aspect of his intellectual
accomplishment. The concise Roman Forgeries shows how Traherne
found his way through what Milton called "the Labyrinth of Councels
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and Fathers". "I saw that Logick, Ethicks, Fhysicks, Metaphysicks,
Geometry, Astronomy, Poesie, Medicine, Grammer, Kusick, Rhetorick,
all kind of Arts Trades and Mechanismes that Adorned the World
pertained to felicity" (C III.36). Traherne's intellectual
Capacity is immense and brought fully to bear in all his writing.
Thirdly, Traheme was particularly interested in "Natural
Philosophy" (C III.44). This "Noble Science, as such is most
Sublime and Perfect, it includes all Humanity and Divinity
together ... it is Nobly Subservient to the Highest Ends: for
it Openeth the Riches of Gods Kingdom . . . Clearing and preparing
the Ey of the Enjoyer" (C III.44). Natural philosophy is connected
with Traherne's important notion of "Enjoyment of the World" (£ 1.25),
the thorough knowledge and appreciation of God's creation necessary
to man's adequate praise and thanksgiving for it. His explicit
comments on natural philosophy and "Enjoyment of the World" are
complemented by his use of imagery that reflects the contemporary
interests of natural philosophers — infinity and space, astronomy,
telescopy, microscopy, motion, light, colours, anatomy — and his
celebration of the "Real Valuableness in all the Common Things"
(c III.53) in both practical and metaphysical senses.
The thesis suggests, then, that Traherne's achievement in his
writing, which is intellectually highly accomplished, seeks
philosophical application to, and traces a conscious relation to,
"the true Estate of this World", can be appreciated in terms of
his stress on activity and practice in a real life; his intellectual
ambition and search for knowledge; and his contemporary interest in
natural philosophy.
The historical context is decisive. Traherne's life was lived
in real places and among real people, at a specific time: at
Oxford in the 1650*s, in London between 1669 and 16?U. He sought
"Knowledge" in terms recognised in his own time. Natural philosophy
was a major contemporary interest: John Wilkins' experimental
philosophy club met in Oxford in the 1650's and the Royal Society
was founded and flourished in Restoration London. The unity of
the texts — Traherne's writing — and contexts — his life and
the historical circumstance from which the writing issues and to
which it relates — is crucial.
Part One of the thesis examines this context. Traherne's
life is outlined in close relation to the production of his
writing. In particular, two periods are isolated for extended
consideration: Oxford in the 1650's in Chapter Two, London from
the late 1660's until 16?^ in Chapter Four. It is assumed that,
defined thus by specific and local time and place, everything that
happened within these terms may be relevant to Traherne's life and
work. More particular relevance is assessed by referring the
context to Traherne's life and known associates (his patron
Bridgeman is especially important here), or to the major
surviving evidence of the texts themselves. As text and context
are measured each against the other in this way a more thorough
understanding of both, and of their interrelations, will become
possible. Given this method, emphasis is placed on particular
points where text and context coincide with unusual thoroughness:
thus Chapter Five, effectively a continuation of the preceding
chapter and very much a part of its attempt to portray the London
known to Traherne, discusses the relation between Traherne's
"Divine Philosophy" and the "Natural Philosophy" of members of the
Royal Society working in London while Traherne was resident
there.
Part Two of the thesis comprises only one chapter. Here
text and context merge still more closely. In the Early Notebook
and Commonplace Book Traherne noted and reacted to contemporary
or near-contemporary works — by Bacon, Gale or Barrow, for
example — and works enjoying a high contemporary reputation —
particularly Platonic and Hermetic writings. Some of the quotations
copied into the notebooks found their way directly into Traherne's
other writing: the quotations from the Hermetic Divine Pymander in
Christian Ethicks, for example (CE 225 ff.). These quotations and
their sources are discussed in relation to Traherne's writing as
a whole in Chapter Six.
In the third and final part of the thesis, Chapters Seven,
Eight and Nine conduct a reading of, respectively, the Select
Meditations, Centuries of Meditations and Christian Ethicks. This
"reading" is offered after the contextural analysis, with little
direct reference to it. This apparent isolation — really an
affirmation of the organic unity of text and context — is
intended to preserve the self-sufficient integrity of the literary
text, both as writing and as itself a real object. The text can be
posed questions about itself, from within, and in this interrogation
the reality of the text itself as a historical object becomes
apparent. Finally, the contextural material is secondary to and
subsumed within the primary authority and integrity of the text
itself. The analysis can only be historical; the text comes from
within history, is within history. The texts are presented here,
then, for reading, a reading that should of necessity embrace at
least some of the material offered in the first two parts of the
thesis. There "is no conception in a man's mind, which hath not at
first, totally, or by parts, been begotten upon the organs of
Sense". The actual influence of "the motion of externall things"
in the filling and fulfilling of "Empty Book" and "Infants Soul"
is infinitely complex and highly elusive. Not to attempt to trace
this is, however, either to adopt the critical presumption of
"native Inscriptions" — the empty and inhuman triumph of anagogic
and transhistorical abstraction — or to leave the "Cabinet" of the
mind entirely unfurnished. "Things unknown have a Secret Influence
on the Soul" (C 1.2) and, "following the clew of Nature into this
Labyrinth" (C III.70), a reading of text and context may suggest
that while "evry Thing allures us" (C 1.2) in its possible
relation to Traherne, there are yet, within the "Labyrinth" itself,
"Invisible Ways of Conveyance by which some Great Thing doth touch
our Souls, and by which we tend to it" (C 1.2). That "Great Thing"
may yet be a thorough sense of the meaning of Traherne's life and
work in relation to "the motion of externall things", in relation




1. Traherne at Oxford, 1653 - ?
CO
Traherne was admitted to Brasenose College on 1 March 16^ and.
matriculated on 2 April 1653• The College Register states that he
was then fifteen years of age.^" He graduated as a Bachelor of Arts
on 13 October 1656 and then, according to Anthony Wood, "left the
2
house for a time" and "entred into the sacred function". This
refers to his ordination and appointment as Rector of the village of
Credenhill in Herefordshire in 1657. On 6 November 1661, however,
Traherne became a Master of Arts and, although Wood says that he was
"created master of arts" (my italics), the Decree permitting him to
take the degree, passed at a meeting of Convocation on 12 September
1661, makes no reference to any failure on his part to fulfil
conditions of residence or to complete required exercises.
Margoliouth observes that "it is highly improbable that none of the
required residence had been kept" (M I.xxxvi, note). So, despite his
appointment as Rector of Credenhill in 1657, when he would seem to
be rather young actually to assume such a position, it is possible
that after graduating as a Bachelor of Arts Traherne left Oxford
"for a time" as Wood says but then returned and remained there for
an undefined period, perhaps until he received the degree of Master
of Arts in 1661 or even later. He was in fact re-appointed to the
Rectorship of Credenhill after the Restoration, in 1661. The first
evidence of his actually being in residence at Credenhill, however,
O
is his signature on transcripts of the parish registers for 1664.
Also in 1664 Brasenose College, then building a chapel, cloister and
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library, acknowledged a gift of "viginti solidos" (£l) from
"Thomas Traherne Rector de Credenhill"By 1664, then, it can be
assumed that Traherne was living at Credenhill, but as regards the
years I656-I664 there must remain considerable doubt.
The Early Notebook, which contains some of Traherne's
undergraduate notes, cannot be attributed wholly to what may be
called the proven period of residence in Oxford (1653-I656).
Traherne was to receive the degree of Bachelor of Divinity in 1669,
and he published Roman Forgeries in 1673- Some of the research for
that book was done in the Bodleian Library (RE, "An Advertisement to
the Reader") and Margoliouth observes that it has "a distinct smell
of the thesis" (M I.xxxviii), suggesting that it represents, in part
at least, work for which Traherne received his B.D. degree. Taking
into account the fact that he received the degree of Master of Arts
in 1661 and cannot be traced as resident at Gredenhill until 1664,
it may reasonably be assumed that Traherne continued his studies at
Oxford for some time between I656 and 1664. It might, for example,
be proposed that he took the degree of B.A., a three year course
(1653-I656), left Oxford "for a time" (say I656-I657) and then
returned to take the four year M.A. course (1657-1661), possibly
<U>
even then remaining in Oxford to 4e research for his B.D. degree and
Roman Forgeries. This is conjecture. However, his M.A. and B.D.
degrees, his gift to Brasenose and particularly his extended studies,
some of which involved work in the Bodleian Library, may well
indicate a connection with Oxford continued at least beyond the
three years' residence required for the B.A. degree.
The dates of Traherne's matriculation and graduation constitute
virtually all the extant information relating to his career at
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Oxford. The Brasenose College Register records that his status was
that of a Commoner, and Margoliouth has traced some scattered
references in the now incomplete series of the Brasenose Buttery
Books (M I.xxiv). In Roman Forgeries Traheme includes a brief
incidental reminiscence from his days at Oxford. He tells how, "One
evening", as he "came out of the Bodleian Library, which is the
Glory of Oxford, and this Nation" he was introduced to "a Grave
Person ... a man that had spent many thousand pounds in
promoting Popery": "The Gentleman came up to us of his own accord.
We agreed, for the greater liberty and privacy, to walk abroad into
the New-Parks". Traheme offered to meet this "Grave Person" outside
the Bodleian on the next day and to take him into the library and
demonstrate to him that the works he accepts as "good Records" of
the Roman Catholic religion are "down right frauds and forgeries".
He refused to come, saying that it did not matter to the Church of
Rome if the records were forgeries. Traheme was outraged: "I
turned from him as an obdurate person" (RF, "An Advertisement to the
Reader"). This passage has little other than anecdotal value
(although, if Traherne was not at Oxford after 1656, it might suggest
a certain precosity in a scholar of nineteen) but, as can be seen
from passages in Traherne's later writings, his career at Oxford was
important to him. Roman Forgeries itself has been seen as evidence
for "the intellectual quality ... of Traherne".^ It is in part
through Traherne's Oxford education that something of this
"intellectual quality" may be appreciated.
The most significant contemporary source for information about
Traherne's career at Oxford is his own Early Notebook. Margoliouth
called this "Philip Traherne's Notebook", although he recognised
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that most of the writing was that of Thomas (M I.xx-xxii). He
did not however identify the source of the major section (EN 69-170)
of "Miscellaneous quoatations, notes, etc., by Thomas" (M I.xx).
Carol Marks has suggested the new title for the manuscript, and
claims that rather more of the notes are by Thomas, although
5
acknowledging that the notebook originally belonged to Philip.
There seems no reason to doubt her conclusion that Philip's entries
end on Page Five. After a clear break at that point changes in the
handwriting, one of which is an important clue to the dating of
the manuscript, can be accounted for by the long period of time
during which Traherne seems to have used the notebook. There are
39^+ pages (numbered i-vi and 1-388), Page iii bearing Philip
Traherne's claim to ownership: "Philip Traherne is the true owner
of this booke Amen Anno Domini 1655"• Thomas Traherne's notes begin
on Page 7» and there are two main groups of notes in the manuscript.
Firstly, those between Pages 7 and 55» which date from circa 1655—
I656, and secondly those between Pages 69 and 170 which are of
uncertain date but probably immediately followed the first group
and extended over several years. Miscellaneous entries were made in
the notebook until the early 1660's. In the first group of notes
Traherne uses a secretary "r", but in the second both secretary
and italic "r" occur concurrently. In all later manuscripts Traherne
7
was to use italic "r" exclusively. It seems then that Traherne made
use of the Early Notebook as an undergraduate at Oxford between 1655
and 1656, having acquired it from his brother who had claimed it as
his in 1655» and then continued to use it after his graduation as a
Bachelor of Arts, probably with decreasing frequency until the last
entries were made in the early 1660's.
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The first significant notes in the Early Notebook, dating
probably from 1655-I656, 3X6 recognisable as part of Traherne's
undergraduate work. The writing is neat and careful, and Latin the
language throughout. The notes are of limited intrinsic interest,
partly because of their brevity, but do provide a glimpse of some
of the material Traheme studied at Oxford. Page 7 bears the title
"Totius Moralis Philosophiae Perfecta Epitome et concisa per
Quaestiones et responsiones Tradita". The notes in this section
extend to Page 21. They follow the Ethica of Eustachius (Eustache
de Saint Paul, 1573-1640), the first English edition of which was
published in Cambridge in 1654-. The notes are organised in question
and answer form, some of the answers being taken from other
unidentified sources. Traheme studied what was, in an English
edition at least, a recent book, one which maintained some currency
throughout the seventeenth century — in 1661 a student at Trinity
College, Cambridge, Isaac Newton, included among his notes some
0
"Annotationes ex Eustachii Ethic.". Eustachius was "a true
scholastic" (CE xxi) and Traherne's epitome reflects a "simplified
Aristotelianism of the kind purveyed in elementary textbooks"
(CE xxi). The main aim of these brief notes seems to have been to
provide an abstract of basic traditional ethical thought at
undergraduate level. The notes themselves indicate little positive
response to Eustachius * text. Traheme was later to remark that he
had no wish to "treat of Vertues in the ordinary way" (CE 3)•
On Page 22 of the Early Notebook begins Traheme's "Epitome
Geometria", which runs to Page 32. This follows a textbook on
geometry, probably that of Ramus (Pierre de La Ramee, 1515-1572)
first published in 1569. The statutes of Oxford would require
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that Traherne attend the geometry lectures of the Savilian
Professor, John Wallis. Wallis' Mathesls Universalis, published
in 1657 and said to derive in part from his lectures, adopts a
more modern approach than Ramus' ninety year old work, but this
may still have been considered adequate for undergraduate use. The
notes again seem to fulfil a basic educational requirement. Sight
pages of historical notes complete this first section of the Early
Notebook and also have a somewhat perfunctory aspect. These are
from Justin's third century epitome of the Historiae Philippicae
et Totius Mundi Qrigines et Terrae Situs by Pompeius Trogus
(fl. c.10 B.C.), a historical text used throughout the middle ages
and still regarded in the 1650's as a convenient if not entirely
accurate text of classical history.
The first section of notes in the Early Notebook, then, can
be dated circa 1655-1656 and probably constitute part of Traherne's
undergraduate notes on ethics, geometry and history. A consideration
of aspects of Oxford education at this time will attempt to provide
a perspective for this part of Traherne's experience. Firstly,
however, an examination of the Early Notebook may conclude with an
account of the longest and most interesting section. The
undergraduate notes are followed by several blank pages (EN 58-68).
Then begins a series of more than 100 pages (EN 69-170), including
some blank pages, of closely written notes in Latin. Page 71 bears




Ex Lib: De Augmentis Scientiarum
Excerptae.
Just before and/or soon after taking his B.A. degree, and for some
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time following, Traherne copied into the Early Notebook an
extensive selection of quotations, the large majority from Francis
Bacon's De Augmentis Scientiarum (1623). There are scattered short
references to some other works by Bacon — to the Essays, for
example. The De Augmentis, a much enlarged version of the
Advancement of Learning (1605), was intended by Bacon to constitute
the survey of existing knowledge that was to be included in his
"Great Instauration", the renovation and reconstruction of all
learning and science that was to supercede the work of Aristotle,
to whom scholastic traditions traced their ancestry. There are nine
books to the De Augmentis. Book One is an almost direct Latin
translation of Book One of the Advancement of Learning, while Books
Two to Nine represent a greatly expanded version of the remainder
of that work. Traherne's notes concentrate on Book One, which deals
with current "vanities" of learning (notably those of the scholastic
traditions) and, to a lesser extent, on Books Two to Three. Notes
from the other books are more sparing and, in the case of Books
9
Seven and Eight, non-existent. There are two prominent groups of
blank pages in this part of the manuscript (EN 77-85, 104-113), but
in view of the sections of Bacon's text that these would account
for there is a case for assuming that Traherne intended to return
to these later
"Flores Elegantissimae" is a neat characterisation of the
notes, and might incidentally be seen, together with the carefully
designed title page itself, to indicate on Traheme's part a more
appreciative attitude to Bacon, to whose work he devotes 100 pages
of the notebook, than to those works from which he extracted the
concise "epitomes" (EN 7, 22) that occupy the earlier 50 pages.
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Traheme copied the mainly "brief extracts from Bacon's work
straightforwardly and, as it were, aphoristically, seeking to
encapsulate in a short phrase something of what he perhaps
perceived as Bacon's moral wisdom. For example:
of Time
Tempus simile est Fluvio, qui in levia et inflata
ad nos evehit; solida autem et pondus habentia
submergit.
(EN 101; WFB 1.460).
Humility in learning a pretious Jewell.
I hold that of L. Bacon a solid Resolution:
Equidem libenter aeque acceperim, ab alijs, ac
ipse impertiverim.
(H3t 118; WFB 1.492).
Interesting considerations in relation to his later works are
raised by the fact of Traherne's having read De Augmentis, and a
more speculative discussion is attempted elsewhere (see Chapter
6 below). Here the concern is more immediately with Traherne's
experience at Oxford.
2. Oxford education in the 1650's
Oxford had played a prominent part in the upheavals of the
1640's and remained something of a Royalist stronghold during the
Civil Wars. Puritan scholaxs, seen by some modem historians as
of special significance in any consideration of interregnum
education, tended to be attracted to Cambridge. After Oxford had
surrendered to Parliament on 24 June 1646, however, Oxford itself
needed to attract scholars, often the earlier disaffected Puritans,
to fill the places made vacant by 370 ejections from senior
positions. The Cromwellian visitation of 1648 effected a
considerable but not a thorough change of personnel, while formal
academic pursuits, and especially undergraduate teaching, retained
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a traditional character. Normal functioning was largely restored
by 1649. The notes of Traherne's contemporaries at Oxford differ
little from those of students of the preceding decades. Scholastic
texts and commentaries on Aristotle and Aquinas continued to
feature in the curriculum: the notes of Benjamin Gostlette and
Henry Parker at Christ Church evince a typical Aristotelian
emphasis, while Aquinas and the scholastic Fonseca and Suarez
figure in the notes of Nicholas Floyd at Wadham and John Hearne
at Exeter College.^* Hearne matriculated in 1653, so was an exact
contemporary of Traherne at Oxford. His notes record his study of
Christoph Scheibler's Metaphysica, a work edited in 1637 by
Thomas Barlow, Bodley's Librarian (1652-1660) and Provost of
Queen's College from 1657. Scheibler's Metaphysica is included
among the works recommended by "an English Scholar-Priest"
working in Oxford in about 1655 as necessary to a form a "library
12
for younger schollers". The "Scholar-Priest" may well have been
13
Thomas Barlow. At some time during his acquaintance with Oxford
Traheme was to know Barlow personally. He tells in Roman Forgeries
how he found copies of a rare book containing work attributed to
Isidore of Sevile: "The Booksellers'-Shops afforded me none: but at
last I met with two of them; the one with the Learned Dr. Barlow,
Margaret Professor, and Provost of Queen's Colledge, the other in
the Bodleian Library" (RF 90).*^ Barlow did not become Lady
Margaret Professor until 1660 so, although this anecdote cannot be
dated precisely, it would seem to suggest that Traherne at least
visited Oxford after 1660.
Barlow's design for the library is "almost exclusively ... in
the old style",^ but it is representative of attitudes to education
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that retained formal approval in Oxford at this time. It is from
within the traditions embodied in Barlow's library that Traherne
would have received his formal education, and his extant notes on
ethics, geometry and history in the first section of the Early
Notebook show his acquaintance with the methods and material
suggested by Barlow. "Ethicks, or Morall Philosophie",
"Mathematicks" and "Historians", as in Traherne's notes, are three
of the main headings under which books are recommended. These
should be complemented, Barlow suggests, by study of "Logique",
"Physicks, or Natural Philosophie (after Aristotle)", "Metaphysicks"
and "Chronologie", and of "Oratores" and "Poets". "Divinity" is
reserved for a long and separate section. Typically, Aristotle is
assumed to have formulated the basis for all secular knowledge.
Barlow would teach "Logique", for example, through commentaries on
Aristotle's Organon by Rubius or Smiglecius, or through works by
16
Scheibler or Zabarella. "Physicks, or Natural Philosophy" should
be studied in terms defined "(after Aristotle)": Barlow recommends
17
works by Duns Scotus, Pererius and Rubius.
In the early 1660's Traherne, looking back to his education at
Oxford, remarked that in "the scholes" he had "heard them dispute
De ente De forma materiali, D^e^ Quid-ditate, and such like Drie
and Empty Theames" (SM III.30). At Cambridge in the l620's John
Milton had already expressed dissatisfaction with the emphasis on
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scholastic pursuits, and in the attack on the "contentious
learning" of scholastic philosophy in Bacon's De Augmentis, read
by Traherne in the 1650's, the "laborious webs of learning" of the
Schoolmen were seen to be spun out in monastic isolation from
experience and knowledge of history or nature under the dominant
influence of "Aristotle their dictator" (WFB 111.285-86). There
is evidence for a tendency among certain commentators in the 1650's
to regard the traditions of scholastic education and disputation,
such as those embodied in Barlow's recommendations, as no more than
"Drie and Empty Theames". While the traditions of the Schoolmen
continued within formal education Bacon's suggestion that "the
contemplation of the creatures of God" (WFB III.286) might more
profitably occupy scholars was taken up by men who identified Bacon
and his "Great Instauration" as a model for the establishment of a
knowledge (or "science", perhaps, in the sense of the German
"Wissenschaft") based on experience, on direct observation and/or
practical application and experiment. Traditional learning
maintained that the works of Aristotle held the key to all
understanding, the summation of which might one day be achieved
as commentary followed commentary. A seventeenth century scholar
like Barlow would consult Aristotle or a relevant commentary on
any question, seeking the ideas and opinions of his "authorities".
The Baconian would seek his own answers by actual observation and
experiment, through immediate experience of the world, pursuing
what Bacon called the "severe inquisition" of the natural philosopher
into nature and the whole of creation (WFB III.284). Traheme was
later to recommend to all men, each of whom he saw as an "Heir of the
World" (C 1.3)» the "Diligent Inquisition into all Natures"
(C III.44) that "Natural Philosophy" (C III.44) involves: "it
openeth the Riches of God's kingdom and the Natures of His
Territories Works and Creatures in a Wonderfull Maner" (C III.44).
Man's experience and knowledge of nature also issues in what Traherne
was to call "Uses" and "Services" (e.g. CE 182) which function in
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practical as well as metaphysical senses. There is a "utilitarian
emphasis, transfigured yet discemable in [Traheme'sH doctrine of
felicity".19
William Petty, who became a Fellow of Traherne's future
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college, Brasenose, in 1648 and Professor of Anatomy in I65I,
had focussed the practical Baconian attitude as it might be
relevant to general education, showing that its usefulness was not
limited to the more "scientific" aspects of natural philosophy:
We wish . . . that the educandi be taught to
observe and remember all sensible objects and
actions, whether they be natural or
artificial, which the educators must on all
occasions expound unto them ... as it would
be more profitable to boys to spend ten or
twelve years in the study of things than in a
rabble of words. . . . There would not then
be so many unworthy fustian preachers in
divinity; in the law so many pettyfoggers; in
physics so many quacksalvers; and in the
country schools so many grammaticasters.^
Petty's contrast between the "study of things" and "a rabble of
words" repeats Bacon's emphasis on "the contemplatioii of the
creatures of God" as an alternative to the Schoolmen's "laborious
webs of learning". Traheme's reservations about the "Drie and
Empty Theamee" of the university disputations he heard in the
1650's might similarly be contrasted with his insistence on the
importance of "the contemplation of GODS Works, wherin all the
Riches of His Kingdom will appear" (C II.3). Elsewhere, however,
he was to remark that, having received a "Bad Education" at
school (C III.7), he went to University and "received there the
Taste and Tincture of another Education, I saw that there were
Things in the World of which I never Dreamed, Glorious Secrets
. . . There I saw that Logick, Ethicks, Physicks, Metaphysicks,
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Geometry, Astronomy, Poesie, Medicine, Grammer, Musick, Rhetoric,
all kind of Arts Trades and Mechanismes that Adorned the World
pertained to felicity" (C_ III.36). While the particular notice
here of "Arts Trades and Mechanismes" itself suggests a Baconian
rather than a scholastic emphasis — traditional scholars scorned
contact with applied science while Bacon found in craftsmanship,
for example, an alternative model of human practice and inquiry
— Traheme's assertion that "Natural Philosophy" itself is
"Nobly Subservient to the Highest Ends" (C III.44) may be
significant in the light of his suggestion that at Oxford he
"received . . . the Taste and Tincture of another Education".
It was pre-eminently "Natural Philosophy" that represented the
Baconian approach to learning. Oxford in the 1650's was at the
centre of an educational controversy which may be focussed in
terms of the study of forms of natural philosophy within the
curriculum. Barlow in his suggestions for a library for "younger
schollers" reveals a limited awareness of contemporary trends. For
him "Physicks, or Naturall Philosophy" can be studied in a
tradition "(after Aristotle)", but he does suggest that to the
authorities he quotes from within this tradition "You may adde"
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works by Gassendi, Bacon, Descartes and Kenelm Digby. Gassendi,
as well as Bacon, had explicitly attacked the Aristotelian
traditions that are otherwise central to Barlow's proposals. This
may suggest an awareness on Barlow's part both of the continuing
development of natural philosophy outside and beyond the
fundamental Aristotelian tradition and of contemporary pressure
for the inclusion of these developed notions within the
curriculum.
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Oxford was subject to such pressure. In 1653 John Webster
published his Academiarum Bxamen in which he suggests that the
"learning of Copernicus, Ticho Brahe, Galilaeus, Ballialdus, and
such like, might be introduced" to the university curriculum "and
the rotten and ruinous Fabrick of Aristotle and Ptolemy rejected
and laid aside" (AE 103). He considers it scandalous that
Ptolemaic theories should be taught more than a century after
Copernicus' De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium (1543), and that
the university should apparently ignore the modern work of the
mathematicians Briggs, Napier and Oughtred. His suggestion for
alternative material to replace the works of Aristotle and
subsequent traditions, are interesting. He would like to see more
attention given to the work of Plato (via Ficino) and of Parmenides
and Empedocles, to the theories of the Greek atomists Democritus
and Epicurus as rendered by Descartes and Gassendi, to Gilbert's
"Magnetical Philosophy" and to the Hermetic writings. Bacon is
Webster's main influence and example: he refers to Bacon more
often than to any other author. He advocates inductive reasoning
as opposed to deductive logic, and seeks the establishment of a
new "science", a new form of and attitude to knowledge, based on
practical observation and experiment rather than theoretical
textual authority and exegesis. He advocates study of nature and
the world "whereby the wonderful works of the Creator are
discovered and innumerable benefits produced to the poor creatures"
(AE 69). Traherne's later sympathy with this form of "Natural
Philosophy", including a "utilitarian" emphasis, has been
demonstrated here. Early in the l660's he was to observe that "By
studying felicity we are brought to the Delineation of God's
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kingdom" (SM III.53) and that "the fabrick of the world and the
uses of [God's3 creatures are . . . contemplated that we may know
the Glory of Him that loveth us" (SM 11.88). Traheme had by then
been reading Bacon, and by the time of his period as Chaplain to
Sir Orlando Bridgeman in London (1669-1674) he was to demonstrate
his acquaintance with many of the works and authors John Webster
had recommended in the 1650's, including Copernicus, Brahe and
Galileo (CB 18V), Plato (FN, passim.), Democritus and Epicurus
(CB 18V), Gilbert (CB 39r» £ 1.2) and "Hermes Trismegistus" (CE
224-37)• As Traherne was to remark in the Centuries he may have
received at Oxford "Seeds of knowledge that were afterwards
improved" (C III.37).
Modern historians have traced relationships between desire for
educational reform in the interregnum and radical political/
religious ideas, stressing a Puritan influence and emphasis on the
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practical aspects of the Baconian "Great Instauration". One
historian has seen a high mark of agitation for reform in the
universities in about 1653* the year of both the publication of
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Academiarum Examen and Traherne's matriculation at Brasenose.
There is little opportunity to enter this debate here. Webster can
however be identified as having had connections with several groups
of interregnum radicals. At various times in his earlier life he
had been associated with Seekers and Ranters, had served as a
Chaplain in the New Model Army, and, as a Curate in Yorkshire, had
been in conflict with the Church over his association with the
2*5
Grindletonians. Educational reform at this time implied more than
disillusion with scholastic traditions. Hobbes in Leviathan (1651)
recognised the importance of the universities as influential
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ideological centres: "the Universities are the Fountains of
Civill, and Morall Doctrine, from whence the Preachers, and the
Gentry, drawing such water as they find, use to sprinkle the
same (both from the Pulpit, and in their Conversation) upon the
People". Thus, for Hobbes and reformers like Webster, the
importance of ensuring that the "water" is pure, according at least
to their individual notions of such purity. In the contemporary
Early Notebook Traheme uses the same image in a comparable
recognition:
our Universities by a Metaphore are called
Fountaines, from whence the various streams
and rivers of al learnings & liberal
proffessions flow and axe nourished; which
were these wanting would soon decay & waxe
drie as a deceitfull brook.
(EN 115)-
It was largely in these terms that John Wilkins and Seth Ward
replied to John Webster in Vindiciae Academiarum (1654).
Wilkins wrote only the Preface. In the main text of the book,
Ward questions Webster's insistence on the central importance of
natural philosophy to education. This, he says, does not
adequately represent the purpose of university education. The
"Nobility or Gentry" who send their sons to university do not want
them to be "set to Chymistry, or Agriculture, or Mechanicks" but
simply to become "Rationall and Graceful speakers, and be of an
acceptable behaviour" (VA 50). Study of natural philosophy should
not be a single aim, but Ward admits that it is important. It
should be remembered, he says, that not everyone wants to be
"absolute in Naturall Philosophy" (VA 50)« Indeed, "there is not
one of many hundreds" who wishes to be so, although "such as will,
ought certainly to follow this course" (VA 50). Compromise is the
^9
fundamental impulse behind Ward's vindication of Oxford education.
He admits to thinking "Aristotle's Books, the best of any
Philosophick writings" (VA but Wilkins claims in the
Preface that
though we do very much honour Aristotle for
his profound judgement and universall
learning, yet we are so farre from being
tyed up in his opinions, that persons of all
conditions amongst us take liberty to
declare against him, according as any
contrary evidence doth ingage them, being
ready to follow the Banner of truth by
whomsoever it shall be lifted up.
(VA Preface).
Vindlciae Academiarum suggests that, while Webster's system of
education is not, and need not be, followed at Oxford, elements
from within that system might be studied, if desired, within a
liberal interpretation of the formal curriculum. Thus there "is
not to be wished a more general liberty in point of judgement or
debate, then what is here allowed", for "there is scarce any
Hypothesis . . . but hath here its strenuous Assertours, as the
Atomicall and Magneticall in Philosophy, the Coperaican in
Astronomy etc." (VA Preface). The Copernican system is taught
"as improved by Kepler, Bullialdus [and! our own Professor" (VA
29» "our own Professor" is Ward himself). In optics "such things
are ordinary now among us ... as heretofore were counted
Magicall" (VA 29). Many modern scientific instruments are used.
More important to Ward than these particular features is the
liberality of Oxford and the wide variety of education and
attitudes that can be made freely available as required:
our Academies are of a more generall and
comprehensive institution, and as there is
a provision here made, that whosoever will
be excellent in any kind in any Art,
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Science, or Language, may here receive
assistance and be led by the hand, till he
come to be excellent; so is there a
provision likewise, that men be not forced
into particular waies, but may receive an
institution answerable to their genius and
designe.
Whatever weight is given to Vindiciae Academiarum and its claims
in an assessment of education at Oxford in the 1650's it is
important here as an internal view of the education that was
supposedly available to Traherne — Wilkins was Warden of Wadham
and Ward Professor of Anatomy. There is a Baconian emphasis in
Vindiciae Academiarum, as well as in Academiarum Examen, but it
is a theoretical rather than a practical one. Ward perhaps
disliked the practical implications — Webster is attacked in
Vindiciae Academiarum as "an absolute Leveller" (see VA 20,51»
68-70,106-08). For Ward, as for Webster, however, the end of
certain aspects of education is that, in a theological as well
as a natural sense, "the way of nature in workeing may be
discovered"
Ward's thorough insistence on the liberality of Oxford
education does suggest that Barlow's Library. for example, does
not provide an entirely representative impression of Traherne's
education. A modern historian has remarked that at this time
"one finds countless examples of changeless forms and regulations,
and transformed subject matter. The arts curriculum, although it
might look like a rigid . . . course . . . had greater
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flexibility in content than its format might suggest". The
curriculum itself inherited something of the medieval form: the
study of the Trivium (grammar, logic and rhetoric) for the three-
year B.A. degree and the study of the Quadrivlum (the mathematical
sciences — arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and music) for the
four-year M.A.. If a liberal interpretation of the curriculum,
already expanded and freed from the stricter medieval definitions,
could be accepted the possibility that attention could be given to
contemporary natural philosophy clearly occured more readily
within the M.A. course. This has been seen as a possible explanation
for the preponderence of traditional subjects and works studied by
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undergraduates in the l650's. Boys, often in their mid-teens, had
first to complete the B.A. course along traditional lines. They
could then either regard their education as complete, their
"reason, Fancy and carriage" improved as Ward suggests, or proceed
to the Inns of Court. Some might stay at Oxford to take the M.A.
degree, but evidence suggests that between sixty and eighty per cent
did not do this. For those who did remain "an interest in science
was strongly correlated with completing the M.A. course", for it was
then that, having completed a basic formal education, students were
allowed more freedom to pursue the often more modern studies of
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their choice. In this respect it is interesting that Barlow's
library was intended specifically for "younger schollers" (my
italics). It would be possible to apply this outline of education
to Traherne, for he did receive the degree of M.A., and there is no
evidence to suggest that he did not fulfil appropriate conditions of
study. Certainly, he followed an extensive course of personal study
throughout his life, one which ranged from a thorough knowledge of
a representative proportion of classical authors to acquaintance
with contemporary scientific theories and works by Bacon and Boyle,
for example. At Oxford in the 1650's and in the Bodleian Library,
"the Glory of Oxford, and this Nation" (RF, "An Advertisement to
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the Reader"), he had perhaps the best opportunity to fulfil his
avid intellectual ambitions and his "Curiositie Profound and
Unsatiable" (C III.42). Whether Traherne can be more particularly
associated with the radical suggestions of John Webster, or sought
only to "receive an institution, variously answerable to []his"l
genius and designe" (VA 50) within the terms of Ward's response to
these, there remains the evidence of his thorough contemporary
study of Bacon's De Augmentis, the "Seeds of Knowledg that were
afterwards improved" (C III.37)> often along the lines suggested
by Webster, and his own "Divine Philosophy" (C IV.3) of the
understanding, appreciation and use of nature to suggest that
Traherne was at least in sympathy with if not directly aware of
dominant aspects of educational theory and debate. "Although the
arts curriculum retained its scholastic bias, many tutors and
students explored new pathways of knowledge . . . evidence points
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to the steady infiltration of new ideas into higher education".
Perhaps, looking back to his experience at Oxford in the 1650's
Traherne was indeed justified in saying that he "received there
the Taste and Tincture of another Education" (C III.36).
3. John Wilkins' "experimental! philosophical! clubbe".
"Nevertheless", Traherne says, at Oxford, "som things were
Defectiv too. There never was a Tutor that did professly Teach
Felicity; tho that be the Mistress of all other Sciences. Nor did
any of us Study these things but as Aliena, which we ought to hav
Studied as our own Enjoyments" (C III.37). "Felicity" for Traherne
is to be aohoived through understanding and appreciation, thorough
"Enjoyment", of God's creation. "Natural Philosophy", as it is
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"Nobly Subservient to the Highest Ends" (C III.44) helps man to
achieve "Felicity" and the "God-like" knowledge of creation
necessary to it. So, "By studying felicity we are brought to the
Delineation of God's kingdom" (SM III.53) and "all the things in
Heaven and Earth are Infinit Treasures: And are never Enjoyed but
when truly seen" (SM III.6). "Felicity" and "Enjoyment" were
lacking as formal pursuits at Oxford: as "Sciences" their matter
and methods, the "contemplation of GODS Works" (C II.3), had to be
studied, if at all, as "Aliena".
Debate about and interest in natural philosophy was not
confined, at Oxford in the 1650's, to criticism or vindication of
the academic curriculum. It is evident when informal pursuits are
considered that this was "a period when Oxford was rapidly
becoming a center for the new science". John Wilkins (1614-1672)
and Seth Ward (1617-1689), as well as holding major academic
apoointments, belonged to a group of men, centred on Wilkins
himself, who were interested and actively engaged in natural
philosophy and its practice. William Petty (1623-1687) of Brasenose
College also belonged to this group, as did Jonathan Goddard
(1617?—1675! Warden of Merton College) and John Wallis (1616—1703 »
Savilian Professor of Astronomy; Exeter College). All these men
had been appointed by Cromwell's visitors in 1648. In 1654, at the
invitation of Wilkins, Robert Boyle (1627-1691) came independently
to Oxford and was soon to establish a laboratory there. Wilkins
became "a principal reviver of experimental philosophy ... at
Oxford, where he had a weekely experimentall philosophicall clubbe,
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which began 1649". Other identified members of this club were
to include Ralph Bathurst, Joseph Glanvill, Richard Lower, John
Mayow, Henry Oldenburg, Walter Pope, Joseph Williamson, Thomas
Willis and the brothers Christopher and Matthew Wren. Robert
Hooke (1635-1703), who matriculated as a member of Christ Church
in 1652 and so was a contemporary of Traherne as a student at
Oxford, assisted Boyle in his laboratory. Another contemporary
student, Thomas Sprat (matriculated at Wadham, I65I) later
recalled the activity of this period in his History of the Royal
Society (166?), and John Locke (matriculated at Christ Church,
1652) was also associated with Wilkins' club.
A tentative list of members of Wilkins' club has been
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established. There is little doubt that this is incomplete.
Wallis, for example, mentioned besides the central members "many
others of the most inquisitive persons in Oxford" and both he and
Ward allude to "divers" now anonymous people who were either
members or showed an interest in the activities of the club.
Wilkins and his acquaintances "found numerous scholars receptive
to their ideas".^ The presence of the "Inquisitive" (C 111.15)
Traherne in Oxford at this time may be noted. The membership,
influence and popular reputation of Wilkins' club is difficult to
determine, but there is no evidence to suggest that Traherne, as
an Oxford student, could not be associated with or at least aware
of the club and its activities, if only by contemporary local
publications by its members and the fact that Wilkins and several
of his closest associates were prominent Oxford academics. It is
the purpose of the ensuing study not necessarily to suggest such
an association on Traherne's part (although this may remain an
attractive possibility) but to trace a significant aspect of the
cultural and intellectual life of the Oxford inhabited by Traherne
and to examine certain features of Traherne's writing and thought
which suggest a positive, if presumably indirect, relation to
this. This relation may be manifest in certain particular
instances but is more pervasive in terms of general philosophical
ideas.about nature and its significance as an object for man's
understanding and appreciation.
Wilkins had been the focus of a similar "experimentall
philosophicall clubbe" in London since about 1645. When he and
his associates moved to Oxford in the late l640's it seems that
they joined a similar group already in existence there, probably
centred on William Harvey (1578-1657? Warden of Merton College
until 1648) with Bathurst, Willis, Walter Charleton and possibly
John Aubrey and Abraham Cowley among its members. The first English
edition of Harvey's Exercitatio Anatomica de Motu Cordis et
Sanguinis appeared in 1649 (as Exercitatio Anatomica de
Circulatlone Sanguinis) and his Exercitationes de Generatlone
Animalium was first published in 1651. His work, like that of
William Gilbert whose De Magnete had appeared in 1600, was
recognised by contemporary natural philosophers as among the
most significant and stimulating of modern scientific efforts.
Both retain a high reputation today. With regard to Wilkins'
"experimentall philosophicall clubbe" of the l650's, however,
it "would be wrong to believe that the whole group was enlivened
by a superior 'modern' scientific methodology and engaged upon
rigorous experimental studies comparable with the highest
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achievements of individual members". It is true, though, that
the Oxford club "gives an impression of wide ranging curiosity.
This was undoubtedly encouraged by Wilkins 'secundum mentem
oO
doraini Baconi'". That Bacon should be seen as the acknowledged
"master" of these natural philosophers provides the basis for a
confirmed recognition of Traherne's shared contemporary interests
in his reading of De Augmentis. His awareness of his own
"Curiositie Profound and Unsatiable" (C III.42) and the later
realisation of his "Capacity" in this sense also suggest a
certain intellectual sympathy. This can be further traced in
the Commonplace Book (CB 39r)» which demonstrates Traherne's
acquaintance with the work of Galileo, Brahe and Maestlin,
and of Copernicus and Kepler, on whose theories Seth Ward,
Savilian Professor of Astronomy at Oxford when Traherne was
resident there, based his work in his De Cometis (1653) and
Astronomia Geometrica (I656).
Ward's first efforts as Professor had been "to bring the
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Astronomy Lectures into Reputation", and to establish "a
Magneticall, Mechanicall and Optick Schoole furnished with the
best instruments, and Adapted for the most useful experiments"
(VA 36)• The telescope and particularly the microscope were
instruments closely and popularly associated with the "virtuosi"
of the seventeenth century.
CPages 57-58 are cancelled: the text continues on Page 59"!
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publicity, and an object of satire". ' This element of entertainment
and popularity should not be forgotten in any consideration of
likely awareness of Wilkin's club at Oxford in the 1650's. Robert
Hooke, who worked as a student in Boyle's laboratory there, did not
publish his treatise on microscopy, Micrographia, until 1665. It
seems however that some of the preparation for Micrographia was done
at Oxford in the preceding decade, and that some of the elaborate
drawings used in the first edition were also prepared there,
possibly by Christopher Wren. "How Rich and Admirable then is the
Kingdom of God; where the Smallest is Greater than an infinite
Treasure!" (C 111.20), Traherne later exclaimed: "we may see a little
Heaven in the Creatures" (£ 11.12). As Hooke observed, "in every
little particle ... we may now behold almost as great a variety of
Creatures as we were able before to reckon up in the whole Universe
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it self".
If the microscope was a source of publicity for the natural
philosophers, the continued popularisation promoted by this could
not rival in immediate effect the publicity resulting from a single
event in Oxford in I65O. William Petty and a local doctor, Thomas
Willis, received for dissection the body of Ann Green, a hanged
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criminal. By chance, some life remained in the body, and Petty and
Willis were able to revive her. The publication of an account of
the event in I65I, however, demonstrated a current belief that the
two anatomists had in fact brought Ann Green back to life when she
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had been dead. The natural philosophers of Wilkins' club, and of
the university itself, could hardly have desired a more dramatic
advertisement of their anatomical skills and interests. Petty had
probably left Brasenose College by 1653» when Traherne became a
member. The interest in and awareness of the physical body, newly
appreciated and understood by the less dramatic practices of
contemporary natural philosophers is however present in Traheme's
detailed admiration of "organized Joints and azure Veins" ("The
Salutation", M II.4-5, 1.23) and. his wonder at
These little Limbs,
These Eys and Hands which here I find,
This panting Heart wherewith my Life begins.
("The Salutation", M II.4-5, 11.1-3).
In the Thanksgivings, and notably the Thanksgivings for the Body
(M 11.214-229), he celebrates the "Real Valuableness in all the
Common Things" (C III.53)» in "Air, Light, Heaven and Earth, Water,
the Sun, Trees, Men and Women" (C 111.53), in the anatomical
perfection of the human form and the physical perfection of the
whole of creation.
The "Real Valuableness" of "Air" (C III.53) was, if more
literally, one of Boyle's major interests at this time. The
"machina Boyleana" or "pnuematical engine", developed in the
laboratory at Oxford with the aid of Robert Hooke, enabled Boyle
to conduct experiments involving and inquiring into the qualities
of air, assessing its weight, and what he called its compressability,
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elasticity and "spring". The results of these experiments were
published in New Experiments Fhysico-Mechanical Touching the Spring
of Air and its Effects (1660). Traherne shows in his later writing
a developed awareness of the air as of many physical phenomena: "the
Air it self" is "a WORK so Divine by reason of its Precious and Pure
Transparency, that all Worlds would be Nothing without such a
Treasure" (C 1.34). Indeed, "all the things in Heaven and Earth are
Infinit Treasures: And are never Enjoyed but when truly seen"
(SM III.6). If "Natural Philosophy" is "Nobly Subservient to the
Highest Ends" (£ III.44) does it contribute directly and
recognisably, in Traherne's view, to the "true seeing" of "all the
things in Heaven and Earth" and thus to the "Enjoyment" that is
part of "Felicity"? "Felicity" and "Enjoyments" could only be
studied as "Aliena" (C III.37) at Oxford in the 1650's. The informal
activity of Wilkins' club shows that a large group of natural
philosophers pursued their own studies, despite some connection with
formal teaching, largely as "Aliena". Can Traherne's notion of
Felicity, and his own "Divine Philosophy" (C IV.3)» already evolving
in the Select Meditations of the early l660's, have any real contact
with, or truly share motivation with, the "Natural Philosophy" of the
Oxford scientists?
4. The "theological use of natural philosophy".
A religious aspect was essential to contemporary natural
philosophy. As central figures in Wilkins' club achieved high
positions as Oxford academics, so did they gain ecclesiastical
preferment. Seth Ward was to become Bishop of Exeter in 1662 and
Bishop of Salisbury in 1667; John Wilkins became Bishop of Chester
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in 1668. Ward and John Wallis were admitted to the degree of
Doctor of Divinity in 1654. Many of the known members of the
Oxford club had some connection with the Church or a special
interest in religion. The preferments gained by some were not
r&t,0 ft/Ulv
necessarily mere formalities or token rccdgnoti-on for their
learning. Many had a genuine impulse, like Seth Ward, "to cleer
to himself, who is a lover of rationall knowledge, an account of
his own belief". The religious impulse could take on the aspect
not only of justification but of initial motivation for natural
philosophical pursuits.
Robert Boyle's activities as a theologian as well as a
scientist were extensive. He was a prolific author and promoter
of religious works and biblical translations — he himself learned
Greek, Hebrew, Syriac and Chaldee so as to be able to read original
scriptures. On his death he established a series of sermons intended
to explain the relevance of natural philosophy to religion, for he
believed that these were complementary studies. As a young man at
Stalbridge, before moving to Oxford (he was 27 in 1654) Boyle's
principal interest had been the study of theology and the regulated
daily practice of a religious life. His scientific studies came
second to this. In 1649 he had written to his sister about a book
he was planning, in which he would explain "the theological use of
natural philosophy, endeavouring to make the contemplation of the
creatures contributory to the instruction of the prince, and to the
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glory of the author of them". He says of his scientific work that
Vulcan has so transported and bewitched me,
that as the delights I taste in it make me
fancy my laboratory a kind of Elysium so as
if the threshold of it possessed the
qualities the poets ascribed to that Lethe,
their fictions made men taste of before ^
their entrance into those seats of bliss.
Such statements are representative of contemporary articulations
of the "theological use of natural philosophy", both in style and
content. Imaginative hyperbole was a common means of expression —
certainly there was little of Sprat's "mathematical plainness"
(HRS 113)» itself somewhat mythical. If philosophers looked to
Bacon for guidance, it would now be wrong to see either his work
or theirs as rigorously scientific after more modern patterns. Many
of the natural philosophers working in Oxford in the 1650's were to
become members of the Royal Society, but the reputation of the
Society in its early days has been falsely coloured by the most
lasting achievements of its more remarkable members. Its foundation
does not represent what has sometimes been regarded as the
initiation of a positivist progress towards complete scientific
truth. Beside the work of Wallis and Boyle must be set the
unrecorded attempts of a largely anonymous body of Oxford scholars
and enthusiastic "virtuosi" to further the contemporary cause of
natural philosophy, together with the superstition and credulity
reflected in Newes from the Dead, for example. While its most
eminent practitioners achieved scientific results, natural philosophy
also afforded interest and entertainment of a far less rigorous kind.
Ultimately, however, the real wonder and awe it inspired — through
the microscope man could literally see "a little Heaven in the
Creatures" (C 11.12) and thus enhance his awareness of God's skill
as the architect of nature and His benevolence in the endowment He
bestowed on man — were not merely diverting. If the Oxford natural
philosophers might reject some of John Webster's more radical
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emphases, they would, acknowledge that, through natural philosophy,
"the wonderful works of the Creator are discovered, and innumerable
benefits produced" (AE 69).
If Boyle's laboratory became "a kind of Elysium", an
anatomical theatre was for William Petty "(without metaphor) a
Temple of God" and anatomy itself "the most God-like of all other
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illustrious faculties". Through the "theological use of natural
philosophy", practised in what could be seen "(without metaphor)"
as temples of God, men might strive towards "seats of bliss".
Ultimately the theological element is less an external "use" than
an internal motive. "Religious conceptions were . . . definitely
integrated with sentiments basic to the contemporary science and
philosophy . . . the ideals and goals of religion loomed large and
science was regarded as an efficient means for the attainment of
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them.
In Some Considerations touching the Usefulness of Experimental
Natural Philosophy (I663), one of several works in which he dealt
with the "theological use of natural philosophy" he had wanted to
explain in 1649, Boyle emphasized the three-fold aspect of natural
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philosophy that he had spoken of in his letter to his sister.
"The two chief advantages, which a real acquaintance with nature
brings to our minds are first, by instructing our understandings,
and gratifying our curiosities; and next, by cherishing our
devotion" (UEP 2). Thus "contemplation of the creatures" leads both
to the "instruction of the prince" of creation, man, and the "glory
of the author", God, through man's consequent appreciation and
praise. Boyle quoted the Hermetic writings to support his
affirmation that man's praises are the noblest offerings he can
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make to the supreme being (HEP 53)- His praises are the more
worthy the more they are based, on a "real acquaintance" with
nature, that of natural philosophy.
This three-fold notion, and the Hermetic idea, correspond to
certain major emphases in Traherne's work. To consider these here
is to anticipate a further more thorough discussion of the later
texts, but Traherne's insistence on the "contemplation of GODS
Works" (C II.3) may be re-affirmed. This "contemplation"
contributes to man's realisation of his place as "Heir of the
World" (C 1.3) and also "Discovers the Being of GOD" (C II.3).
Traherne sees man as the "Golden link or Tie of the World, yea
the Hymenaeus Marrying the Creator and his Creatures together;
made as David witnesseth a little lower than the Angels" (C IV.74).^
As "A Messenger between the Creatures, Lord of Inferior things, and
familiar to those abov" (C IV.?h) it is his understanding and
appreciation of God's creation which makes that creation "real"
at once in itself and as a contribution to man's conception of God
and of himself and his own Capacity. "GOD, THE WORLD YOUR SELF.
All Things" are "the objects of your Felicity" (C 11.100), and all
three, God, the world and man, may be realised in images of infinite
possibility and potential, inter-related in the "Circulation" that
involves God's creation issuing from God and returning to him
enhanced and made real by man's appreciation, his Enjoyment, of it.
In the Select Meditations of the early l660's Traherne
celebrated "man's Dominion over the world" (SM III.IOO). Without the
"Interposure and mediation of man", who is the "Inclusive Head of
all Spiritual and Material perfection" (SM III.9), God himself
cannot "Enjoy" this "Adspectable world" (SM III.9). As "Heirs of
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the World" (SM 111.58) men realise aspects of their own nature
as "the fabrick of the world and uses of [God'si creatures are
. . . contemplated that we may know the Glory of Him that loveth
us" (SM 11.88). The "Divine Philosophy" (C IV.3) of the Centuries
was formulated some few years after Traheme left Oxford. In
Boyle's words, in Traherne's "Divine Philosophy" of the
"Circulation" of creation, "contemplation of the creatures"
contributes to "the instruction of the prince", man, and the "glory
of the author", God.
"Divine Philosophy" may, in Traherne's view, contain "Natural
Philosophy" (C 111.44). The religious emphasis of natural philosophy
as practised at Oxford in the l650's suggests a close relationship
between the two. It is possible that the emergence of imagery and
ideas that reflect contemporary scientific concerns in Traherne's
writing connects with a deeper impulse to engage those particular
and practical concerns within a generalised metaphysical framework.
Both "Divine" and "Natural" philosophies share the impulse to see
and understand God's creation itself, man as a being alone capable
of a true understanding of it, and God as the origin of both.
Traheme remarks in the Early Notebook that, "That all things are
our Treasures immediately we owe it to the Goodness of our Nature,
but finaly to him from whom we received both it and them" (EN 235)•
This three-fold emphasis on the "Treasure" of creation, the "Goodness
of our Nature" and the bounty and skill of God the creator might be
acknowledged not only by Boyle but by fellow members of the
"experimentall philosophicall clubbe" and other contemporaries of
Traheme at Oxford in the l650's.
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CHAPTER 3
Traherne, Credenhill and Susanna Hopton
This short chapter introduces the Select Meditations, the only
significant extant manuscript of original work not thought to have
been completed in London, and gives some account of the remainder of
Traherne's work belonging to neither the Oxford nor the London
periods. This latter material is examined here more for what it
reveals of Traherne's life and historical circumstance than for its
intrinsic interest as writing, which is nevertheless considerable.
It should be emphasized that it is only with certain reservations
that this interval can be spoken of as the period of Traherne's
residence in the village of Credenhill in Herefordshire. He was
appointed Rector of Credenhill under the Commonwealth in 1657 and
re-appointed under the restored monarchy in l66l. It is not known,
however, whether Traherne moved to Credenhill in 1661 or 1664, or at
sometime between these two dates.* By the end of 1669 he was in
London. The period under consideration here may therefore be defined
as circa 1660-1669. It may in fact be erroneous to associate either
the Select Meditations or the Ficino Notebook, which appear to date
from early and late within this period respectively, with Credenhill.
It is, however, to the presumed Credenhill period that their dates
of composition most readily if not conclusively correspond.
Two items extant only in manuscript may be discussed first. The
manuscript of the Select Meditations is an important recent discovery,
2
acquired and attributed to Traherne by James Osborn in 1964. The
extant manuscript is of some 200 leaves of small octavo, but some 40
or 43 leaves are missing at the beginning. It contains prose
68
paragraphs or meditations like those of the Centuries of Meditations
and is similarly organised. There were originally 368 pieces disposed
in 4 Centuries. The first complete piece is now the eighty-second of
the First Century, and there are extant less than 287 of the original
368 meditations. After SM IV.68 there are 9 blank pages, so, as in
the Centuries, Traherne never accomplished any project he might have
had to complete a certain number of Centuries. Unlike the Centuries
of Meditations, however, the Select Meditations were given titles by
Traherne. The beginning of the First Century is missing, but at the
head of the Second, Third and Fourth is the title Select Meditations
and the sub-title "The Second Century" and so on. As Louis Martz
observes "The title is of considerable interest, since it implies
3the existence of a larger body of meditations by Traheme". It
would also seem to imply that the meditations were written down
without a dominant plan and perhaps organised as Centuries only for
convenience and order: only the lost early part of the manuscript
would resolve Margoliouth's doubt as to whether, in the Centuries of
Meditations at least, Traherne deliberately set out to write Centuries
as such (M I.x-xi).^ The possible "larger body" of similar pieces may
or may not have been written down in this form. Such a body would be
large: the Select Meditations and the Centuries of Meditations
together comprise about 150,000 words. Both groups of meditations may
be collections of informal pieces written at various times and without
a definite plan. Neither have a strongly pre-determined content or
coherence and neither were actually finished: both manuscripts contain
blank pages after the writing ceases. The Select Meditations
manuscript was conclusively identified as Traherne's because it
contains the poem "All Musick, Sawces, Feasts, Delights and Pleasures"
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printed in Christian Ethicks (SM IV.60; CE 171» M 11.186). The
manuscript itself provides no indication of date, but there are
references to the restored king (SM 1.82) and to the re-established
church (SM III.25) so it must date from after 1660. The remark "As
long as our Nation continue in peace" (SM 1.86) suggests a date
before the Dutch Wars beginning in 1665. Given a date no more precise
than circa I66O-I665 it is not therefore possible to assert that the
Select Meditations were written at Credenhill, for there is no
definite evidence for Traheme's presence there before 1664. Although
he may have been in Oxford until 1661 or later it is not possible at
present to state precisely when or where the Select Meditations were
written down.
The second unpublished manuscript to be discussed here is a
notebook. Like the manuscript of the Poems of Felicity it is part of
the Burney collection. It is not mentioned by Margoliouth but has
been called the Ficino Notebook by Carol Marks.^ It measures 7 inches
by 5l" inches and is of 59 leaves. It seems that after Traheme's
death this, with the Poems of Felicity copied by Philip Traherne
and a copy of the Greek gospels brought by Philip from Turkey, was
in the possession of Philip Traherne and later passed from him to
Charles Burney.^ The Ficino Notebook, like the manuscript of the
Select Meditations, is of marginal date, in this case of the late
n
1660's and before the Centuries of Meditations. Since it is not
known precisely when the Centuries were written, although they can
be dated within the London period of 1669-1674, the Ficino Notebook
may itself be an early notebook from that same period, or it may
date from late in the Credenhill period.
This manuscript is unusual in bearing Traherne's signature
(FN lv). It is in Latin throughout apart from a few incidental
notes. Traherne gave the notebook a general heading, "PLATONIS
PHILOSOPHI Speculationes practicae A MARSILIO FICINO breviter
digestae" (FN 3T), suggesting that he intended an extensive study
of Platonic thought as rendered by Ficino. Ke annotated Ficino's
Epitomes of and Commentaries on the Platonic dialogues, following
fairly closely the order established in the 1576 edition of Ficino's
Opera Omnia, but broke off after the Epitome of the fifth book of
the Republic. There are then some notes from an anonymous life of
Socrates with the title "Observationes quaedem digniores a SCCRATIS
vita — Qui Platoni Magister erat veraciter excerptae" (FN ^6r-56r),
followed by a "Correllarium" to the same work (FN 56V~57V)• The
final pages of the manuscript contain miscellaneous notes on
Socrates, including the "learned Gale's" account of Socrates' death
which was probably added later by an amanuensis under a heading
Q
written by Traherne, and some fragments from Ficino's Hermetic
essay ("Argumentum Marcilij Ficini Florentini In Librum Mercurij
Trismegisti", FN 58 J. There are also some notes on an anonymous
and untraced work ("Stoicismus Christianus", FN 59r) and a list of
"Socrates his Disciples" (FN 59V)• Valuable as the manuscript is as
explicit evidence of Traheme's interest in Platonism, most of the
notes are very brief. Traherne practised his usual notebook
technique of rigorous selection. Like the later Commonplace Book,
however, where the notes themselves are much more extensive, the
range of reference is much wider than the notes directly imply. A
study of all the Traherne manuscripts suggests that what he actually
wrote down is often no more than a clue, to serve to release
associated patterns of thought. The notes are reminders and abstracts
71
of reading and thought, suggestions rather than statements. That is
an interesting speculation if it is also applied to the often note¬
like Select Meditations and Centuries of Meditations.
Traherne made notes in the Ficino Notebook on Ficino's Epitomes
of the Meno, Buthyphro. Lysis, Thaetetus, Ion, Statesman, Buthydemus
Charmides, Laches, Kenexenus and Republic (Books One to Five) among
the dialogues now considered genuine; on the Epitomes of the
Hipparchus, Erastae (Amatores), Alcibiades I and II, Minos and
Greater Hippias among dialogues no longer regarded as being by Plato;
9
and on the Commentaries on the Parmenides, Philebus and Sophist. The
method of annotation, however, recalls Traherne's treatment of
Bacon's De Augmentis Scientiarum in the Early Notebook. It is brief
and fragmented with a tendency to the aphoristic. Traheme uses
Ficino's sub-titles, indicating what Ficino saw as the main emphasis
of each dialogue, as his main titles. He then gives a reference to
the dialogue by name, and notes only what seems directly relevant to
his title. So, in the Meno he seeks comments on virtue (Ficino: "In
Menonem de virtute, Epitomae"), in the Minos on laws (Ficino: "In
Minoem, vel de lege, Epitomae"), and in the Euthyphro on holiness
(Ficino: "In Euthyphronem, vel de sanctitate, Epitomae"). His
reading of the Republic, if only of Books One to Five here, appears
to have been more thorough — there are minor references to this
dialogue throughout the manuscript, so it is possible that Traherne
was already acquainted with it. As with Bacon's De Augmentis, however,
the rather fragmentary nature of the manuscript notes does not
necessarily detract from their importance as clues, albeit rather
cryptic ones, to the importance of Platonic elements in Traherne's
thought. He seems to have been more interested in Plato than his
translator and commentator, Ficino, and equally interested in
Socrates, possibly in terms of an attempt to trace the origin of
Platonic thought. The notes on the lives of Plato and Socrates are
in fact the most copious in the manuscript. As the Ficino Notebook
is not central to the present study a brief examination of only two
entries will be made here.
Traheme's notes "On the nature of Man" ("De natura Hominis",
FN 1JT V; from Ficino's Epitome of Alcibiades i) have an obvious
connection with his own notion of man and his Capacity as the image
of God and heir of the world and with the ideas he was to quote from
Pico della Mirandola (C IV.74-78) and the Hermetic writings (CE 224-
34) in his later work. He notes here both the physical usefulness of
man's body and his mental and spiritual ability to participate in
the Platonic "rational mind". Man's mind is the exemplar of the
divine mind, and in his own concept of the divine mind he is able to
propose to himself a representation of an absolute Good. God can be
identified as the absolute or ultimate Good ("De Summo Bono", FN I8r
from Ficino's Commentary on the Philebus). Man is able to strive to
achieve this absolute Good himself, and it is in this striving for
perfection that he fulfils himself and realises his Capacity.
Philosophy is a medium for this striving for perfection and a
possible means of its accomplishment. Philosophy includes morality,
theology and mathematics, and it is implied that it also includes
other areas of thought and practice. Traherne later thought of
himself as a philosopher (C IV.3).
Philosophy is the subject of another interesting note ("De
Philosophia", FN llr; from Ficino's Epitome of the Erastae).
Philosophy, Traherne observes, is itself divine, and includes both
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contemplation and action (see G IV.l). It offers man an opportunity
to gain the understanding necessary to the direction of human life,
and by implication the direction of that life towards the absolute
or ultimate Good. The Platonic emphasis on the relationship between
the individual's "goodness" and that of the people among whom he
lives, the "goodness" of the state, is here particularly noted by
Traherne. Philosophy includes not only knowledge and private prudence
and morality but also the public virtues of civility and, for example,
kingship. It aids all people living together in all the business of
life, from questions of personal behaviour to the administration of
the household or the state: it is necessary to the achievement of
Justice which, whether in the private or the public realm, is an
earthly equivalent of the ultimate and absolute heavenly Good.
Traherne is rarely given credit for awareness of such ideas, but his
own notion of Felicity can be closely associated with this attitude
to the Good. His "Divine Philosophy" (C IV.3) includes both "Activ"
and "Contemplativ" "Happiness" (C IV.3) and seeks relevance to "This
Life", "the most precious Season in all Eternity" (C IV.93)- There
are "hard lessons, in a pervers and Retrograde World to be practiced"
(C IV.5^) "but these lessons will benefit all men in the "true Estate
of this World" (C IV.20).
Neither of the two published works written within this period
were printed until more than twenty years after Traherne's death,
the Thanksgivings in 1699 and the Meditations on the Creation in
1717. It was during the Credenhill period that Traherne's association
with Susanna Hopton would have been at its closest.® Very little is
known about this but a great deal has been surmised. Hopton's life
is a minor history of religious and political controversy. Born
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Susanna Harvey, she was Royalist and Episcopalian under Charles I.
Secretly converted to Roman Catholicism during the Interregnum, she
married Richard Hopton, a Parliamentarian officer who became a
Royalist supporter after the regicide. At the Restoration she again
became a member of the Church of England. Traherne's brother Philip
married her niece, Susan, who was to be an executor of Thomas' will
(M I.xxvi-xxvii). The period of Traherne's life in question and the
details of his relationship with Susanna Hopton are beyond the main
scope of this study, but it should be pointed out that while
Margoliouth confidently asserts that in Herefordshire "Mrs. Hopton
became the centre of a religious society which included Thomas
Traherne" (M I.xxxiv) the evidence for this, especially for Traherne's
involvement, is slight. There certainly was some connection between
Traheme and Susanna Hopton, but the existence even of her "religious
society" is not a proven fact. The Dictionary of National Biography
remains the major source of information about this. While it remains
possible that the Centuries of Meditations were written for Hopton
once Traherne, in London, could no longer maintain personal contact
with her (the Hoptons lived at Kington, fifteen miles from Credenhill),
this relationship need not be unduly emphasized. If this is the main
reason for the writing of the Centuries, why were the very similar
Select Meditations written when Traherne was, presumably, in direct
contact with Susanna Hopton? However close their relationship may
have been it is misleading to assume that there was complete parity
between the opinions of Hopton and Traherne. The Centuries aim,
explicitly, to teach the person for whom they were written, and to
explain "those Truths you love, but know not" (C 1.2). It is
interesting, however, that the two works by Traheme probably written
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in this period, the Thanksgivings and Meditations on the Creation,
owe their near-contemporary publication in part at least to
Susanna Hopton. These are in themselves very different works, but
their most interesting features from the point of view of the present
study are the common circumstances of their posthumous publication.
As far as their composition is concerned they are both early pieces,
dateable on mainly stylistic evidence to the early l660's.
As a book the Thanksgivings constitute by far the most elegant
near-contemporary publication of Traherne's work. It is a neat
duodecimo of 148 pages with prefatory matter. It includes a
frontispiece, a somewhat rudimentary engraving showing people in a
landscape adoring a shining triangle containing the Hebrew word
"God" and surrounded by angels, or representations of human souls,
and cherubs in clouds. Quotations from Psalms appropriate to the
theme of thanksgiving are printed above and below the engraving
(Psalm 148, verses 1,2,11,12; Psalm 150, verse 6). The full title of
the volume, which is not necessarily Traherne's title, is "A Serious
and Pathetical Contemplation Of the Mercies of God, In Several Most
Devout and Sublime Thanksgivings for the same". The details of
publication are unusual: "Published By the Reverend Doctor Hicks, At
the request of a Friend of the Authors".^ The "Friend of the
Authors" (i.e. "Author's" — the book is later said to be by one
particular author who is all but named as Traherne) is probably
Susanna Hopton, who knew George Hickes, the publisher of the
Thanksgivings, who, with Nathaniel Spinckes, was also involved in
the publication of the Meditations on the Creation. This formed the
first part of A Collection of Meditations and Devotions "reviewed
12
and set forth" by Hickes and published by Spinckes in 1?1?.
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Some confusion surrounds both these publications. The
anonymous Thanksgivings and Meditations on the Creation are almost
certainly" by Traherne. The Preface to the Thanksgivings gives a
direct attribution for that work: the author was a Chaplain to Sir
Orlando Bridgeman who, "being removed out of the Country", "died
young" (M I.xxxii). This corresponds to Traherne's life: he came
from Herefordshire to London in 1669 as Bridgeman's Chaplain and
died in 167^ at the age of thirty seven. The case of the Meditations
on the Creation is more complicated. The title page of the 1717
Collection attributes all three parts to "the First Reformer of the
17
Devotions in The Ancient Way of Offices", Susanna Hopton. The
Meditations on the Creation, however, are now attributed to
1 ii
Traherne.
Traherne's Meditations on the Creation^"^ compose "An Hexameron"
(1717 Collection AT0): there are six meditations, one to each day of
the creation.^ The subject of each meditation is God's work of
creation on each of the six days as narrated in Genesis. Each
meditation quotes biblical texts, particularly the Psalms, and each
"Day" concludes with a poem. The creation is presented "not by way
of Commentary or Explication, but rather of Recital and Admiration"
(1717 Collection A8r). Man is "one that is to render Praise and
Thanksgiving to God for all his Works" (1717 Collection 85). His
thanksgiving cannot be based on superficial observation: he must
"understandingly praise" God for his works (1717 Collection 38) and
"prize every thing according to its Value" (1717 Collection 37)•
This celebration of the physical world is not shared by- the
other two parts of the 1717 Collection. The Meditations and Devotions
17
on the Life of Christ comprise "applicatory Prayers upon the Merits
1 8
of our Saviour" (l?17 Collection 306). The Daily Devotions
contain "penitential Confessions, Effectual Absolutions, Charitable
Intercessions . . . £ancH . . . Tears, Sighs and. Groans" (1717
Collection 372-73)• These offer thanksgiving not for the work of
creation and man's Capacity to appreciate it but for "our excellent
Liturgy" (1717 Collection 372). "Regeneration" and "Corrobation"
are in the eucharist (1717 Collection 373) not in the actual
communion of man with God through the medium of the world. The
importance accorded to the liturgy in both these works suggests the
hand of Susanna Hopton, whose special interest this was. Hickes had
already published her "Reformed" version of John Austin's Devotions
in the Ancient Way of Offices. This had originally been published in
Paris, because its concern to anglicize Roman Catholic rites was not
acceptable in the Church of England as re-established in 1660.
The Thanksgivings accomplish the duty of understanding praise
outlined in the Meditations on the Creation through celebration of
many of the "Common Things" (£ III.53) of the physical world,
notably the human body ("Thanksgivings for the Body", M 11.214-29).
These are known and appreciated through man's soul ("Thanksgivings
for the Soul", M 11.229-44) and his "Power, To en .joy all things"
(M II.237» 1.320). The Thanksgivings offer lists of objects and
attributes as in themselves sufficient cause for praise, and frame
these lists with abstract consideration of God's generosity and the
wealth of man's endowment. God has "made this World the Chamber of
£hisl presence" (M 11.219, 1.180) and through understanding of it
man, able to "Comprehend the Heavens . . . Can4~' . . • Measure all
the Spaces beyond the Heavens", can himself "Receive the Deity of
the eternal God" (M 11.230, 11.38.40,41). There are also
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"Thanksgivings for the Glory of God's Works" (M 11.244-56) and
"A Thanksgiving and Prayer for the NATION" (M 11.320-31).
The anonymous Preface to the Thanksgivings includes the only
surviving sketch of Traherne's character. He was
so fully bent upon that Honourable Function in
which he was engaged; and so wonderfully
transported with the Love of God to Mankind,
with the excellency of those Divine Laws which
are prescribed to us, and with those
inexpressible Felicities to which we are
entitled by being created in, and redeemed to,
the Divine Image, that he dwelt continually
amongst these thoughts, with great delight
and satisfaction, spending most of his time
when at home, in digesting his notions of
these things into writing, and was so full of
them when abroad, that those who would converse
with him, were forced to endure some discourse
upon these subjects, whether they had any sense
of Religion, or not. And therefore to such he
might be sometimes thought troublesome, but his
company was very acceptable to all such as had
any inclinations to Vertue, and Religion . . .
He was a man of a cheerful and sprightly Temper,
free from any thing of the sourness of
formality, by which some great pretenders of
Piety rather disparage and misrepresent true
Religion, than recommend it; and therefore was
very affable and pleasant in his Conversation,
ready to do all good Offices to his Friends,
and Charitable to the Poor almost beyond his
ability.
(M I.xxxi-xxxii).
This is particularly interesting if Susanna Hopton's acquaintance
with Traherne, as a "Friend of the Authors", was at all close.
Hopton's friendship with Hickes is also of interest. Both Hickes
and Spinckes (who brought out the 1717 Collection after the deaths
of Hopton and Hickes) were close friends of Susanna Hopton. All
three seem to have shared views on the anglican liturgy. Both Hickes
and Spinckes were younger than Traherne, and it is unlikely that he
19
ever met them. Both achieved some recognition as clergymen in the
l670's and early l680's — both were, at different times, Chaplains
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to the Duke of Lauderdale, and Hickes was a Chaplain to the King
after 1681 — but both refused allegiance to William and Mary after
the 1688 revolution and were suspended and deprived, Hickes in 1689
and Spinckes in 1690, because of their commitment to the "ancient
way of offices". Hickes' name appears on the title page of Traherne's
Thanksgivings and at the foot of a prefatory letter in that volume,
published in 1699. As a non-juror since 1689, however, he had been
living in partial concealment in Oxford, in London, and abroad. He
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had been elected titular bishop of Thetford in 16^ but was unable
to practice his beliefs openly. He emerged from retirement only in
1699, so his part in the publication of the Thanksgivings must have
been among the first of his public acts. The title page prominently
proclaims both his and Hopton's part: "Published By the Reverend
Doctor Hicks, At the request of a Friend of the Authors". The terms
in which the unsigned Preface "To the Reader" recommends Traherne's
work are reminders of Hickes' presence. The Thanksgivings are
offered as "the Remains of a very devout Christian" in an attempt to
"retrieve the Spirit of Devotion, and the sacred Fires of Primitive
Christianity" amid "the unhappy decay of true Piety . . . the
Immoralities of the Age . . . and too evident contempt of Religion"
(M I.xxxi). This suggests a commitment to the "ancient way of
offices" which the Thanksgivings do not share. The attribution to
Traherne is unambiguous but he is not actually named ("To tell you
who he was, is I think, to no purpose", M I.xxxi). Nor is there any
mention of his other publications, Roman Forgeries and Christian
Ethicks: contrary to the implication here, the Thanksgivings by no
means comprise the whole of his "Remains", What matters to the author
of the Preface is that Traherne lived "in the late disordered Times
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when the Foundations were cast down, and this excellent Church laid
in the dust, and dissolved into Confusion and Snthusiasme" and that
he "never failed any one day either publicly or in his private
closet" to practise strict religious rites (M I.xxxii). In the
Select Meditations, written soon after the Restoration, Traherne
praised the re-established Church, chiefly as the focus for a new
unity in a country recently split by religious civil war (SM III.25).
His concern then was not for particular liturgical forms. Such
details are in fact notably absent from his writing, which is hardly
at all concerned with the particularities of formal worship. The
Thanksgivings, offered with the name of the non-juring Hickes on the
title page, would surely have disappointed those seeking advocacy of
the "ancient way of offices". The apparently deliberate separation
of the Thanksgivings from Traherne's other published work — which
included, in Roman Forgeries, a substantial attack on the Roman
Catholic Church — suggests their recruitment to a cause that
neither they nor Traherne's other writing truly support.
In 1?00, when Susanna Hopton's revision of Devotions in the
Ancient Way of Offices was published, Hopton herself remained
anonymous but Hickes' name appeared on the title page. His name
appears again on the title page of the 171? Collection. In both
instances there would be some point to an appeal to non-juring
sympathies: the Daily Devotions and the Meditations and Devotions
on the Life of Christ emphasize the importance of "our excellent
Liturgy" and imply a commitment to the "ancient way". All three
works, Daily Devotions, Devotions in the Ancient Way and Meditations
and Devotions on the Life of Christ, are devotional handbooks. Their
explicit liturgical aspect is absent from Traherae's Meditations on
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the Creation as from the Thanksgivings.
The Daily Devotions had appeared before, in l673> entered in
the Stationers' Register, in fact, on the same day as Traherne's
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Roman Forgeries. From the first edition of the Daily Devotions
to their re-appearance in the 1717 Collection Susanna Hopton's
work, always published anonymously, can be traced as a tradition
of high anglican devotional literature. Hickes was invariably
involved in the publication of Hopton's work and, unlike her, was
actually named on title pages. Into this tradition Traherne's
Thanksgivings and Meditations on the Creation were taken, initially
by Susanna Hopton as a "Friend of the Authors". This relationship
between Traherne and Susanna Hopton must be acknowledged. To read
the work offered within this tradition, however, is to become aware
of the extent to which Traherne's writing remains outside it. The
Preface to the Thanksgivings describes them as the work of "a very
comprehensive Soul" (M I.xxxi) and it is in terms of this
comprehensiveness that Traherne's writing may be distinguished from
that of Susanna Hopton. Her particular concern for liturgical and
devotional practice has almost no contact with the "Divine Philosophy"
(C IV.3) expounded by Traherne. Traherne benefitted by his friendship
with Susanna Hopton — it may have been through her influence that
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he became Sir Orlando Bridgeman's Chaplain — and he may have
written some of his work with her and her religious society in mind.
In print, however, her own work suggests that, finally, their aims
are very different and that, if Hopton prompted any large proportion
of Traherne's writing, this served only as a partial and immediate
stimulus for his comprehensive attempt to explicate a whole "Divine
Philosophy" addressed perhaps, in the case of the Centuries, to one
person, but to one person as the representative of all. A "Liberal
Soul Prone to Delight in the Felicity of all" (C IV.9), the
philosopher was "concerned in all the world" (£ III.23): "he was





1. Traherne in London, 1669-167^-
In 1669 Traherne was appointed Chaplain to Sir Orlando Bridgeman,
Lord Keeper of the Seal. He was to spend the remainder of his life in
or near London, living either in the Bridgemans' town house, Essex
House in the Strand, or at their country home at Teddington. Factual
documentary evidence for this period in Traherne's life is as scant as
for any other. His written output, however, was far larger than at any
other time of his life and no slight achievement for any writer in a
single five year period. The relative silence and apparent obscurity
of the Rector of Credenhill are in marked contrast to the eager
articulation of the Chaplain to the holder of the highest state
office in Charles II"s government. In London Traherne published two
books (Roman Forgeries, 16?3» Christian Ethicks, published
posthumously in I675 but entered in the Stationers' Register in
August 167^, before Traherne's death in October);* he wrote the
equivalent of at least two more (Centuries of Meditations; The Church's
Year Book; and the detailed and ordered notes of the Commonplace Book);
and he probably added significantly to the poems he had written while
at Credenhill. Assumptions about Traherne as a retired and retiring
country clergyman should be challenged. He held a sought-after
position in the capital city, and it was in Restoration London that
he particularly chose to write and publish.
Considerable interest is therefore attached to Roman Forgeries
and Christian Ethicks, the two books that Traherne himself wanted to
see in print. As these can provide direct links with the local
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circumstances of Traherne's life, however, discussion of them will
be delayed until it can lead directly into a wider examination of
that life. Bearing in mind that the immediate consideration of the
years 1669 to 1674 in Traherne's life should give major emphasis to
the only works he was to publish, discussion will begin here with
the writings that remained in manuscript. Among these the Centuries
of Meditations are the most familiar of all Traherne's works, so
consideration of the circumstances in which these were written is an
appropriate means of initiating discussion of less well known texts
and background.
It is possible that Traherne attached as much importance to the
Centuries of Meditations as to the published works. They first
appeared in print, however, only in 1908. The original manuscript is
2
now in the Bodleian Library. No evidence determines the precise date
of authorship. There is evidence to suggest that the Centuries were
written for Susanna Hopton, alter Traherne had moved away from her
circle in Herefordshire (M 1.234). They are addressed to a second
person, whether Susanna Hopton or any student of Felicity. This
enhances their immediacy but does not limit their reference: "Lov of
all" becomes an important motive (C 1.33)•
Margoliouth's description of the third leaf of the manuscript
is significant: "A title 'Centuries of Meditations', in a hand which
may be seventeenth-century but is certainly not Traherne's" (M I.x).
This is the source of the title that has become so familiar: it is
not necessarily Traheme's title. Although it may have been added to
the manuscript by a contemporary, it is possibly a later addition.
In view of the significance that become attached to this title in a
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climate of avid literary categorisation, it is worth quoting
Margoliouth's account of the manuscript at length:
Traherne gave the book no title, and, although
many of his sections can be properly described
as meditations, many cannot. The purpose of his
writing was not to put his meditations on paper,
but to instruct his friend in the way of
Felicity: he would fill the book with
"Profitable Wonders". What the manuscript
suggests is that he started writing his
paragraphs or sections . . . and numbering them.
At the number 101 he decided not to head it
'101' but to head it 'The Second Century' (or
hundred) and so to start the numbering again
with '1'. Though the beginning of this Second
Century reverts to the main topic, which was
last specially touched on in I.65, there is no
real break in subject-matter between I and II.
On the other hand 11.100 reaches a climax which
might well have concluded the work. By this time,




Thus Traherne went on the-write the largely autobiographical third
Century. In a fourth Century he "set out to expound the 'principles'
of Felicity" (M I.xi). "He started a fifth Century . . . and in V.10
reached a climax with which the Centuries happily and fitly conclude.
Yet it is clear from '11* at the top of the next page that Traherne,
at one time at any rate, thought of going on" (M I.xi). Finally,
Margoliouth observes that "I think it highly probable that the
prayers and some of the paragraphs which are strictly meditations
were, like the poems, already in existence and judged by Traherne
to be suitable for insertion in this work. But the great body of
instruction about Felicity seems to have been written currente
calamo" (M I.xi).
Margoliouth, whose edition of the Centuries was the first to
attempt to follow Traherne's spelling, punctuation, capitalisation
ij,
and complex variation of emphasis precisely, was surely better
qualified to make judgements on the technique of the manuscript than
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many other critics. The text they use was established by him. A
reading of the Centuries in manuscript seems only to confirm his
judgement. As an experience it is different to reading the printed
text. That is not to say that Margoliouth's edition is not
authoritative as such, but to suggest that the Centuries, with
their characteristic and sometimes arbitrary sense of direction,
did not aspire to authoritativeness. The verbal acrobatics of the
text are complemented in the manuscript by the small but dashing
italic script and the varying emphasis of space and capital.
Margoliouth's judgement, as a direct reaction to the manuscript, is
in many ways definitive of the reading experience. The eager
writing challenges the reader's literal grasp of the text; the text
itself overwhelms him in rapid kaleidoscopic effusion.-'
That Traherne became "conscious that he was writing Centuries"
only after he had been writing for some considerable time is,
however, open to dispute. The Select Meditations, discovered since
Margoliouth's edition of the Centuries appeared, are also organised
as Centuries. There the last three Centuries bear both the title
Select Meditations and the sub-title "The Second Century" and so on.
Ironically, the first pages of the manuscript of the Select
Meditations, which would show whether, unlike the Centuries of
Meditations, these were called "Centuries" from the beginning, are
<^UtAl"WYVfl.Uc/
missing. Margoliouth's attitude, even if in this respect fucotioablc,
is still a tonic to what otherwise threatens to become an over-
insistence on Traherne's awareness of form. If he did set out to
write Centuries it must be said that in neither case did he finish
or round off the works as such, although it would appear that he
did make some revisions in what he had already written. The Select
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Meditations end after section IV.68; the Centuries of Meditations
after section V.ll, Both manuscripts contain "blank pages after the
writing ceases. The significance of Centuries as a form for
Traheme must "be questioned.
Traherne often arranged his writing or notes on some principle
of order.^ Centuries, for Traherne, may be little more than that:
a convenient principle of order that gives form to a series of
prose paragraphs or sections that could sometimes be inter-related
and necessarily consequent or sometimes individual pieces, finished
in themselves and possibly unrelated to context. The idea of
"Centuries" as such may be no more significant than that of the
alphabetical arrangement of the Commonplace Book. The common form
of Centuries, although associated with similar forms that assume or
imply necessary connection between form and meaning, does
demonstrate examples of the use of "Centuries" as a convenient
method of disciplining heterogenous and disparate material, usually
material disposed into short paragraphs or other independent
sections. Bacon's Sylva Sylvarum: or, A Natural History. In Ten
ry
Centuries (l62?)» comprises a mass of experiments and observations
which all contribute to an overall heterogenous unity but could
not otherwise be effectively organised. The fact that this collection
was assembled by an editor and not the author himself is apposite.
It is misleading to attach too much importance to Traheme's having
(supposedly) written "Centuries" of "Meditations". In the two
manuscripts, of the Select Meditations and Centuries of Meditations,
there are extant some 697 paragraphs or sections of prose. Perhaps
both are fragments from a larger collection, or partial reflections
of an unrealised idea. There is no explicit statement of such or
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similar intention in either. It is upon Margoliouth's studied
impressions that an empirical consideration of the Centuries can
be based. It is with "An Empty Book" and nothing more that the
writing begins (C I.l); it is precisely in the filling of that
book (C I.l) that the writer's purpose will be accomplished.
Consideration can next be given to the two manuscripts
containing the great majority of Traherne's poems. The first of
these is the "Dobell Folio", which occasioned the modern discovery
g
of Traherne, and which is now in the Bodleian Library. The second,
although belonging to the British Museum since 1818 and attributed
on the title page to "Tho: Traheron. B.D. Author of the Roman
Forgeries, & Christian Ethicks", remained unrecognised until Dobell
g
published the poems from his manuscript. There are 37 poems in the
Dobell Folio and 61 in Poems of Felicity; 23 are common, in some
form, to both.
The copies in the Dobell Folio were made early in the London
period. The Commonplace Book, which follows the poems in the same
notebook, seems to cover almost the whole of the period 1669 to 1672
(if not later), so the copies of the poems were probably made before
1670. It would seem likely that most were written at Credenhill.
Rather more of the Poems of Felicity may have been written in London,
but this manuscript was compiled by Philip Traherne, probably after
the death of his brother.^ Philip Traherne headed these poems
"Divine Reflections On the Native Objects of An Infant Ey", but
his presence as the compiler of the manuscript calls into question
its real usefulness and authenticity. "Philip's arrangement of the
poems is on the whole a good one. His editing and changing of the
text is a disaster" (M I.xv). The poems are not considered in detail
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here. Doubts about their date of composition and the lack of real
textual authority for any but thirty-seven poems are reasons for
this. These, however, are subsidiary to a conviction that the poems
as a whole represent neither Traherne's best nor most interesting
work. In the prose writings it is clear that the intuitive
"Reflections . . . of An Infant Ey" are superceded by the more
penetrating gaze of the "Ey of Reason" (C 1.2$} see C IV.5^). It is
in terms of the "Highest Reason" (G_ III.2) that fulfilment is sought,
and it is in relation to this that the "Divine Philosophy" (C IV.3)
of the prose writings can best be understood. The poems are no
adequate vehicle for the expression of this, and when they attempt
explication of the perceptions of the eye of reason they often
become little more than lists of philosophical propositions. The
11
poems best realise the naive apprehension of the infant eye. That
apprehension remained, for Traheme, a valuable image of innocent
spontaneity; but the poems suffer in so far as they do not mature
as true reflections of the perceptions of the eye of reason. The
only poems that Traheme sought to publish are those of the Christian
Ethicks, which are hardly more than useful illustrations of ideas
presented in the main text. His own fair copy of thirty-seven of
his poems in the Dobell Folio is followed immediately by the notes
of the Commonplace Book, perhaps suggesting that Traheme himself
decided to direct his energies elsewhere.
Two unpublished manuscripts date from the London period: The
Church's Year Book and the Commonplace Book. The Church's Year Book
is discussed and analysed by Margoliouth (M I.xvii-xx) and by Carol
12
Marks. It is a notebook of 133 leaves, the dating of which has
been the subject of some controversy. Margoliouth dated it 16?2 or
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(more probably, he thought) 1673» and. suggested that certain
remarks demonstrate Traherne's sympathy for his patron Bridgeman
after the surrender of the Great Seal in 1672. Traherne does pray
for protection "From Deifying of Kings" and "From Flattering of
the People": "From all the Evils of State Good Lord Deliver us"
(CYB 30V). Carol Marks has shown, however, that these are quotations
from Lancelot Andrewes' Private Devotions and are not original to
Traherne in 1672 or 1673. In fact, Marks suggests, The Church's
Year Book was composed in 1670, between April and November, long
before Bridgeman became involved in the political events leading
13
to his resignation. Her evidence for this, however, is her
identification of some of the handwriting in The Church's Year Book
(CYB 2^V) as that of Philip Traheme, who was out of the country
after I67O and until 1675. As sole evidence for dating this is not
absolutely convincing: parts of The Church's Year Book may date
from after I67O.
It would, however, be appropriate to the contents of The Church's
Year Book to date it early in Traherne's service as Bridgeman's
Chaplain. It evinces a tendency to refer to sources rather than create
original material and is organised as a devotional handbook based on
the major feasts of the Church year. Traherne may have composed this
theologically sound but somewhat uninspiring piece to please his
patron. Reservations must be made about the enthusiasm often
attributed to Traherne as well as Susanna Hopton for the details and
observance of high anglican liturgy, but this would have suited what
is thought to have been Bridgeman's own conventional anglican piety.
As that assumption takes too little account of Bridgeman's direct
initiative in the 1668 Comprehension Bill, however, so the formal
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framework of The Church's Year Book is ultimately inadequate to
Traherne's urge to written expression. It is "more restricted in
scope and more narrowly defined in purpose" than any other Traherne
Ik
manuscript. About one half of the pages contain material from
other sources. These sources include, fundamentally and ail-
pervasively, the Bible and Book of Common Prayer; and also
Lancelot Andrewes' Private Devotions. The Auncient Ecclesiastical
Histories (1577). sermons by John Donne, Daniel Featley's Ancilla
Pietatis (1626), The Meditations, Soliloquia, and Manuall of the
Glorious Doctor S. Augustine (1631)» William Austin's Devotionis
Augustinianae Flamma (1635)» Jeremy Taylor's The Great Exemplar of
Sanctity (1649), Edward Sparke's Scintillula Altaris (1652), and
Anthony Sparrow's A Rationale upon the Book of Common Prayer (l665).^^
Marks proposes that The Church's Year Book "escapes being a mere
potpourri" because of Traherne's "habit of assimilating to his own
manner and thought the style and ideas of other writers".*^ She
makes a case, which she herself seems to find ultimately unconvincing,
for The Church's Year Book being a product of Traherne's own mind.
However, her references to some few passages which do have contact
with Traherne's other work only reinforce the sense that these
passages are somewhat out of context here. The quotations are
perhaps representative in what appears to be deliberately compiled
as a devotional handbook, but, precisely, Traherne selects his
17
authors only as "a thoughtful priest of the Church". The sources
would make the strongest case for a full exposition of Traherne's
work as determined or influenced by traditions of meditation and
devotion. Traherne speaks of "the Sweet Methods of Meditation" here
(CYB 75V). If a substantial and coherent theory could be extracted
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from these references, however, Marks' observation about the
sources of The Church's Year Book remains true: "none of them is
a 'source' in the sense of a fountainhead of j^Traherne'sl thought
. . . They are instead grist for his mill; the force which drives
18
the mill is more complex". Even when Traherne's more vigorous
personal style breaks into confident expatiation redolent of his
other writings the effect is here somewhat empty. The Church's Year
Book is an interesting document and evidence for another aspect of
Traherne's intellectual interests, but it has few claims to
attention in terms of originality or widely ranging speculative
interest. Recalling Traherne's assertion in Christian Ethicks
— "I need not treat of Vertues in the ordinary way" (CE 3) — it
is possible to suggest that a conventional spiritual or devotional
handbook would not hold his full interest throughout. "There is a
Glory in the Work which the silent Habit is uncapable of" (CE 191):
the "Sweet Methods of Meditation" do not offer real stimulus or
fulfilment.
The Commonplace Book, however, occupying by far the larger
proportion of the Dobell Folio containing Traherne's fair copy
of his poems, is the most interesting among all unpublished Traherne
manuscripts.**^ It is analysed by Margoliouth (briefly; M I.xii) and
20
by Carol Marks. It can be dated no more precisely than within the
London period, and represents work done in preparation for Christian
Ethicks, possibly early within this period (c. 1669-70?). The
handwriting is not Traherne's throughout, but the organisation of
all the notes and extracts under a series of alphabetical headings
(some of which are cross-referenced) written or dictated by Traherne
would allow for the assistance of an amanuensis. This can be traced
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in the notes themselves: "Traherne responded personally to, made
use of, even manipulated, his sources, [the amanuensis! merely
21
made verbatim transcripts". It seems that Traherne directed the
enterprise fairly closely, and a good proportion of the notes are
in fact in his own hand. He can be seen "using his sources as a
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point of departure for an expanded consideration of the same topic",
but his tendency to reduce the results of his extensive reading to
concise points of opinion and controversy is also notable. The sources
of the notes encompass a representative proportion of the classical
learning extant in the seventeenth century. The contemporary sources,
which account for the majority of longer notes, in contrast to the
brief references accorded to classical writers, include John
Everard's translation of the Hermetic The Divine Pymander (I650),
Theophilus Gale's The Court of the Gentiles (Part One, 1669; Part
Two, 1670), and a sermon by Isaac Barrow preached in London in
I67I, The Duty and Reward of Bounty to the Poor (1671).^ The
Commonplace Book provides substantial evidence for the learning and
intellectual ambition behind all Traherne's work: it will later be
discussed in greater detail. This notebook, and The Church's Year
Book, together with the Centuries of Meditations, Roman Forgeries
and Christian Ethicks, shows that Traherne's time in London was a
period of considerable preoccupation with reading, note-taking and
original writing. This survey of his activities as a writer in these
last five years of his life may conclude with a consideration of the
two books he published.
The only book of his that Traherne actually saw published was
Roman Forgeries. It w»s "Printed by S. and B. Griffin, for Jonathan
Edwin at the three Roses in Luagate-Street" in l673> being entered
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in the Stationers' Register on 25 September of that year. It is
a scholarly but unusually short discussion of the ways in which and
the extent to which the Roman Catholic Church was thought to
falsify historical fact, either by outright forgery of documents or
by dogmatic interpretation: as the title says, "a TRUE ACCCUNT OF
FALSE RECORDS Discovering the IMPOSTURES AND Counterfeit Antiquities
OF THE CHURCH OF ROME". The book was published anonymously (the title
page says it is "By a Faithful Son of the Church of ENGLAND") with a
Dedication to Sir Orlando Bridgeman: "TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE Sr
ORLANDO BRIDGEMAN KNIGHT and BARONET One of HIS MAJESTIES Most
Honourable Privy Council; The AUTHOR Devoteth his best Services AND
DEDICATETH The USE and BENEFIT of his Ensuing Labors". Margoliouth
suggested that Roman Forgeries contains material used by Traherne
for an exercise or thesis for his B.D. degree (M I.xxviii). Traherne,
however, says that he tried to write a more popular book. He saw no
need to "expatiate downwards" to the last scholarly detail: this
would "overswell the Book, which is intended to be little, for the
use and benefit of all" (RF B6r v). He does state that work on
Roman Forgeries was done in the Bodleian Library (RF B6V-B7X),
however, and the book does offer considerable evidence of "the
25
intellectual quality and austerity of Traheme".
Traherne deals particularly with forgeries in records of the
Councils of the Roman Catholic Church. His major inquiry is into
the Decretals of Pseudo-Isidore (isidori Mercatoris Collectio
Decretalium) as published in Jacques Merlin's edition of Collected
Councils (Conciliorum quatuor generalium, 1530) (RF 28-64). This
collection of papal decrees and letters was assembled in the ninth
century. Parts are genuine but most were forged, the apparent
object of falsification being to give authority to a separation
of Church and state. Merlin attributed the collection to Isidore
of Sevile (c.570-636) but Traherne disputes this and uses the
suspected forgery as an attack on the whole Roman Catholic Church.
Forgery is a crime, and "If the Church of Rome be guilty . . . her
Antiquity and Tradition, the two great Pillars upon which she
standeth, are very rotten, and will moulder into nothing" (RF 3)«
His other chapters include similar discussions of collections of
records by Petrus Crabbe, Batholome Carranza, Laurentius Surius, and
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Severinus Binius. Traherne's scholarship later received a tribute
from Thomas Comber in his Roman Forgeries in the Councils (1689).
Traherne had originally intended his book "for the use and
benefit of all", however, and it is in relation to his comprehensive
attack on the Roman Catholic Church that this aim can be seen.
Gilbert Burnet observed that in the early 1670's "Popery was
everywhere preached against. The bishops . . . charged the clergy
to preach against popery, and to inform the people aright in the
controversies between us and the church of Rome. This alarmed the
28
court as well as the city and the whole nation". It
was in Roman Forgeries that Traherne, for his part, sought to
"inform the people aright" in these controversies. In demonstrating
the "rotten" foundations of the Roman Catholic Church Traherne seeks
to show that Roman Catholics have attempted to "steal away the
Truth" (RF B2V). A church guilty of forgery cannot claim legitimate
credence. "It is sufficient to prove that all the Streams are
infected by the Poyson that is thrown into ihe Fountain-head" (RF B6r
Contemporary attacks on Roman Catholicism "alarmed the court", s
Burnet observes. The Queen was a Roman Catholic. The Roman Catholic
96
Duke of York had ceased attending the Chapel Royal in 1672 after
John Tillotson had preached a sermon there on "the hazard of
being saved in the Church of Rome". Charles II himself was already
widely suspected to be a Roman Catholic, It is significant that
Roman Forgeries, dedicated to Bridgeman, was published only after
Bridgeman had ceased to be a member of the government. Although
research for the book may have been done some ten years earlier,
its publication in 1673 as an attack on the foundations of the
Roman Catholic Church bears directly upon contemporary controversy.
In 1673 John Milton inquired as to "what best means may be
us'd against the growth of Popery" in his pamphlet Of True
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Religion. "It is unknown to no man", he wrote, "that the increase
of Popery is at this day no small trouble and offence to the
greatest part of the Nation"."Popery" is chiefly upheld by the
71
"ignorance in Scripture" Traherne sought, in part, to inform.
Milton remarks upon contemporary attacks on Popery — "some have
already in Publick with many considerable Arguments exhorted the
32
people to beware the growth of this Romish Weed"-^ — and regards
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it as a common duty to lend his hand "to so good a Purpose". He
will not "enter into the Labyrinth of Councels and Fathers", however,
for that is "an intangl'd wood which the Papist loves to fight in,
not with hope of Victory, but to obscure the shame of an open
34
overthrow". Traherne attempted an "open overthrow" on his own
side by a foray into the "intangl'd wood" of the forged councils,
attempting to produce a less than usually obscure guide "for the use
and benefit of all". The sharper mind of Milton perceived that "such
manner of dispute ... to Learned Men, is useful and very
commendable" but also that he must "insist now on what is plainer
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to Common apprehension". Traheme's attack, if less direct, was
no less thorough. Milton, though, inevitably connected Popery with
what he saw as the contemporary national decline: "it is a general
complaint that this Nation of late years is grown more numerously
and excessively vitious than heretofore; Pride, Luxury, Drunkenness,
Whoredom, Cursing, Swearing, bold and open Atheism every where
o kT
abounding: Where these grow, no wonder if Popery also grow a pace".
It will later be necessary to examine, in Traherne's other writings,
his own reaction to the society that provoked this response from his
older contemporary.
Traherne did not live quite long enough to see Christian Ethicks
published. It was entered in the Stationers' Register on 6 August
16?^, and announced in the Term Catalogues for Michaelmas of that
year.-^ The title page is dated 1675- Traheme died in October 167^
and was buried at Teddington on 10 October (M I.xxviii). As for
Roman Forgeries the publisher of Christian Ethicks was Jonathan
Edwin, and the book was printed at "the Three Roses in Ludgate-
street" again probably by Sarah and Bennet Griffin. A note was
inserted in copies of Christian Ethicks asking the reader to pardon
mistakes in the printing due to the writer's death "hapning
immediately after this Copy came to the Press". Both Christian
Ethicks and Roman Forgeries, however, are badly printed — Christian
Ethicks being somewhat the worse — and both contain numerous
misprints and erratic pagination. Some damaged type was used and the
capitalisation is often more unusual than Traherne's own in his
manuscripts. The title page of Christian Ethicks assigns the book
to Traheme by name and cites his authorship of Roman Forgeries:
"Christian ETHICKS: OR, Divine MORALITY. Opening the WAY to
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BLESSEDNESS, By the RULES of VERTUE AND REASON. By THO. TRAHERNE.
B.D. Author of the Roman Forgeries".
Noting here only that "VERTUE" and "REASON" are the guiding
principles behind the book, it will be necessary later to consider
the Christian Ethicks as an exposition of the thought of the
Centuries all the more interesting for having been published in
the seventeenth century. It is certainly the nearest Traherne came
to seeing his own philosophy expounded publicly in his own time.
The "WAY to BLESSEDNESS" is none other than the path to Felicity
traced in the Centuries: the connection between the two is explicit.
Christian Ethicks was intended "for vulgar Apprehensions" if not
for "the very meanest readers" (CE 23). It is not a spiritual or
moral handbook. In The Whole Duty of Man (1658; attributed to
Richard Allestree) there is a good example of such work, Traherne
says (CE 3)> so he "need not treat of Vertues in the ordinary way".
Similarly, "the French Charron" has presented a sceptical view of
the world, showing the necessity of "Wisdom" to the maintaining of
a man's individual integrity (CE 3)«"^ So in Christian Ethicks
Traherne speaks not of the "Duties enjoyned by the Law of GOD", nor
of the "Prudential Expedients and Means for a man's Peace and
Honour on Earth" but rather of "the reality, force and efficacy of
Vertue . . . its Beauty, Dignity and Glory" by way of the
"advantages" he "gained in the nature of Felicity (by many years
earnest and diligent study)" (CE 3).
Little can be learned about Traherne's life from Christian
Ethicks, but he does speak of his acquaintance with "high-born
Souls in Courts and Palaces" (CE 260). He suggests that he was
"admitted to the society and friendship of Great men" (CE 173) and
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tells how he "often experienced" their confidence: they entrusted
to him "their Wives and Children . . . their Gold, their Bonds,
their Souls, their Affairs, their Lives, their Secrets, Houses,
Liberties, and Lands" (CE 200). He also refers to his patron
Bridgeman as an example of charity and humility: "My Lord Bridgeman,
late Lord Keeper, confessed himself in his Will to be but a Steward
of his Estate, and prayed GOD to forgive him all his offences; in
Getting, Mispending, or not Spending it as he ought to do: And that
after many Charitable and Pious works, perhaps surmounting his
Estate, though concealed from the notice and knowledge of the
World" (CE 239). While Bridgeman was still Lord Keeper another book,
like Roman Forgeries a year later, was dedicated to him: Richard
Cumberland's De Legibus Naturae (1672). Cumberland, who was to
become Bishop of Peterborough in 1691, had received a living as a
result of Bridgeman's patronage in 1667. His book was reprinted
many times well into the eighteenth century, and foreshadows in a
number of ways later work by moralists of the eighteenth century.
It is not without contact with aspects of the thought expounded in
Traherne's Christian Ethicks, however.
Cumberland sought, in De Legibus Naturae, a "Common Good"
through "Benevolence": "The greatest Benevolence of every rational
Agent towards all, forms the happiest State of every, and of all the
40
Benevolent, as far as is in their Power". "Benevolence" and "Self-
love" were to become major preoccupations of eighteenth century
moralists — of Joseph Butler, for example — but Cumberland's
emphasis on Benevolence was explicitly intended as a reply to
Hobbes' contrary theory of Self-love. Only later were Benevolence
and a new theory of Self-love seen to coincide. Traherne, however,
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had already defined an alternative form of Self-love: the author
of "that arrogant Leviathan", he said, "made a great mistake . . .
so far to imprison our love to our selves, so as to make it
inconsistent with Charity towards others . . . [for-! ... it is
impossible to love our selves, without loving other things" (CS 26l).
Thus "self Lov is the Basis of all Lov" (C IV.55) • Traherne's
"Felicity", "rightly defined, to be the Perfect fruition of a Perfect
Soul, acting in a perfect Life by Perfect Virtue" (CE 19), is a form
of the Common Good, "the happiest State", realisable through
Benevolence. Traherne derived his definition from Aristotle but
proposed its direct relevance to a "perfect Life" sought
contemporaneously with Cumberland's Common Good.
Cumberland's "rational Agent" seeks the Common Good partly
through knowledge. He praises "the happy Genius of this learned
Age [in whichf] the intellectual Part of the World has been much
C/
illustrated by that great Accession of Light, which former Proofs
of the Being of God, and the Immortality of the Soul have receiv'd
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from the daily increasing knowledge of the inferior Part of Nature".
Traheme saw man as "the Interpreter of Nature" (C IV.74) who might
"by Plight Reason discover all the Mysteries of heaven" (C IV.81):
/ \ 42
"Never so much clear Knowledge in any Age", he exclaimed (CE 283).
This, for him, was an essential aspect of man's achievement of
Perfect Life and Felicity. It is in this sense that "Natural Philosophy"
contributes to Felicity (£ III.44). Cumberland was more locally
explicit, identifying the "great Accession of Light" and "daily
increasing of knowledge" with the achievements of "those great Genius's
43
of which the Royal Society is compos'd". J He thought that "the whole
of moral philosophy ... is ultimately resolv'd into natural
101
observations known by the Experience of all Men, or into
44
Conclusions of true Natural Philosophy". Traherne's own
relationship to this idea will be examined later. It is significant
in this respect that Cumberland defines "Natural Philosophy, in the
large Sense", as capable of containing man's inquiry into "the
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Nature of our Souls" and "knowledge of the first Mover". What
can be emphasized here, however, is the apparent proximity of
Traherne and Cumberland in London in the early 1670's. It was
Hezekiah Burton, Traherne's predecessor as Chaplain to Sir Orlando
Bridgeman, who wrote the dedication to Bridgeman for Cumberland's
De Legibus Naturae. Cumberland and Burton may serve here, then, to
introduce the patron they had in common with Traherne.
2. Sir Orlando Bridgeman, Lord Keeper of the Seal 1667-1672
In 1667 Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon and Charles II's Lord
Chancellor since the Restoration, was banished and left for France.
During the next seven years no one man was to attain so dominant a
position and so extensive a control in court and parliament circles.
This is the period of the "Cabal", a group of ministers and court
members — Thomas Clifford, Baron Clifford of Chudleigh; Henry
Bennet, Earl of Arlington; George Villiers, Duke of Buckingham;
Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury; John Maitland, Duke
46
of Lauderdale — who, not being in competition among themselves
for one centrally important post (they held independent posts
concurrently or, like Buckingham, were friends of the King) were
available to Charles as individual advisers and confidants. Through
them he could play a complex game,the aim of which was to rule on
the model of Louis XIV: without Parliament. He could play off one
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member of the Cabal against another, and so, since each inevitably
had his own ambitions, intentions became multiply disguised.
Parliament was allowed to play very little part in this political
hide-and-seek (it did not meet between April I67I and February
1673) a^d no one man could ever really know the truth of motive
and/or policy. The best example of this, and one to which it will
be necessary to return, is the Treaty of Dover of 1670, which was
produced amd signed in two copies. One copy contained a secret
clause of which only Charles, Clifford and Arlington knew.
Clarendon's actual influence had not been inherently connected
with his official position as Lord Chancellor. Upon his demise his
power was dispersed and the official post he had held fell to Sir
Orlando Bridgeman, who became Lord Keeper of the Seal rather than
Lord Chancellor. Bridgeman, born probably in 1606 and educated at
Queen's College, Cambridge, had a high reputation as Lord Chief
Justice of the Common Pleas. He was a Fellow of Magdalene College,
Cambridge, had practised at the Bar and had been a member of
Parliament. Knighted in 1643, Charles II had later awarded him the
first Baronetcy of the Restoration. He had presided at the trial of
the regicides, where "he did wholly rip up the unjustnesse of the
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war against the King". In 1667 he was regarded as one of the
country's foremost lawyers, and had most recently assisted in
settling property disputes after the Great Fire of 1667• He seems to
have been chosen by Charles for a post which was probably regarded
by the King, with his absolutist ambitions, as somewhat perfunctory.
The substitution of the less prestigious title of Lord Keeper for
that of Lord Chancellor reflects this, as well as Charles' wish to
avoid the rise of another minister of such dominance as Clarendon.
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The Lord Keeper needed to be a lawyer of the greatest general
repute, but, in the King's opinion, he would have little business
apart from the administration of church and state patronage and
the actual fixing of the Seal to state papers. Bridgeman would be
an efficient functionary who would not need to be too closely
informed of the details of state business.
Bridgeman received the Seal in August I667. Pepys recorded
that "the Seal is delivered to Sir Orlando Bridgeman, the man of
the whole nation that is the best spoken of, and will please most
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people; and therefore I am mighty glad of it". Bridgeman "was
49then at my Lord Arlington's". A newsletter echoed Pepys' pleasure:
"The people are transported with joy upon the lord keeper's instalment
into the ministry".^ The association with Arlington and the
instalment of the new Lord Keeper into the "ministry" indicate
something of Bridgeman's inclination, at least in the first two or
three years of his tenure, to participate more positively in state
affairs than perhaps Charles had either expected or desired. More
positively, too, than later became his habit. His relationship
with Arlington, a member of the Cabal, was at first professionally
close, but later declined.
As Lord Keeper Bridgeman's duties included responsibility for
royal patronage and for certain compensatory payments in lieu of
loss or distress — dealing with the results of fire and shipwreck,
for example, and with cases of all "idiots and lunatics".^ At first,
however, Bridgeman himself initiated and was involved in discussions
bearing directly upon national policy. On 2 January 1668, for
example, Sir William Temple wrote to Sir John Temple about
negotiations with Holland: "his Majesty came to a resolution of the
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greatest importance which has yet passed, I think, here in any
foreign affairs ... in which the new ministry, particularly my
52Lord Keeper, and my Lord Arlington, have had a very great part"."''
At least in 1667 to 1668 Bridgeman and Arlington may have been of
something of central importance in state business. The writer of
a newsletter in December 1667 hoped that the "Lord Keeper and Lord
Arlington have spoken together" about business to which he attaches
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particular importance. Later, in August 1668, "The Lord Keeper,
Duke of Buckingham, and Lord Arlington were together in private
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after the Council, from 11 till near 2 o'clock". On the whole,
however, it would seem that the "new ministry" (an idea to which
Charles would be opposed — he wanted to rule alone) never really
established itself as a political force. The sharing of political
power and motivation would be widely suspect and unlikely to be
successful in the aggressive and deceptive individualism of
Charles II's government. Bridgeman was nevertheless a senior
member of the Privy Council.
Bridgeman was a prime mover in a discussion of religious
tolerance, centred on the Comprehension Bill proposed in 1668.
Non-conformists were "big with expectation, that their idol gods,
their factious ministers, should be tolerated to prate in public"
when Bridgeman was heard to be included in the government.A
later newsletter refers to the "Act of Comprehension, which the
Lord Keeper promotes" and suggests that "it will destroy the Act
for Uniformity".-^
The Act of Uniformity was part of what has been called the
"Clarendon Code", the three-fold series of measures by which the
Church of England was re-established after the Restoration.
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Buckingham, at the height cf his influence after Clarendon's
deposition, sought to change the former Lord Chancellor's
religious policy. The Comprehension scheme was launched in
December 1667, and a plan formulated by the following January.
Buckingham was the major court figure involved, but Bridgeman
and John Wilkins were the most important members of the group
responsible for the written proposals. This also included Matthew
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Hale, Hezekiah Burton, Edward Stillingfleet and John Tillotson.
William Bates, Thomas Manton and Richard Baxter may also have been
consulted. Thus Burnet observes that "Bridgeman and Wilkins set
on foot a treaty, for a comprehension of such dissenters as could
be brought into the communion of the church, and a toleration of
£•0
the rest". Wood remarks that the meetings were held "in the
chamber of that great trimmer and latitudinarian Dr. Hezekiah
Burton in Essex House, without the Temple barr, being then the
habitation of sir Orl. Bridgeman, to whome Burton was chaplayne
59then". The project was not radical and, according to Bumet,
represented little more than an attempt to realise the promises
made by Charles in 1660 but not embodied in the Clarendon Code.
Burnet does say, however, that "This treaty became a common subject
of discourse. Many books were printed upon it. All lord
Clarendon's men cried out that the church was undermined and
betrayed".^ The Commons were opposed to the Bill. Having had
previous warning, through Wilkins' inopportune discussion of the
matter with Seth Ward, Parliament dismissed the Bill by passing a
motion that no such Bill should be so much as accepted for
consideration by the House.
It is after the failure of the Comprehension Bill that
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Bridgeman's name appears less frequently in state records and is
then more often associated with administration and matters of
patronage. Bridgeman seems gradually to decline into the
functionary Charles had probably intended him to be. By virtue
of his office, however, he continued to move in court circles and
was inevitably if not seminally involved in state affairs. One
possible reason for the decline of Bridgeman's involvement as an
initiator of policy is his variable health. Ke was over sixty when
he became Lord Keeper and his health seems to have declined during
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his term of office. On 24 January 16^ Pepys was summoned to a
meeting of the King and Council held at Essex House, Bridgeman's
home, because the Lord Keeper was temporarily bedridden: "Here
all the Officers of the Navy attended, and by and by were called
in to the King and Cabinet, where my Lord [Bridgemanl, who was ill,
did lie upon the bed. . . . And the business was to know in what
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time all the King's ships might be repaired fit for service".
The discussion about the navy reported by Pepys is one of
the threads by which Bridgeman can be connected with what,
historically, was the overriding concern of the period 1667 to 1674:
Britain's foreign policy, particularly relations with France and
Holland, and naval affairs, especially as all these, and the ever
more pressing religious question, focus in the Treaty of Dover of
1670. The Treaty, and the controversy and intrigue associated with it,
is representative of the politics of the period, and also
illustrates the extent to which, for Charles and his inner circle
of advisors but much less so for Bridgeman, religion had a part to
play in politics. Charles was widely suspected to be a Roman
Catholic or at least a possible convert to Roman Catholicism. The
10?
Duke of York was known openly as a Roman Catholic and rumours
of the King's conversion were frequent. His admiration for
Louis XIV seemed to indicate something of his tendency in this
direction, and also the political dangers of his possible
conversion: French domination or English monarchical absolutism.
It was through Louis that Charles came closest to Roman
Catholicism. Charles insisted that England must have an alliance
with Catholic France against Protestant Holland to protect her
naval and trading interests. One of his favourite arguments was
that "the French will have us or Holland always with them, and if
we take them not, Holland will have them". This was his public
policy, and was sufficiently controversial as such. It was
reinforced, however, by his private motives, the final outcome
of his negotiations with France being that Louis agreed to
finance Charles, making him independent of Parliament and able to
govern after Louis' manner, if Charles became a Roman Catholic
and converted, by force if necessary and with French reinforcements,
the whole of Britain to Catholicism. When a treaty was to be drawn
up arrangements were made so that only Charles, Clifford and
Arlington knew of the clause promising the conversion of Britain
and its King in return f<pr Louis' financial and military assistance.
Thus, in 1670, the Treaty of Dover was signed in two copies; one,
a useless document intended only for public use, omitting the
vital clause. It is partly through such involvement with political
and state matters that religious controversy became an ever more
sensitive subject in the 1670's.
Meanwhile it was left to Bridgeman and other state officers
who knew nothing of the secret clause to maintain what can now be
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seen as a charade of government. Bridgeman, for example, had to
read the King's speech to Parliament. It was the custom that a
very brief address from the King would precede a longer, but still
very short, speech by the Lord Keeper at the opening and closing of
Parliament. The Lord Keeper read both speeches but may have written
neither. In practise the speeches amount to little more than a
reiteration of Charles' request for a "Supply" of money, perhaps
with some mention of major policy — the union of Scotland and
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England in 1669 and 1for example. The King, and the Lord
Keeper on his behalf, customarily thanked the Houses for their
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"wholesom Laws", "Advice", "Supplies and Aids" and for their
"Affection and Loyalty".^ Then followed the request for money:
"my Debts have pressed Me very much",^ "When we last met, I asked
you for a Supply, and I ask it now again with greater Instance". '
The recent wars with the Dutch were frequently given as reasons
for the need for money — Charles assured Parliament that none
of the money voted for paying for the war had been diverted to
any other purpose and that he had even used some of his own
revenue to pay war debts. The cost of the plague and Great Fire
were also cited as additional expenses. Having read such speeches
on the King's behalf, Bridgeman would face Parliament with his
speech, composed largely of the same formulae and urging members
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to "take [the King'si Debts effectually into consideration". The
speech often ended with an observation to the effect that "there is
no Distinct Interest between the King and His People, but the good
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of one, is the good of both". 7 Charles himself might insist more
peremptorily, again with particular emphasis on his need for a
"Supply", and again, of course, through the mouth of his Lord Keeper,
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that "it is yours and the Kingdom's Interest as well as Mine".
Charles' continual need for money, together with the frequent
inter-involvement of religious and political manoeuvre, is a major
characteristic of the period, when Charles had sufficient funds
to maintain himself and the state he would prorogue Parliament and
rule alone. So the financial question became a political and
constitutional one. Charles saw Louis' financial assistance as
being of vital importance in his relationship with Parliament,
which he saw as little more than the body which voted him and the
state an adequate "Supply". That parliament also took it upon
itself to debate other matters only made it the more irksome: "he
did not think he was a king, as long as a company of fellows were
looking into all his actions and examining his ministers as well as
his accounts". In the early l6?0's Charles had to manipulate
Council and Cabal to his own ends and the fulfilment of the Treaty
of Dover, the financial promise of which he could not of course
reveal. The need for funds became desperate, despite a grant of
£1,200,000 in September 1671 and some money from Louis. When war
was declared on Holland in 1672 as part of the agreement with
France money was sought by means of the "Stop of the Exchequer",
whereby the government ceased all dealing. Loans made to the
government for repayment with interest were not to be repaid at the
regular time but held over to finance the war.
The Stop of the Exchequer coincided with Charles' introduction
of a Declaration of Indulgence, which suspended "all Penal Laws in
matters Ecclesiastical" while intending the preservation of the
Church of England and denying preferment to anyone "who is not
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exactly conformable". Lord Keeper Bridgeman disapproved of both
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this and the Stop of the Exchequer and, refusing to put the Seal
to the Declaration of Indulgence, relinquished his office. His
precise motives for his disapproval of the Declaration are not
known. He may have objected on religious grounds, or he may have
resented the use of religion for political ends. He may also have
suspected something of the probable truth of the situation — that
Charles, bearing in mind the secret clause of the Treaty of Dover,
felt obliged to give Louis some evidence of his willingness to
be converted, and in due course to see his country converted, to
Roman Catholicism. The Declaration would give as much legal
recognition to Roman Catholics as the continued existence of the
Church of England would allow. Bridgeman's reaction only anticipated
the massive objections of Lords and Commons, who forced Charles to
withdraw the Declaration and consent to a Test Act in 1673.
Either Clifford or Ashley may have been largely responsible
for the Stop of the Exchequer. Clifford became Treasurer, and
Ashley, created Earl of Shaftesbury and given the more prestigious
title of Lord Chancellor, replaced Bridgeman. The sessions of
Parliament in 16?3 mark the end of Charles' hopes for establishing
any real form of absolute monarchy sanctioned by a redundant
parliament. He was forced to consent to the Test Act and to make
peace with Holland in 167^, thus severing his relations with
France. The informal Cabal also dissolved. In 1672 Bridgeman
retired to his country home at Teddington with a substantial state
pension and remained there until his death in 167^.
If Bridgeman had failed to leave his own mark in political life
he was by virtue of his office involved directly in the government
of Britain. A more than usually forceful character was necessary
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if such a man was to stand out from the aggressive and convoluted
masquerade of contemporary court and political life. Bridgeman
did find a place, if an ignominious one, in one critic's view of
the period. After the Great Fire there was still
one thing more
Though its walls stand, will bring the City low'r.
When legislators shall their trust betray,
Hir'd for their share, to give the rest away,
And those false men, by th'easy people sent,
Give taxes to the King and Parliament;
When barefac'd Villainy shan't blush to cheat,
And 'Chequer doors shall shut up Lombard Street;
When players come to act the part of queens
Within the curtains and behind the scenes;
When sodomy is the Prime Minister's sport,
And whoring shall be the least crime at court;
When a boy shall take his sister to his mate,
And practise incest betwixt seven and eight;
When no man knows in whom to put his trust,
When e'en to rob th'Exchequer shall be just;
When declarations lie, and every oath
Shall be in use at court, but faith and troth;
When two good kings shall be at Brentford town,
And when at London there shall not one be found;
When the seal's given to a talking fool,
Whom wise men laugh at and whom women rule,
A minister able only in his tongue
To make starch'd empty speeches two hours long.
Bridgeman does not seem to have been comfortable in this context.
He did, however, play a major part in promoting the Comprehension
Bill and his general importance is indicated by the meeting of the
King and Privy Council, attended by Pepys, at Bridgeman's own
Essex House. After the failure of the Comprehension Bill Bridgeman's
acquaintance John Wilkins became Bishop of Chester, probably
through Buckingham's influence. John Evelyn attended the consecration
and gives some indication of the circles in which Bridgeman, as
Lord Keeper, customarily moved:
November 16681 invited to the Consecration of
that excellent Person the Deane of Rlppon Dr.
Wilkins, now made Bish: of Chester; it was at
Elie House: Officiating The A: Bish: of
Canterbury, Bish: of Durham Cousin, Bish: of Ely,
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Salisbery, Rochester & others: Or. Tillotson
preaching . . . Then we went to a most sumptuous
dinner in the hall, where was the Duke of
Buckingham, Judges, Secretaries of State, Lord
Keeper, Counsell, NoBemen, & such an infinity of
other Companie, as, were honourers of this
incomparable man.
Bridgeman's life, like that of his Chaplain, is perhaps less obscure
in fact than by virtue of the inadequacy of records.
Less still is known of Bridgeman's private life, and what
information there is tends to contradict itself. His health seems
68
to have been particularly variable. In King an<i Council had
to meet at Bridgeman's home because he was bedridden, but in May
1670 he married his second wife, Dorothy Craddock, by whom he was
to have three children before his death at the age of 68 in 167^.
Roger North says that in character Bridgeman "was timorous to an
Impotence, and that not mended by his great Age" and his own
clerk, Thomas Johnson, observes that he led "a Sedentary kind of
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Life in his Chamber". J Burnet, however, says that Bridgeman
possessed "a courage . . . that could stand against a current".
Burnet, unlike North, was impressed by Bridgeman: when he received
the Seal in 1667, he says, Bridgeman was "then in great esteem . . .
He was a man of great integrity, and had very serious impressions of
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religion on his mind".
A nineteenth century biographer, Edward Foss, quotes North
but observes of Bridgeman that "All parties unite in acknowledging
his amiable disposition, his honest principles, his piety, his
moderation, and his learning", although "in his new office he did
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not long maintain the esteem he had previously acquired". In the
l640's he "showed himself a strenuous supporter of monarchical
government" while "His learning ensured him immediate employment
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on the Restoration". "He laboured very much to please
p0
everybody".~ North had criticized precisely where the later Foss
was to praise: "He labour'd very much to please every Body; and
81
that is a Temper of ill Consequence in a Judge". He made, in
North's opinion, "a very good Common Law Judge" but "a very bad
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Chancellor". His timorousness, as North calls it, seems to have
been due in part to his unwillingness to give complete judgement
on any one side of a case or cause. North speaks of "his timidous
Manner of creating and judging abundance of Points, some on one
OO
side, and some on another": he "would never give all on one Side".
Further, "his Family was very ill qualified for that Place; his
Lady being a most violent Intriguess in Business; and his Sons
kept no good Decorum ... he had not a Vigour of Mind, and
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Strength, to coerce the Cause of so much Disorder".
In his Examen, however, North gives a closer analysis of the
events leading to Bridgeman's resignation in 1672. Previously
North had claimed that in relation to his duty, and to the
Declaraction of Indulgence and Stop of the Exchequer, Bridgeman
P
had merely "bogled at diverse Things required of him". Later,
however, North recognised Bridgeman's entitlement to an opinion of
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his own: on both points he was "pressed, but proved restiff".
He finally decided that "these Impositions were too rank for him
to comport with".®'' After the Declaration and the Stop the
Attorney General, Heneage Finch, and Solicitor General, Francis
North, together with a number of eminent lawyers, met with
Bridgeman at Essex House, where "they all agreed they were Rocks
upon which they must split ... for they lay directly in the Way,
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and would not be surmounted". Here at least Bridgeman is allowed
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integrity and some courage — a split with the government had
become inevitable if he was to "stand against a current" of which
he seems increasingly to have disapproved. North's analysis of the
ultimate cause of Bridgeman's departure from office returns again
to the maze of political manoeuvre in which Bridgeman's principles
became too easily lost, or at least misinterpreted. Ashley, soon
to become Earl of Shaftesbury,
lay behind the Curtain . . . [and]] . . . urged
these Points to the King, as necessary to his
Affairs, and practicable; and that it was only
a morose Scrupulosity and Humour in his old
Keeper, that made him averse to passing them;
and that his Majesty was under a Necessity to
displace him, and find another more complaisant
in his Room . . . And what is more easy to be
conceived, than that his Lordship might add,
that, rather than fail, if his Majesty would
command his Service in that Place, he would
undertake it, and perform all, and upon the
main, order Affairs, so as the Parliament, at
their Meeting, should give his Majesty no
Disturbance? ... It was no new Device to
shove Men out of their Places, by contriving
incomportable Hardships to be put upon them,
and then bespeaking the Succession for
themselves, by officious undertaking to 4o„
all that was required and desired of them.
Whether "timorous to an Impotence" or tending to "morose Scrupulosity"
Bridgeman's character was finally less important than the situation
in which he found himself. His "amiable disposition, his honest
principles, his piety, his moderation, and his learning", if he was
indeed possessed of these, would not prevail against the aggressive
politics and devious self-seeking well summarised by North. Rather,
they might be a handicap. A "man of great integrity" who "had very
serious impressions of religion on his mind" might prefer to shun
rather than seek recognition, even if in so doing he brought upon
himself accusations of weakness deriving from his characteristic
releuctance to conform to the mode and manner of the age. Here,
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however, it is sufficient to have suggested something of
Bridgeman's inevitable if perhaps unwilling involvement, as
Lord Keeper, at the centre of state and court circles between
I667 and 1672, and his direct, if discomfited, contact with
Restoration society.
3. Traherne, Bridgeman, and others.
As his Chaplain, Traherne's admiration for Bridgeman was real
(CE 239) and their relationship may have been close: Bridgeman's
"very serious impressions of religion" and his particular choice
of the otherwise obscure Traherne suggest this. Bridgeman's
patronage of his former Chaplain, Hezekiah Burton, and of Richard
Cumberland, extended beyond any formal obligations. He may have
held his Chaplain in special esteem. Bridgeman had been centrally
involved in the negotiations for the Comprehension Bill, with the
"latitudinarian" Burton. Traherne, too, was "comprehensive" (M I.xxxi),
so there may have been real common interest. His work is also not
without contact with that of Cumberland, dedicated to Bridgeman in
1672. Traherne suggests that he was acquainted with "high-born
Souls in Courts and Palaces" (CE 260) and "admitted to the society
and friendship of Great men" (CE 173)• It is through Bridgeman, and
while living at Essex House in the Strand, that Traheme would most
readily form contacts with these "high-born Souls".
"Courts and Palaces" were terms used of all noble households,
many of which were in the Strand, along the River Thames between
the commercial City of London itself and the court and government
centres at Whitehall and Westminster. Anthony Ashley Cooper, a
member of the Cabal and Bridgeman's successor (as Lord Chancellor),
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maintained an establishment at nearby Exeter House. His physician,
secretary and friend, John Locke, lived there between 1667 and
167^.^ Bridgeman had open access to the foremost of all "Courts
and Palaces", Whitehall itself: he may have had his own office
91there. Pepys suggests Bridgeman's immediate involvement with the
daily life of King and court when he describes a visit to the
Council Chamber: "All I observed there is the silliness of the
King, playing with his dog all the while, or his codpiece, and not
minding the business and what he said was mighty weak; but my Lord
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Keeper I observe to be a mighty able man". Might Bridgeman's
Chaplain sometimes accompany him to Whitehall?
This, of course, is the purest speculation. Even speculation,
however, may have a value if its purpose is defined and its
limitations recognised. There is a definite purpose here. In I673
Traherne wrote decisively and destructively against the Roman
Catholic Church, just when, as Burnet says, "Popery was everywhere
preached against", when Milton re-engaged the religious debate in
93
prose, when '"No Popery' became the popular cry". ^ Traherne stands
in real relation to a real society — to "the true Estate of this
World" (C IV.20) — and significant aspects of his work are
ignored if his immediate place in and relation to Restoration
London are ignored. Bridgeman is a key to the charting of this
relation. The overall aim is to show Traherne in relation to his
own contemporary world. In Bridgeman's own life and circumstance,
and the life and circumstance of others connected with his household,
this contemporary world can be seen in specific terms, as a world of
particular men — of Burton and Cumberland, for example. Such
specific details suggest immediate contexts for Traherne, too, as
11?
Bridgeman's Chaplain, but they only contribute to a view of
Traherne in a particular, and surely relevant, context: they do
not claim to be factual statements about Traheme's circle of
acquaintance, but they are facts, nevertheless, facts about
immediate and specific aspects of the society in which he lived,
the world he shared, in some proximity it seems, with these other
men. More generally, Bridgeman's whole life during his term of
office as Lord Keeper, his whole relation to contemporary society,
offers material for a view of Traherne's own relation to that same
society in the same period. The one becomes, it even seems, almost
a parable of the other.
Firstly, then, some specific facts and their speculative promise
in relation to Traherne. Hezekiah Burton, already encountered as
Bridgeman's former Chaplain and the author of the dedication to
Bridgeman in Cumberland's De Legibus Naturae, seems to have
retained some connection with the Bridgeman household after 1669.
Burton was a member of Magdalene College, Cambridge, like Bridgeman
(and Pepys),^ and gained the degree of Doctor of Divinity by royal
mandate, probably through Bridgeman's administration of royal
patronage, in 1669. Bridgeman provided him with a Chaplaincy and
fturt-nr*'
prebendary stall at Norwich, but Bridgeman remained in London and
became minister of St. George's, Southwark. Wood referred to him
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as "that great trimmer and latitudinarian", which is interesting
in relation to the description of Traherne as himself "a very
comprehensive Soul" (M I.xxxi), and in relation to Bridgeman's "very
serious impressions of religion". The Comprehension Bill, Burton's
latitudinarianism and Traherne's comprehensiveness suggest the
possibility of common concerns. Burton's friends, John Tillotson
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and Edward Stillingfleet, advocated a tolerant latitudinarianism
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contemporary with that of the Cambridge Platonists. Tillotson
was to edit Burton's Discourses in 1684, and it is through
Tillotson that Burton may have had close acquaintance with the
ubiquitous John Wilkins, who had also been involved in the 1668
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Comprehension Bill negotiations. Sir Matthew Hale, a colleague
of Sir Orlando Bridgeman, was also a friend of Tillotson and
Stillingfleet, as of John Wilkins and Seth Ward, and of Isaac
Barrow. Hale's writings included legal and scientific treatises,
and also some Contemplations Moral and Divine (1676), much
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admired by Tillotson and Wilkins. Traherne annotated a sermon
by Isaac Barrow in 1671 in his Commonplace Book, where he also
referred to "Learned Stillingfleet".^ Burton, Cumberland, Hale,
Wilkins, Tillotson, Stillingfleet, Barrow, Ward — and perhaps
Henry More of the Cambridge Platonists — describe circles of
acquaintance and common interest around the Bridgeman household.
The Comprehension Bill suggests a further interesting
possibility. Bridgeman, Buckingham and Wilkins, the "men of
comprehension" who promoted the Bill, seem to have been associated
in Burnet's mind with Andrew Marvell. Marvell's The Rehearsal
Transpros'd (1672; The Second Part, 1673)*^ wa-s a polemical plea
for comprehension in the form of an attack on Samuel Parker, as
Burnet tells:
[Parker! was attcked by the liveliest droll of
the age [i.e. Marvell!, who writ in a burlesque
strain, but with so peculiar and so entertaining
a conduct that, from the King down to the
tradesman, his books were read with great
pleasure. . . . [The! author of the Rehearsal
Transpros'd had all the men of wit ... on his
side. But what advantages soever the men of
comprehension might have in any other respect,
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the majority of the house of commons was so
possessed against them, that when it was
known in a succeeding session, that a hill
was to be offerred to the house for that
end, a very extraordinary vote passed, that
no bill to that purpose should be received.
Burnet seems to have confused events of 1668 and 16?2, but he does
suggest a continuity of interest between the promoters of the 1668
Comprehension Bill and The Rehearsal Transpros'd. This, he said,
was extremely popular, and shared something in common with the
1668 proposals. Marvell had been a government servant, and mentions
Bridgeman incidentally in The Rehearsal Transpros'd and in his
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letters. Buckingham, a close friend of the King, was associated
with the Comprehension Bill and with Bridgeman and Wilkins (for
whom Buckingham obtained the Bishopric of Chester), and it was
from the play The Rehearsal, of which Buckingham was at least part
author, that Marvell took his title.Marvell had been involved
in the Commons campaign against Clarendon in 1667, which would
104
suggest involvement with Buckingham's supporters. Buckingham's
wife was the Jane Fairfax who had been Marvell's pupil at Nun
Appleton House in 1650 to 1652. How well did Marvell know
Buckingham, and how directly did he intend the reference to The
Rehearsal in The Rehearsal Transpros'd? By the very nature of their
place and work in the court and government Buckingham and Bridgeman
were closely associated, regardless of their particular connection
with the negotiations for the Comprehension Bill (itself, in part,
an outcome of the 166? campaign against Clarendon). Marvell's
apparent proximity to, and possible endorsement of, the Bill
promoted by Traheme's patron should at least be noted.
So much for speculative interest. It cannot be too strongly
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emphasized that the point of this exercise is not to suggest
that Traheme actually knew Locke, Wilkins or Marvell, for
example. Rather, the aim is simply to show that he was genuinely
a contemporary of such men, that they all lived and wrote in the
same city at the same time, that they shared a common cultural
inheritance and milieu. These are facts which can help the reader
of Traheme's work to an appreciation of the historical situation
from which the writing issues and in relation to which it stands
as a reflection of "the true Estate of this World" (C IV.20).
The facts as quoted here are intended to serve this, and only this,
purpose.
And more generally? "No reader of the 'Select Meditations' could
ever conceive of calling this author a 'poet of felicity'.*0"' There
was always, surely, a historical irony in the misnomer. The "poet
of felicity" wrote in Restoration London:
He look'd, and saw the face of things quite chang'd;
The brazen Throat of Warr had ceast to roar-,
All now was turn'd to jollitie and game,
To luxurie and riot, feast and dance,
Marrying or prostituting, as befell,
Rape or Adulterie, where passing faire
Allurd them; thence from Cups to civil Broiles.
At length a Reverend Sire among them came,
And of thir doings great dislike declar'd,
And testifi'd against thir wayes; hee oft
Frequented thir Assemblies, whereso met,
Triumphs or Festivals, and to them preachd
Conversion and Repentance, as to Souls
In Prison under Judgements imminent:
But all in vain: which when he saw, he ceas'd.
Contending, and remov'd his Tents farr off. -
Traheme, however, felt himself "a concerned person in all
Transactions . . . ever present with all Affairs" (C IV.69). He
was "concerned in all the world" (C III.23).
The immediate contemporary relevance of Roman Forgeries is
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clear. But what of Bridgeman's career? That career was immediately
related to the whole government of the nation, in which Bridgeman
was crucially involved. The Declaration of Indulgence and the Stop
of the Exchequer provoked his resignation. These measures were the
culminating points of a second decisive phase in Charles II's
reign, from the fall of Clarendon in 1667 to the Test Act of 1673*
They issue from major contemporary preoccupations: the religious
problem and state finance. These problems relate to and expose the
whole political fabric of the period: the confrontation of a
history of religious civil war; the whole problem of "Popery" and
its implications; Charles' deals with Louis XIV, his independence
of parliament and possible absolutist ambitions; Britain's
relations with France and Holland, her naval supremacy and eager
competition for foreign and colonial trade. The two causes of
Bridgeman's resignation are focal and representative points, his
career an abstract of the history of the period. His relation to
that history was an uncomfortable and unhappy one. A "man of
great integrity", with "his amiable disposition, his honest
principles, his piety, his moderation, and his learning", he was
yet the "talking fool" to the "false men", the "players . . .
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Within the curtains and behind the scenes". He lived amid
"barefac'd Villainy", "When no man knows in whom to put his trust /
. . . and every oath / Shall be in use at court, but faith and
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troth". This was a world recognisable, perhaps, as that of
Charles II, Rochester, Hobbes, Pepys, or Wycherley, but not as
Milton saw "Popery" as a cause of the "Pride, Luxury, Drunkenness,
Whoredom, Cursing, Swearing, bold and open Atheism every where
that of any "poet of felicity". It was a world in which
abounding".It was "the true Estate of this World" (C IV.20) in
which Traherne lived and wrote.
4. Traherne and Restoration society
Traherne's writing seeks "the Gentle Ways of Peace and Lov"
(C 1.4) but knows that it must turn away from "the Nois of Bloody
Wars, and the Dethroning of Kings" (C 1.4). It contains and seeks
to transcend an awareness of a definite historical situation.
"Save this nation . . . let Thy Citties prosper, our villages
flourish . . . Soften our King's Heart, Teach our Senator's
Wisdom" (SM 1.82). The Civil Wars and the death of "King Charles
the Martyr" (C 1.61) are remembered by the man who grew up in the
once besieged city of Hereford and ended his life in Restoration
London. He offers his "Divine Philosophy" (C IV.3) and the pursuit
of Felicity as "hard lessons, in a pervers and Retrograde World to
be practiced" (C IV.54): "we are here upon Earth Turmoiled with
Cares and often Shaken with Winds and by Disturbances distracted"
(C_ II.89). Traherne idealises what he calls the world of nature
and the riches of light, created by God (C 1.33)» in conscious
opposition to the world of invention and the riches of darkness,
created by men (C 1.33)- Thus "the World is both a Paradice and a
Prison" (C I.36). Traherne, eager for the "hard lessons" that will
bring him to the Enjoyment of Felicity in a true "Paradice", sees
his way towards this only after escape from a "Prison".
"A Comfortless Wilderness full of Thorns the World was, or
wors: a Waste Place covered with Idleness and Play, and Shops and
Markets and Taverns" (C_ III.14). Thus, as a boy, Traherne felt
the effects of his "Apostacy" and recognised one true aspect of the
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world, the world of "Envy, Rapine, Bloodshed, Complaint, and
Malice" (C I.k), the "Prison" from which he later sought to
escape by means of the "Highest Reason" (C III.2). In this prison
men "invented Scarce and Rare, Insufficient, Hard to be Gotten,
litle, movable and useless Treasures" (£1.33) — the "Riches of
Invention", "Gold Silver Houses Lands Clothes &c" (C III.9) —
which they "violently Persue ... as if they were the most
Necessary and Excellent Things in the whole World" (C 1.33)• In
their pursuit of the riches of darkness men ignore the riches of
light, of nature, and are "Alienated" (C III.?) from their natural
inheritance as heirs of the world by an "Impetuous Torrent of
Wrong Desires" (C III.7) so that "Trades, Taverns, Markets, Houses,
Money, Coachs, Clothes . . . cover the face of Nature" (SM 11.18).
They have
let in Broyls and Dissatisfactions into the World,
and are ready to Eat and Devour one another.
Particular and feeble Interests, fals Properties,
Insatiable Longings, fraud, Emulation, Murmuring
and Dissension being evry where seen, Theft and
Pride and Danger and cousenage envy and contention
Drowning the Peace and Beauty of Nature . . . the
Prospect of their Ugly Errors is able to turn ones
Stomach: they are so Hideous and Deformed.
(c 1.33)
Traherne is himself like the man who "must like a GOD, bring Light
out of Darkness, and Order out of Confusion" (C IV.21). He must
produce the potential paradise from within the prison that men
habitually accept as a condition of their existence in the world.
The riches of nature must be known and used over and against the
riches of invention. The need is the more desperate as the "Customs
and maners of Men" (C III.?) threaten even his own integrity: "Men
being mistaken in the Nature of Felicity, and we by a strong
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inclination prone to pleas them, follow a Multitude to do evil"
(C IV.44).
The riches of invention, though, can offer some potential for
Felicity. A "Magnificent or Noble Dining Room", with its "Gold and
State and Carved Imagery", was "Dead" and Traherne "departed
*
Dissatisfied" — but only until he "saw it full of Lords and Ladies
and Musick and Dancing" (C III.22)."Men and Women" — creators of
the riches of invention — can themselves be "a Principal Part of
our True Felicity" (C III.22). Just as the student of Felicity
should "be all Life and Mettle and Vigor and Lov to evry Thing"
(C 11.68) so the actual life of real people turns the "Dead" objects
of invention into real treasures. The ambivalence of Traherne's
relation to the life of "Men and Women" is real. There can be no
simple contrast between light and darkness, nature and invention.
"We lov to be Rich" in a material as well as a spiritual sense
(C II.57): "the Dust of "the Streets were as precious as Gold"
(C 1.25). It is very easy to "follow a Multitude to do evil". It
is even rather exciting. Material self-aggrandizement is an image
of man's natural and infinite Capacity: "It is the Nobility of Mans
Soul that He is Insatiable . . . men get one Hundred Pound a year
that they may get another; and having two covet Eight, and there is
no End of all their Labour; because the Desire of their Soul is
Insatiable" (C 1.22). Traherne condemns the riches of invention
but sometimes seems to be secretly attracted by pursuit of them, and
by their apparent potential for Felicity. "Men and Women", "Lords
and Ladies" celebrate their own insatiable appetite against a
background of material opulence. They provide an image of Felicity,
and bring "Dead Things" (C I.lOO) to life. The "Ey of Reason" (C 1.25)
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is ready to be dazzled by the spectacle: he has, it seems, "a
strong inclination" to follow their example, to celebrate a
Felicity based less exclusively on the riches of nature alone.
Traherne, then, seems to have been impressed, overawed
perhaps, by the "Gold . . . Bonds . . . Affairs . . . Houses,
Liberties, and Lands" that the "Great Men" of his acquaintance
entrusted to him (CE 200). If he spoke of "the Lov of Mony which
is the Root of all Evil" (C 11.98) he nevertheless recognised the
temptations of material prosperity and saw the ease with which,
"mistaken in the Nature of Felicity", men could place their hope
in the pursuit of the riches of invention. In the real "Enjoyment
of the World", of the riches of nature, men should "so Esteem it,
that evry thing in it, is more your Treasure, then a Kings
Exchequer full of Gold and Silver" (C 1.25). "Gold and Silver",
however, riches of invention, are still treasurable even if they
are transcended by true Enjoyment of the riches of nature. Only
in the full Enjoyment of the ultimate Felicity will "all
Govetousness and Ambition" be "satisfied" (C 1.24), Meanwhile
"Covetousness and Ambition" must be recognised and accommodated
within "the true Estate of this World" (C IV.20).
The years Traheme spent in London, from 1669 until 1674,
were the early years of what has since been called a "Commercial
Revolution".London was a very prosperous city, a manufacturing
and trading capital and the urban focus of commercial interests
greatly out of proportion to those found elsewhere in a
predominently rural Britain. This must have been noticeable to a
young clergyman like Traherne, "being removed out of the Country"
to his first appointment in London (M I.xxxii). The avid commercial
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interests of the City were not the exclusive province of a
class of merchants, however. Court and. government, the "high-born
Souls in Courts and Palaces", were closely involved with and
dependent upon these interests. A quarter of the shares of the
Royal African Company, for example, were owned by the aristocracy,
and its designation as "Royal" identifies it, and the several
other Royal Companies, with government policy. The dominant part
played by foreign and naval affairs in the period 166? to 16?4,
especially the question of Britain's relationships with Prance
and Holland, stems from concern for trade. Britain sought and
actively pursued an unlimited expansion of her world trade and
national wealth. "What we want is more of the trade the Dutch now
have", remarked Albemarle.*** Britain's commercial prosperity
was strained in the 1660's by the expenses of the plague and the
Great Fire, and by the wars against the Dutch, but war was for
trade and in the l6?0's trade and prosperity were escalating.
"Foreign contemporaries were inclined to think that the difference
between the warmongering of the English and of the others was that
the English war represented a material objective broader than mere
dynasticism, and one planned with a more cunning regard to the
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interests of His Majesty's subjects. They may have been right".
War and trade were complementary, and both were involved in
Britain's ambitions for power and profit. Her great assets were
the navy and merchant fleet. Shipping more than doubled between
1660 and 1668, and about half of the total was controlled by London
113merchants. J One quarter of the population of London depended on
the sea for a living. The growth of the Joint Stock Companies is
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a measure of immense commercial and colonial expansion. When,
12?
in 1666, Sir Christopher Wren sketched a plan for the rebuilding
of the city after the Great Fire he suggested that the Royal
Exchange should be rebuilt on its old site but this time surrounded
by a wide forum. It would be, he said, "the Nave or Center of the
Town, from whence . . . Streets as so many Rays, should proceed to
all principal Parts of the City".^^^ His plan was not adopted (it
raised too many problems of property ownership and compensation)
but it would have been appropriate had the Royal Exchange achieved
so physically a dominant position in the commercial city. Material
power and profit can be seen as dominant ambitions, promoted and
fostered by government policy, involving closely a large proportion
of the population of London. The increasing wealth and prosperity
of Britain, and the hope of her further expansion and domination
abroad, issued from the London known to Bridgeman's household and
was promoted by the government of which Bridgeman was a prominent
member.
This prosperity can be associated with a feeling of confidence
and optimism based upon a powerful sense of the insatiable ambition
of men. In Annus Mirabilis: The Year of Wonders, 1666 John Dryden
gives expression to this. Contemporary London will be "a wonder
to all Years and Ages", he asserts.The wonder, however, is
produced from disaster — the Great Fire and the Dutch wars — and
it is the "vigour" of the people of London, who are able "to be
struck down and to triumph", that is celebrated: "You are now a
Phoenix in her ashes . . . I am to conclude that your sufferings
are at an end; and . . . one part of my Poem has not been more an
History of your destruction, then the other a Prophecy of your
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restoration". London will not only be restored but improved,
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"an immortal Monument" built on its own ruins, "a wonder to all
1 1 Q
Years and Ages". In Annus Hirabilis Dryden gives expression to
an optimism no less overweening than that commonly seen as almost
unique to Traherne.
It is easily assumed that the optimism of Traherne's "Divine
Philosophy" (C IV.3) is based on a thorough ignorance or refusal
of "the true Estate of this World" (C IV.20). The "hard lessons" of
the philosophy are offered, however, in the face of real and
recognised difficulties in the "pervers and retrograde world" of
men (C IV.54). "Here ... is a Place of Trial" (C IV.60) where
"Practical Happiness" (C IV.l) is a genuine problem. Dryden's
optimistic affirmations are made in the face of disastrous events:
he gives a prophecy of "restoration" in a history of destruction.
This restoration, Dryden suggests, to the real creation of a
paradise on earth, in London, "a wonder to all Years and Ages".
There was a genuine contemporary consensus about this. In his
Memoirs, Sir John Eeresby says of the Great Fire that "the
dreadfull affects of it were not soe strange as the rebuilding
was of this great citty, which, by reason of the Kings and
Parlaments care . . . and the great wealth and opolency of the
citty itselfe, was rebuilded most stately with brick (the greatest
part being nothing before but lath and lime) in four or five years
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time". The actual rebuilding of the city was no more than half
begun by I67I, "four or five years" after the Great Fire, and work
on Wren's new St. Paul's Cathedral, the completion of which in
1711 marks the real end of the restoration of the city, did not
begin until 1675« Reresby has given, whether deliberately or not,
a misrepresentation of the facts, inspired, it must seem, by his
129
faith in "the great wealth and opolency of the citty itselfe".
Dryden's predictions axe also a form of this faith in material
prosperity. From within this faith issue assertions of no less
confidence in the destiny of man than those of Traherne. Man may
truly, and in this world, create a paradise of a prison. By his
rare Capacity, by virtue of his "vigour" and his material and
spiritual wealth, he can "be struck down and . . . triumph": he
will be, "Phoenix-like", "a wonder to all Years and Ages".
There is, however, a dual aspect to this feeling. The "World
is both a Paradice and a Prison" (C I.36). Charles II's Restoration
Court — in which Bridgeman had a part — reflects a dual aspect
of material prosperity and ambition. In the poetry of Rochester,
for example, a cynical frivolity and attempts at necessary self-
aggrandizement in the face of fits of depression and complete loss
of confidence reflect the frustration of more genuine needs
beneath a wilful libertinism and material opulence. Thus, it might
be said, men "invent Ways to make them selvs Miserable in the
Presence of Riches" (C I.32). Rochester, like Charles himself,
had known Thomas Hobbes when in exile in Paris, and it is in the
writings of Hobbes that many characteristics of Restoration
society can be seen to be anticipated and delineated. It has been
said that the theories of Hobbes "were to find their most complete
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vindication in Restoration England". It is true, for example,
that Charles had been restored on the terms recommended in
Leviathan (I65I) — unconditionally, protected by a special treason
act, and with absolute control over the armed forces — but the
historical fact, the suggestion that there may have been some
direct link between Hobbes' theories and a perhaps partially
conscious realisation of them, is less relevant here than a
sense of Hobbes as prophet and. portrayer of attitudes and
atmosphere in the period.
Hobbes' doctrines were based on local observation of actual
behaviour: they claim to be derived "from true principles by
evident connection" and to have no concern with the abstract
principles of moral philosophers, which are "the causes of all
1 ?1
contentions and bloodsheds". The Preface to Hobbes' English
version of De Give (Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Government
X 22and Society, 1651) provides a concise guide to his reasoning
and methods as these concern the behaviour of men in a "state of
nature" and in "civil society". To Hobbes "the state of men
without civil society, which state we may properly call the state
of nature, is nothing else but a mere war of all against all; and
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in that war all men have equal right unto all things". Absolute
power, preferably monarchy, established by "compact", is the only
adequate mediation for the absolute self-seeking of men. In a
state of nature and by natural law and natural right self-
preservation is absolute: Hobbes' work focusses on the necessity
and possible means of reconciling the absolute right of self-
preservation with political obligation. This reconciliation is
best accomplished, he thought, under a monarchy. Under the "compact"
necessary to monarchy the natural law will be restrained to allow
the tolerable function of a civil society. The "war of all against
all" will be reduced in its consequences but not abolished as a
fact of human nature — it is only "so learned a piece of folly"
to think that men might "not . . . desire the preservation of that
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by which they are preserved". Self-preservation, the cause of the
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war of all against all, remains absolute. Hobbes' conclusions
are based, he says, on deduction from observation: "men travel
not without their swords for their defences; neither sleep they
without shutting their doors against their fellow subjects, but
also their trunks and coffers for fear of domestics. Can men
give a clearer testimony of the distrust they have each of other,
and all of all?"12-5
It was the idea of the "war of all against all" that was to
gain the most contemporary currency of Hobbes' doctrines. Hobbes
was popular. The printing of Leviathan was restricted, but when
Pepys bought a copy he found it "mightily called for" and had to
pay twenty-four shillings instead of the eight shillings originally
1
asked. In 1673 Dryden was attacked in print for having
represented characters in The Conquest of Granada as being "in a
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Hobbian state of war". John Bramhall spoke of "Hobbian
128
principles" in I658. "Hobbians" were political rationalists who
claimed that God had left man to establish their political
societies arbitrarily and independently of the divine will,
129
"according to the principles of . . . self-preservation".
Self-preservation was a "Hobbian" principle, restrained but
retained in civil society. In 1673> John Eachard found many "sturdy,
resolved practicants of Hobbianism" in contemporary London; Thomas
Terison thought that "there is certainly no man who hath any share
of the Curiosity of this present Age who is unacquainted with
1
[Hobbes'l Name and Doctrine". J Modern historians have concluded
that the "alarming and increasing phenomenon of 'Hobbism'" reflects
the "serious ideological purchase" of his doctrines in Restoration
society: Hobbes "gave the ablest and most influential presentation
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to a point of view which was gaining increasingly in fashionable
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acceptance and ideological importance". J "The society itself
122
gave birth to Hobbist ideas, in others as well as Hobbes".
The "serious ideological purchase" of Hobbes' doctrines is
further reflected in the number of writers who, publishing some
fifty years or even a century after Leviathan appeared, included in
their work some response or reply to Hobbes. The relevance of his
views and doctrines to certain aspects of experienced and social
life were powerfully and generally felt. Richard Cumberland's De
Legibus Naturae (1672), dedicated to Sir Orlando Bridgeman, is
conceived, in part, as a refutation of Hobbes' doctrines. In
Christian Ethicks Traherne explicitly opposes himself to Hobbes
(CE 261). Hobbist doctrines were readily generalised, expanded and
extended, to frame a view of life as a state of war among self-
seeking individualists in a world ravaged by their aggressive
refusal to recognize the rights of others. The generalisation has
continued down to the present day: "Hobbes has rightly been seen as
122
the high priest of competitive individualism".
Traherne was not unaware of a certain truth to experience in
Hobbist attitudes. He, writing only twenty years after Leviathan
was published, could see ways in which, in its pursuit of material
wealth, the "Christian World" is a "Salvage Nation", "absurdly
Barbarous": it exceeds "Rude and Barbarous Indians" in "Barbarous
Opinions and Most Monstrous Apprehensions" (£ III.12). "GCD hath
placed our Trial in sharp and bitter Atchievements" (CE 191). "Men
are generally Evil, deformed and blind, erroneous, perverse and
foolish, poor and miserable: . . . all the Honour which they
generally give is irrational and feigned" (CE 230). He observes
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that "our present Estate" is one of "Labour" not "Reward", of
"Trial" not "Fruition": men must "Toyl, and Sweat, and travail
hard, for the promised Wages" and "we must expect some Blows"
(CE 19). His answer to this perceived aspect of life is emphasis
and concentration on the individual self, the realisation of
individual Capacity, not in the material terms of Hobbes but in
a "spiritual" sense, launching mortal man towards his ultimate
Platonic achievement of God-likeness. Although, as Traherne insists,
"The Maner is in every thing of the greatest Concernment" (C III.38),
so that "material" apprehensions are as evil as "spiritual" ones are
good, Traherne's pursuit of Felicity, and his encouragement to
others to seek their own fulfilment, has something in common with
the programme of self-aggrandizement inspired by and reflected in
the writing of Hobbes. Although, in Traherne's opinion, the author
of "that arrogant Leviathan" made "a great mistake ... so far to
imprison our love to our selves, as to make it inconsistent with
Charity towards others" (CE 26l), Traherne himself says that "self
Lov is the Basis of all Lov" (C IV.55). While "No man loves, but he
loves another more than Himself" (C IV.56) the basis of argument in
Traherne and Hobbes is the same of the superstructure is very
different.
Or is it very different? Two quotations from Hobbes, in which
he outlines the "felicity" men can achieve by action issuing from
self-love, may suggest otherwise:
Continuall successe in obtaining those things
which a man from time to time desireth, that is
to say, continuall prospering, is that men call
FELICITY; I mean Felicity of this Life. For there
is no such thing as perpetuall Tranquillity of
mind, while we live here; because Life it selfe
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is but Motion, and can never be without
Desire, nor without Feare, no more than
without Sense. What kind of Felicity God
hath ordained to them that devoutly honour 0,
him, a man shall no sooner know, then enjoy. J '
Felicity is a continuall progresse of the
desire, from one object to another; the
attaining of the former, being still but
the way to the later. The cause whereof is,
That the object of mans desire, is not to
enjoy once onely, and for one instant of
time; but to assure for ever, the way of his
future desire.
"The Maner is in evry thing of the greatest Concernment": "prosperity"
in Hobbes carries a more material emphasis than in Traherne's
"spiritual" concern for an eternal Felicity (but compare Hobbes'
"not to enjoy once onely . . . "). Elsewhere, however, Traherne
remarks that "All Life consists in Motion and Change. The pleasure
of Acquiring is oftentimes as great, and perhaps alwaies greater than
that of Enjoying" (CE 211), "The pleasure of Acquiring" could provoke
an emphasis on material ambition parallel in Traherne's writing to
that on spiritual ambition. A remarkable identity between the terms
of Hobbes and Traherne must be noted: both recognise, centrally and
crucially, a need to enjoy felicity in a life that is all motion
and change.
A very great deal depends on the sometimes tenuous distinction
between the material and spiritual "Maner". Traheme would see
Hobbes' thought as having relevance only to the world of invention,
while his own belongs to that of nature. "Gold Silver Houses Lands
Clothes &c . . . are indeed the Riches of Invention . . . The Riches
of Nature are our Souls and Bodies, with all their Faculties Sences
and Endowments" (C III.9). Can the two be so separate? It is only
the "Maner" of apprehension and appreciation which makes "the World
. . . both a Paradice and a Prison to different Persons" (C I.36;
see G III.68). Without a notion of spiritual apprehension and
Felicity the material world becomes for Traheme a Hobbist desert:
"Being Swallowed up therfore in the Miserable Gulph of idle talk
and worthless vanities, thenceforth I lived among Shadows, like a
Prodigal Son feeding upon Kusks with Swine. A Comfortless Wilderness
the World was, or wors: a Waste Place covered with Idleness and Play,
and Shops and Markets and Taverns" (C III.14). When the spiritual
manner lapses the riches of nature are lost and the riches of
invention break in and force a harsh accommodation to "the true
Estate of this World" (C IV.20). The material world, the acquisitive
Hobbist world of invention and self-aggrandizement, is recognised,
if recognised, finally, only to be denied.
Within the world of nature, however, and in terms of the
spiritual "Maner", there are further parallels with the material
advance and ambition of Hobbes and the society that can be seen to
take colour from him. "It is the Nobility of Mans Soul that He is
Insatiable" (C 1.22), Traherne says: "You must Want like a GOD, that
you may be Satisfied like GOD" (C 1.44). He celebrates both "The
Noble Inclination wherby Man thirsteth after Riches and Dominion"
(C 1.23) and "the Avaricious Humor . . . Whereby we refer all unto
our selvs and naturaly desire to hav all alone in our Private
Possession, and to be the alone and single End of all Things"
(C 11.79). "Riches and Pleasures may be infinite" (CE 67); "all
the World is yours" (C I.16). Traherne's ambition, based on his
own version of self-love is, in its eager and often overweening
intensity, a spiritual parallel of Hobbist materialism; and always
underlying the paradise perceived in the spiritual manner is the
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material prison of the world of invention.
It is a potent awareness of the influence of material objects
and material wealth, of the riches of invention and man's pursuit
of them, that forces Traheme back on the "Pure and Virgin
Apprehensions" of his infancy as a resource to be used against
and in contrast to "Barbarous Inventions", the "enemies to all Pure
and True Apprehensions" (£ 111.13). Thus "it is requisit that we
should be as very Strangers to the Thoughts Customs and Opinions of
men in this World as if we were but little Children" (C III.5). The
origins of Traheme's pursuit of Felicity through the "Ey of
Reason" (C 1.25), the recovery of the apprehensions of the "Infant-
Ey" (M II.86-87) on the principles of the "Highest Reason" (£ III.2),
are in a reaction or rebellion against the Hobbist "Customs and
maners of Men" which "ecclypsed" the pure apprehensions of his
childhood and "alienated" him from a true and natural inheritances
If you ask me how it was ecclypsed? Truly by
the Customs and maners of Men, which like
Contrary Winds blew it out: by an innumerable
company of other Objects, rude vulgar and
Worthless Things that like so many loads of
Earth and Dung did over whelm and Bury it: by
the Impetuous Torrent of Wrong Desires in all
others whom I saw or knew that carried me
away and alienated me from it: by a Whole Sea
of other Matters and Concernments that
Covered and Drowned it . . . All Mens
thoughts and Words were about other Matters
... I was little and reverenced their
Authority; I was weak, and easily guided by
their Example: Ambitious also, and Desirous
to approve my self unto them. ... My
Thoughts . . . were blotted out.
(£ III.7)
The reaction is itself Hobbist to the extent that it is provoked
and promoted by "self Lov" (C IV.55)> albeit that self-love is
conceived not in individualist terms but rather as a means of
13?
returning to a state of mutual participation, on the part of
all men, in a primal unity in which self-love and a form of
social love or charity become identical. The power and interest
of Traherne's writing and thought, in his avid search for the
Felicity he once felt to be the universal inheritance of innocent
man may in part be due to the thoroughness and proximity with
which he senses the alienating "Customs and maners of Men" in
society, the aggressive and materially concerned society of his
day. He wanted to teach "Those Pure and Virgin Apprehensions"
"by Experience", for they are "unattainable by Book" (C III.l).
The pursuit of Felicity does not draw on a complete, preconceived
and preconstituted ("mystic" or "meditative") discipline, the
obedience to which will bring the initiate to his spiritual
reward. The pursuit of Felicity as an ideal resulted from a
deliberate reaction against the common behaviour, the "Customs
and maners", of men in society, their "Ambitions, Trades,
Luxuries, inordinat Affections, Casual and Accidental Riches"
(C III.5). Once corrupted, and "made to learn the Dirty Devices
of this World" (C III.3), the student of Felicity sought once
again a pure and natural inheritance formerly Enjoyed in intuitive
innocence, still sensed, and one day perhaps regained through the
exercise of the "Highest Reason" (C III.2).
Traherne's reaction against an awareness of the accustomed
behaviour of men in society, his rejection of material values,
launches, is in part responsible for, his pursuit of spiritual
ones. His recognition of a material influence working against his
spiritual ambition but at once in part inspiring it is present in
his writing. The society he lived in and reacted immediately against,
the society of Restoration London, is particularly marked in
its embodiment of those values he rejected. This is reflected
positively as well as negatively in his work. For, while
rejecting the riches of invention pursued by other men, he finds
material wealth secretly attractive and is himself ambitious and
acquisitive as regards spiritual apprehension and possession of
the riches of nature. So, while it is possible to see a negative
recognition of the values of Restoration society in his rejection
of those values, it is also possible to see a positive reflection
of them in his spiritual pursuit. In spiritual terms he urges
upon man a doctrine of avarice and insatiableness based on
self-love that makes it possible to suggest that Hobbist ideas,
the theories and practise of material self-aggrandizement, and
the Restoration ideology of power and profit — even perhaps
Charles II*s own absolutist ambitions — were subtly transmuted
in the doctrine and pursuit of Felicity."We lov to be Rich",
Traheme asserts (C 11.57)! "It is the Glory of Man, that his
Avarice is insatiable, and his Ambition infinite, that his
Appetite carries him to innumerable Pleasures, and that his
Curiosity is so Endless, that were he Monarch of the World, it
would not satisfie his Soul" (CE 5^0 •
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CHAPTER 5
The Royal Society and. Natural Philosophy, 1660-16?^-
In an earlier chapter it was shown how, in the Oxford of the
I65C s, John Wilkins and the members of his experimental philosophy-
club began, in a series of informal meetings, to inquire into all
manner of physical phenomena in ways which prefigure the later
development of physical science. It was shown that, while some of
their discoveries, particularly those of Robert Boyle, were to be
incorporated into later versions of scientific progress and truth,
a large proportion of the work may have been undertaken for various
and often apparently "unscientific" reasons, sometimes for religious
reasons. Whatever the motivation, "experimental" or "natural
philosophy" seemed often to take on explicit religious connotations.
While there may be some connection in this with the work of a
writer like Traherne — primarily in the idea of research into and
understanding of God's creation — any major consideration of a
possible relationship was delayed. There was at that time little
theoretical writing on the aims and more general significance of
natural philosophy. This appeared only in the 1660's.
A major reason for the upsurge in theoretical debate about
natural philosophy was the foundation of the Royal Society, "The
Royal Society of London for the Improving of Natural Knowledge".
This received its Royal Charter in 1662. Several members of the
Oxford club formed a nucleus within the Society, although their
numbers were greatly increased. John Wilkins was again a central
figure.^ In the l660's the Society, having greater prestige, impetus
and confidence than the Oxford club, began to disseminate in print
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not only reports of its work but also, through the writings of
its members, explanations of and apologies for its existence and
for the practice of natural philosophy as a whole. Thomas Sprat's
History of the Royal Society (166?) has become a classic of polemical
apology, but to this can be added Abraham Cowley's original plea for
the establishment of a society such as was shortly set up, A
Proposition for the Advancement of Experimental Philosophy (l66l),
and three works by other members of the Society: Robert Boyle's
Some Considerations Touching the Usefulness of Experimental Natural
Philosophy (1663), Henry Power's Experimental Philosophy (1664) and
Robert Hooke's Micrographia (I665). These provide a contemporary
basis for discussion that offers more immediate and closer parallels
with the abstract and philosophical work of a writer like Traherne.
He himself affirmed that "Natural Philosophy" is "Nobly Subservient
to the Highest Ends" and showed an inclination to discuss the
"Diligent inquisition into all Natures" (C III.44) in terms of
"Humanity", "Divinity" and "Ethicks" (C III.45). Natural philosophers
discussed their activites in similar terms, terms which are
complemented by an interest in the practical aspects of what both
Traheme and Henry Power called the "use and service" of common
things (EP 164; CE 182). At first sight Traherne's interest in
natural philosophy might appear to issue from a more fundamental
concern with a particular "religious" view of nature. So, it might
be suggested, the natural philosophers' interest in religion issues
from their own more fundamental concern with a particular
"scientific" view. A closer examination of the relevant texts will
show the actual relationship to be more complex than this
abstraction suggests. It will also suggest that the relation between
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"religion" and "science" was far- less well defined than might be
thought. In the specific context of Restoration London apparently
dissimilar forms of discourse can be seen to evince common concerns.
For debate about natural philosophy, and the activities of the Royal
Society in general, are of interest in relation not only to Traherne's
writing but also to the life of London as a whole at the time when
Traherne was resident there.
The Royal Society formed a major intellectual focus in
Restoration London. With the King as its patron (Charles II
maintained his own laboratory at Whitehall) the Society was
supported by a more than representative selection of the most
eminent men of the time. It also expresses and represents, often
consciously, the forward looking optimism that in part characterizes
the age, permeating all forms of cultural activity. As Dryden asked
rhetorically in Of Dramatick Foesie (1668) : "Is it not evident, in
these last hundred years (when the Study of Philosophy has been the
business of all the Virtuosi in Christendome) that almost a new
2
Nature has been reveal'd to us?". Members of the Society were
impressed, and expected other people to be impressed, by the
achievements and ideology of the Society as these directly reflected
what was consciously felt to be a new and highly developed awareness
of the greater wonder and glory of God's creation. This was seen in
a new and more wonderful light as a result not only of experiments
and observations but simply through the attitudes the Society
fostered. Sprat is perhaps the best representative of this feeling,
and for him, as the Society's official historian, the contemporary
"Improving of Natural Knowledge" heralded not simply practical
progress for the Royal Society and for Britain (great though this
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was, he insisted) but a new golden age for mankind, a realised
ideal both individual and universal.
Meetings of an informal group of experimental philosophers
had been held at Gresham College, Bishopsgate, probably since
1645. It was there, after the Restoration, that the Royal Society
was to hold its meetings. After the Great Fire in 1666, however,
Gresham College was used by the Common Council and the Royal
Exchange, the official buildings of which had been destroyed, and
also to accommodate the Lord Mayor and other dignitaries whose
official residences had been burned. The Royal Society was obliged
to find another meeting place. A recently elected member, Henry
Howard, later sixth Duke of Norfolk, allowed the Society to use
the Norfolk family's London mansion, Arundel House in the Strand.
Arundel House was in fact the neighbouring palace to Essex House,
the Bridgeman household of which Traherne was a member after I669.
The first meeting of the Royal Society to be held at Arundel House
was on 9 January 16^, and meetings at Gresham College did not
recommence until late in 1674 (certainly by 12 November), so
throughout the period of Traherne's residence at Essex House the
3
Royal Society met next door at Arundel House. No conclusions
should be drawn from this, but the proximity itself is of more
than passing interest. Some views by Wenceslaus Hollar, who had
himself been connected with the Norfolk family, show the
juxtaposition of the two houses and their relationship to the
rest of London. One view shows the prospect from the roof of
Arundel House, with the roof of Essex House in the foreground, and
another, from Milford Stairs, a jetty onto the River Thames between
4
the two houses, shows the frontage of Essex House to the river.
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The activities of the Royal Society were on occasion anything but
inconspicuous. Apart from the number of people, whether members
or casual visitors, who arrived regularly for their meetings at
Arundel House — an experiment on 12 December 1667, for example,
"was made in a great crowd of spectators which would not admit of
that exactness, which was designed" — the nature of the Society's
interests occasionally required them to work outside. On 21 April
1670, for example, "Mr. HOOKE brought in his instrument to observe
the motion of the sun to seconds; which was ordered to be produced
again at the next meeting, and to be tried upon the leads of
71
Arundel House, if the sun should shine", and on 7 March 16^^ "An
experiment was made of the method proposed by Mr. HOOKE ... of
conveying intelligence from place to place, which was performed
from Arundel-house garden to a boat lying near the shore on the
other side of the Thames, by letters of a foot long and glasses
[telescopes^ of two feet long, the distance being about half a
mile".
The activities of the Royal Society in the seven year period
of its meetings at Arundel House cover a very extensive range.
The human body — the heart and the blood system, the lungs and
respiration — and the physical world, considered topographically,
microscopically, magnetically, and in relation to the heavens,
themselves examined through telescopes. The nature of motion, air,
light and colours. Practical tools and mechanical gadgets; literally
any specimens. The Royal Society and its members inquired into any
and all phenomena observable around them.-^ A whole physical world
was to be seen and known anew, more thoroughly than before. Natural
philosophy had begun to re-define and promote anew man's response
144
to and observation of the natural world, a response and observation
that might be echoed through man's whole intellectual and
speculative practice; "almost a new Nature" was indeed to be
"reveal'd". To reiterate particular interests that Traherne shares
in common with the natural philosophers of the Royal Society — his
"Thanksgivings for the Body" (M 11.214-19)( his idea of the
"Circulation" (M 11.152-54), his celebration of "Common things"
(C III.53), of air (C I.34) and of the stars (C 1.14; CE 72, 112),
his magnetic image (C 1.2) and microscopic awareness (C 11.12, 111.20);
even his interest in "News from a foreign country" (M 11.88-89) — is
only further to delay study of more thorough and more important
analogies that are to be found in the writings of the natural
philosophers of the 1660's. For they sought to define and explain
the whole of creation, benefitting not only an abstract scientific
cause but a philosophical one bearing upon the whole of man's life.
The immediate and practical emphases of natural philosophy sought
to define the "use and service" of things, but even here "all
kind of Arts Trades Mechanismes . . . pertained to felicity" (C III.36),
to an ideal Good. Natural philosophy sought, for the good of all
men, a thorough view of God's creation and a new insight into the
whole "mysterious process of . . . divine Art" in the "great
Machine of the World" (EP 193)« This philosophy of nature may be
examined, then, by analysis of the four texts cited above, beginning
with Sprat's major History.
1. Thomas Sprat, The History of the Royal Society of London For the
Improving of Natural Knowledge.
Sprat's History is the most complete guide to the aims and
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ideals of the early Royal Society. As history it is inaccurate
— for example in suggesting that the meetings of the Oxford
experimental philosophy club in the 1650's were the first of their
kind, whereas similar meetings had been held at Gresham College
since 164-5 — but as polemic and panegyric it offers an elaborate
description of and justification for many aspects of the Society's
thought and practice. It was commissioned by the Society and
written by one of it members. Sprat was also a bishop, so a
typical ecclesiastical viewpoint was not lacking. In Restoration
London the Royal Society provided a focus for all manner of
people — it was in many ways the intellectual centre of the city —
and this is reflected in Sprat's History, the relevance of which
claims to extend beyond the aims and attitudes of the widely
associated Scoiety itself to those of the city and nation in which
it had its existence. Students, academics, tradesmen, merchants,
clergymen (including bishops and archbishops), army officers,
naval commanders, statesmen, politicians, the gentry, nobility
and aristocracy, and the King himself, were welcomed as members,
"Philosophy being admitted into our Exchange, our Church, our
Palaces, and our Court" (HRS 403). The Society itself thought this
was right. It was part of the intention of members that the Society
should recruit, and advance its cause through, a wide variety of
members, typically those of high social standing and/or political
influence. Sprat boasts that very few ministers and ambassadors,
for example, are not members. Sprat saw the Royal Society as an
epitome of all that was best in the nation, and looked continually
towards national advancement in terms of natural philosophy and its
practical and philosophical application. In his view, and that of
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the Society, the interests of the Royal Society and the nation
were one, so closely involved with the life of the nation did
the Society seem to he. Ultimately, there is a millenial emphasis
in the History: national interests also become the universal
interests of mankind as a whole. It was this forceful and expansive
ideology that helped to make the Royal Society a dominant and
dominating force in many aspects of life in Restoration London.
For later commentators Sprat's History has aoheived fame, if
not infamy, for his insistence on what has been supposed to be
scientific truth and mathematical accuracy of statement. His
history is inaccurate and his arguments are deliberately over-
emphatic. His call for "a close, naked, natural way of speaking
. . . bringing all things as near the Mathematical plainness as
they can" and his preference for the language of "Artizans,
countrymen, and Merchants" to that of "Wits, or Scholars" (HRS 113)
has, however, been taken seriously, and his History once stood as
an example of a new "scientific" prose style. These claims have
a place in the context of the book and in the ambitions of the
Royal Society, but, while Sprat instructs his readers to avoid
"the luxury and redundance of speech", to banish "eloquence" and
reject "amplifications, digressions and swellings of style"
(HRS 111, 113), his contemporary, Samuel Butler, makes an apt
comment on Sprat's own style: "The Historian of Gresham Colledge,
Indevors to Cry down Oratory and Declamation, while He uses
nothing else".^ It is at least possible that Sprat, the author of
a deliberately polemical work, would admit the justice of Butler's
remark. Natural philosophers did use "Oratory" and develop their
own rhetoric, when discussing their work: it is this rhetoric
14?
which gives their books considerable interest in relation to
other writing in the period. Examples of Sprat's "Oratory" are
many, but, having remarked upon the King's interest in the Royal
Society and its activities, it is perhaps apt to quote here
Sprat's recognition of the fact that Charles II maintained a
laboratory in St. James's Park: "Saint Jameses Park may witness,
that Ptolemy and Alphonso were not the only Monarchs, who
observ'd the motions, and appearances of the Stars" (HRS 149).
For Sprat and his fellow members the interest of the King and
prominent members of the court was important to the Royal Society,
a major reason for its contemporary prominence and recognition,
and an immediate index of its respectability and responsibility.
These could in turn be further dignified by grandiloquence,
classical allusion and romantic metaphysics: King and country
unite in the pursuit of natural philsophy which traces an
ancestry to Ptolemy and surveys the very heavens.
Sprat's "Mathematical plainness" can also be called into
question when an attempt is made to define what exactly is meant
by "natural philosophy". The History seems to'be about "Natural
Philosophy", or sometimes "Experimental Philosophy", but the
Royal Society, as indicated in the title, is said to deal in
"Natural Knowledge". While the "Natural" emphasis is important,
the best solution to the problem of terms is to retain "Natural
Philosophy" as the over-riding concept, but to emphasize the
"Philosophical" content of this by reference to another of Sprat's
terms, "General Learning" (HRS 14). "Natural Philosophy", General
Learning", is indeed very generalised — it can be pursued by
"Philosophers, or Schollars, or Virtuosi" (HRS 26) — but the
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important point, for Sprat and the Royal Society, is that it
should relate, or be seen to relate, in some way more directly
to nature than has previously been seen to be the case. Sprat
wants to establish "the true Philosophy of Nature" (HRS 4-5) and
to deal in "the solid substance of Science itself" (HRS 18) but
within the broad effusion of terms and definitions there remains,
in the actual practice, an element both of trial and error: there
is really little more than an emphasis on the unrestricted
exploration of virtually all subjects in vaguely defined "natural
philosophical" terms. Sprat says that while "True Philosophy" will
begin with a "scrupulous, and severe examination of particulars"
and proceed by continued experiment and verification (HRS 31)» the
members of the Royal Society do not and should not "circumscribe
their thoughts" with "any certain Art of Experimenting" (HRS 89).
The Society aims "to make faithful Records, of all the Works of
Nature, or Art, which can come within their reach" (HRS 6l), and in
the pursuit of "True Philosophy" or "the true Philosophy of Nature"
they should avoid "Metaphysics" and "Cloudy Knowledge" (HRS 326), It
is "philosophy" in which the Society is regularly seen to engage,
however: "Philosophers, or Schollers, or Virtuosi" can all pursue
a broadly defined and heterogenous natural "philosophy". Sprat's
aim is to give a general indication of the Society's interests and
methods, or at least their attitudes, and to recruit and/or justify
as many "Philosophers, or Schollers, or Virtuosi" in the general
cause of natural philosophy as possible. He speaks of his "Generall
Learning" simply as "The Philosophy" (HRS 14). It is very much as
a philosophy that the Royal Society's pursuit is characterized in
an effective aphorism that can be seen to summarise what little
149
Sprat has to say (with any "Mathematical plainness" at least) in
the way of a definition of his subject: "The Natural Philosopher
is to begin, where the Moral ends" (HRS 33)• Not the least
important emphasis in that statement is that on natural philosophy
as an extension and continuation of other forms of philosophy,
certainly not a rejection of them. Natural philosophy is not an
exclusive discipline (it is neither exclusive nor disciplined —
natural philosophers should not "circumscribe their thoughts"): in
many ways its essence consists in the extent to which it is the
opposite of this. The natural philosophers are said to be "conversant"
with "all the objects of men's thoughts: which can be nothing else,
but either God, or Han, or Nature" (HRS 81). In fact Sprat's form
of natural philosophy is less a new concept than a reformation of
old concepts with some novel additions. It must refer to "nature"
and the "natural" in the broadest sense (although it also deals
in "Art"), but Sprat recalls the ancient definition of a philosopher
as one "skill'd in all Divine and human things" (HRS 72). This
"Divine and human" reference should be included in any discussion
of natural philosophy. Sprat's natural philosopher "is to begin,
where the Moral ends" and is to deal in "all the objects of men's
thoughts", specifically God, Man, and Nature, in a "Divine and
human" sense. As will be seen, metaphysics and religion have a
place, and often a prominent place, in the thought and
responsibilities of the natural philosopher.
Natural philosophy, "General Learning", is seen by Sprat to be
as widespread as its objects and methods are disparate. He insists
on the popularity of natural philosophy among the King and Court,
and extends this to a national and international scale: "All
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places and. corners are now busie, and warm about this Work"
(HRS 71-72), "there is a universal desire, and appetite after
Knowledge" (HRS 152). A preoccupation with the "Secrets of Nature"
(HRS 131), he suggests, is vital to any man of good breeding or
learning. The intention to "restore the Truths, that have lain
neglected" and "to push on those, which are already known, to more
various uses" acquires a prophetic emphasis: natural philosophy
will "make the way more passable, to what remains unreveal'd"
(HRS 61). "We are to overcome the mysteries of all the Works of
Nature" (HRS 64). In the context of the religious relevance of
natural philosophy the attempt to "overcome the mysteries of all
the Works of Nature", to understand and appreciate the works of
God the creator, becomes a duty for all believing men.
The dual notion of duty to God and the advancement of mankind
is fundamental to Sprat's argument. He regards the Royal Society
and its natural philosophy as being of vital importance to what
is conceived of as man's destiny in a universal sense. In a section
on "The Restoration of Learning" Sprat asserts that the age of the
formation of the Royal Society is the third "great age of the
flourishing of Learning", Greece and Rome in ancient times
representing the other two great periods. Sprat surveys previous
philosophical achievements to make this clear — "The Philosophy
of the Arabians", for example. Contemporary events and philosophical
developments are seen by Sprat in the broadest and most exalted
terms. His theme of the public involvement with and usefulness of
natural philosophy takes on two aspects, nationalist and universal.
Firstly, the members of the Royal Society will set "an infallible
course to make England the glory of the Western world" (KRS 79).
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Nature, Sprat implies, is more inclined to reveal her secrets
to Englishmen (HRS 113). London is the best centre for the
"Universal Intelligence" that is necessary to "Universal Philosophy"
(HRS 82). Nor does Sprat ignore the reason for this: trade. He is
well aware that Britain's naval strength had more than trebled in
twenty years, and he observes of contemporary England that "the
gain of Trade is become great enough to overbalance all other
strength" (HRS 408), seeing this as "the best means, not only to
inrich particular Merchants but to enlarge their Empire" (HRS 408).
Commerce is relevant to the practical aspects of natural philosophy,
which will benefit trade by making it more efficient, while the
"Improvement of Trades, the advancement of Manufactures" (HRS 436)
— all the wealth, prosperity and opulence of this aspect of
Restoration London — contribute to the good and advancement of
natural philosophy. Sprat sees this as being to a certain extent
directly linked with commerce and trading interests, not only
by sharing practical interests and benefits: he draws attention
to the connection between the Royal Society and the Royal
Companies. Typically, Sprat sees "Mastery of Commerce" (HRS 423)
as leading to the greatest possible good — in the prophetic
sense previously noted — and the sharing of Royal Charters by
the Royal Society and Royal Companies may be seen to indicate
not only their mutual interests but the whole Restoration concept
of Britain as a leading world power, flourishing in all senses
and, through the wealth gained through "Mastery of Commerce",
realising predictions of a new golden age of civilisation.
Secondly, there is a universal aspect to the natural
philosophy practised by members of the Royal Society. They seek
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"to make all their Labours unite for the service of man-kind."
(HRS 76). "So neer is Mankind to its happiness" (HRS 437) in this
"Learned and Inquisitive Age" (HRS l) that the pursuit of natural
philosophy fostered by the Royal Society will bring about the
dawn of a millenium:
While this Halcyon knowledge is breeding all
Tempests will cease: the oppositions and
contentious wranglings of Science falsly so
call'd will soon vanish away: the peacable
calmness of mens Judgements will have
admirable influence in their Manners; the
sincerity of their Understandings will appear
in their Actions; their Opinions will be less
violent and dogmatical, but more certain;
they will only be Gods one to another, and
not Wolves.
(HRS 437-38)
It is in such passages that the philosophical element in Sprat's
work becomes dominant, for this represents for him the fulfilment
of the philosophical aspect of natural philosophy. The learning
promoted by the Royal Society is offered as a means to the
fulfilment of the potential of all men — they will be "Gods one
to another" — and as a prospect for the realisation not only of
a golden age of learning but of universal peace and amity in
millenial terms, the realisation of God's kingdom on earth.
That realisation is not only a millenial hope, however. As
was suggested, the experiments and researches of natural philosophy
are regarded by Sprat and the Royal Society as a religious duty, in
the sense that they represent man's discovery and appreciation of
God's works. This is a major theme in the History: "the contemplation
of God's visible Works, and such easy and rational Arguments" is
"Next to the succor of divine Power . . . the most probable way to
preserve the Christian Faith among us" (HRS 375)• The world —
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nature, the whole of creation, God's kingdom — could he
examined and discovered anew, in new terms and by direct
experience and observation, and would appear more wonderful than
before. The more man knows and understands about God's creation
the more wonderful it will appear and the more truly grateful man
will become: "he will be led to admire the wonderful contrivance
of the Creation; and to apply, and to direct his praises aright:
which no doubt when they are offer'd up to Heven, from the mouth
of one who has well studied what he commends, will be more suitable
to the Divine Nature, than the blind applauses of the ignorant"
(KRS 3^9). While religious and theological considerations are not
direct preoccupations of the Royal Society ("the Royal Society is
abundantly cautious, not to intermeddle in Spiritual things", HRS
347), the natural philosopher inevitably "has always before his
eyes the beauty, contrivance and order of Gods works" (HRS 3^9)•
This aspect of his pursuit demands his attention and inevitably
provokes speculation.
There are two main aspects to Sprat's discussion of the
relationship of natural philosophy to religion and theology. The
most basic of these is the notion that the examination and
discovery of the complexity of what are apparently the most
simple things — the best example of this would be in the use of
the microscope to examine the details of leaves or insects —
increases man's awe at the complexity of God's creation as a
whole. Thus "ordinary Works . . . they do almost raise to the
height of wonders, by the exact Discovery, which they make of
their excellencies" (HRS 36I-62). Further, when man sees and
understands such formerly incomprehensible, indeed unimaginable,
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wonders as "the numberless particles that move in every mans
Blood" he will recognize that "what the Scripture relates of the
Purity of God, of the Spirituality of his Nature, and that of
Angels, and the Souls of men, cannot seem incredible" (HRS 3^8)•
This physical/spiritual transfer is a common argument, almost an
artistic device, of seventeenth century natural philosophers. As
ordinary objects became more complex and wonderful, so formerly
wonderful objects became more easily comprehensible, or at least
credible, and no less wonderful. It was as if man had entered a
newly perceived world, or gained a whole new means of perception.
As man's observation became more complex, so did the objects of
creation perceived by him, and so therefore did God their creator.
It did seem like the dawn of a golden age. Man's knowledge would
be greatly increased, as he began to see the previously unimaginable
wonder and complexity of everything around him. This could only lead
him to redouble his praise for the origin and creator of all things;
and his gratitude would be only the more acceptable to God the more
man understood and fully appreciated the wonders that God had
prepared for him. Further, as man's physical knowledge of the
creation aids and enhances his praises and religious belief by
showing him the true complexity of God's creation, his evaluation
of the spiritual aspect of his nature, of creation, and of God
himself, will also be enhanced. To "understand aright what is
supernatural, it is a good step first to know what is according to
Nature" (HRS 352). Knowledge of nature is a key to all knowledge,
physical and spiritual; it enhances man's nature and his perception
of and relation to the whole of creation and to God himself.
The second aspect to Sprat's consideration of natural
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philosophy and religion is a development from this. It
culminates in an almost metaphysical view of the natural
philosopher's work. The first, more simple theme was concerned
to explain the benefits, in physical and spiritual terms, of
natural philosophy to religion. The second theme intercepts and
develops this. Intercepts, because it might be argued that, while
natural philosophy enables man to see and understand more of God's
work, it was not part of the divine intention that man should see
and understand more than he was formerly accustomed or allowed to
see. It might be suggested that he should only use his own eyes,
unaided by the microscope, or that, in aspiring to understand more
of creation he repeats Adam's sin. Sprat answers any possible
objections before they are made by showing that man too is God's
creation, and so anything that benefits him is not a matter of
personal profit to man alone (as against God) but to the advantage
of creation as a whole: man honours God his maker by exercising his
faculties to the full. Indeed, for Sprat, the "greatest Elemish of
human Nature" is "a defect in . . . Knowledge and Understanding"
(HRS 350)5 It is an offence to God if man does not make full use of
the endowments, those of "Knowledge and Understanding", in which he
is unique. Researching into every aspect of creation becomes a duty
rather than an offence to God, as it is a duty to mankind. "This was
the first service, that Adam perform'd to his Creator, when he
obey'd him in mustring, and naming, and looking into the Nature of
all the Creatures" (HRS 3^9-50)« "God never yet left himself
without witness in the Norld" (HRS 350) and this "witness" is to be
found, as Bacon said, as much in God's works as in God's word, so
"it is not only sottishness, but prophaneness for men to cry out
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against the understanding of Nature: For that being nothing else
but the instrument of God, whereby he gives being and action to
things; the knowledge of it deserves so little to be esteem'd
impious, that it ought rather to be reckon'd as Divine" (HRS 351)•
Natural philosophy thus has a particular and special religious
value and importance, for it deals with and examines, seeks to know
in the greatest detail, the "instrument of God". Its knowledge,
then, "ought ... to be reckon'd as Divine".
Sprat claimed that natural philosophy deals in "all the objects
of men's thoughts: which can be nothing else, but either God, or
Kan, or Nature" (HRS 81). All three subjects are connected, but
"Nature" claims a special place. The study of nature leads man to
a better understanding of God, in both his physical and spiritual
manifestations, but so does study of man (in whom "may be
consider'd the Faculties, and operations of . . . Souls", HRS 82),
God's greatest creation. Nature, God and man are too closely inter¬
related to allow a study of the scope of natural philosophy to
concentrate solely on nature. God and man inevitably enter the
discussion, and Sprat not unwillingly considers the ultimately
metaphysical relationship of all three, nature, God and man, in
terms that recall Bacon's pyramid of knowledges in his discussion
of "Metaphysic" 'P
Such is the dependance among all the orders
of creatures; the inanimate, the sensitive, the
rational, the natural, the artificial: that the
apprehension of one of them, is a good step
towards the understanding of the rest: And this
is the highest pitch of humane reason; to
follow all the links of this chain, till all
their secrets are open to our minds; and their
works advanc'd, or initiated by our hands. This
is truly to command the world; to rank all the
varieties, and degrees of things, so orderly
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one upon another; that standing on top of them,
we may perfectly behold all that are below, and
make them all serviceable to the quiet and
peace, and plenty of Man's life. And to this
happiness, there can be nothing else added: but
that we make a second advantage of this rising
ground, thereby to look the nearer into heaven:
An ambition, which though it was punish'd in
the old World, by an universal Confusion when
it was manag'd with impiety and insolence: yet,
when it is carried on by that humility and
innocence, which can never be separated from
true knowledg; when it is design'd not to brave
the creator of all things, but to admire him
the more: it must needs be the utmost
perfection of humane Nature.
(HRS 110-11)
It is in this "utmost perfection of humane Nature" that the full
potential of natural philosophy can be realised. The History,
itself a highly wrought work of art, presents a whole philosophy
which looks forward to a new golden age for man in national and
universal terms. Men will become "Gods one to another" as they
study "all the objects of men's thoughts", "God, or Man, or
Nature". Man will learn to "direct his praises aright", finding
"wonders" in "ordinary Works" and attaining knowledge of the
supernatural by ever increasing knowledge of the natural world:
nature is "the instrument of God" and knowledge of it is "Divine".
2. Abraham Cowley, A Proposition for the Advancement of Experimental
Philosophy.
Cowley's brief Proposition is the earliest apology for the
aims and ideals of the Royal Society — it in fact takes the form
of a plea for the foundation of a "Philosophical Colledge", the
role of which, to a certain extent at least, the Royal Society was
to fill. The college is necesssary, Cowley says, because "the
solitary and unactive Contemplation of Nature, by the most ingenious
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Persons living, in their own private Studies" will effect little
(AEP A5r V). Corporate and active "Contemplation" will produce
the practical results Cowley seeks — there is a particular- emphasis
on the utilitarian aspect of natural philosophy — but is also the
best means to a better understanding of nature. Cowley, like many
advocates of natural philosophy in the seventeenth century
(particularly John Webster in the 1650's) attacks the still widely
held academic belief that the ancients (at least in combination with
their commentators) knew or could show the way to knowledge of all
there is to know about nature and the natural world. Even in 1661,
Cowley says, students are not given sufficient opportunity to
experiment and examine for themselves, but are required to study
ancient and inadequate authorities rather than the world around
them. Man, Cowley says, must always seek new knowledge and not
just inherit it.
Cowley's analysis of the various divisions of learning and
knowledge is more explicit than that of other seventeenth century
advocates of natural philosophy. Thus his particular relevance here.
"All Knowledge" he states, "must either be of God, or of his
Creatures, that is, of Nature" (AEP A2r). For Cowley, there are no
other forms of knowledge or study. "Knowledge of God" is "Divinity"
and not part of Cowley's present subject, although he finds it well
provided for (AEP A2r). "Knowledge ... of Nature", that is all
knowledge other than "Divinity", is part of "Natural Philosophy"
(AEP . "Natural Philosophy" is divided into "Contemplation" of
either the "Immediate" or "Mediate" "Creatures of God" (AEP A2r).
"Creatures" might now be read as "creations": the "Immediate . . .
Creatures of God" belong to the realm of pure nature, the original
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creation of God; while the "Mediate Creatures of God" are more
accurately the "Creatures" or creations of man — in relation to
God they are the "Creatures of his Creature" (AEP A2r). The
"Mediate creatures" include "all Arts for the use of Humane Life"
(AEP kZ0). The subdivision of these "Arts" — all part of "Natural
Philosophy" — may be examined.
Firstly there are the purely human arts, made or created by
man alone. These include rhetoric, politics, grammar and logic.
Secondly there are the mixed arts, which concern "Mans Creatures
no otherwise then by the Result which he effects in Conjunction
and Application of the Creatures of God" (AEP A2r). These mixed
arts depend upon a connection with the "Immediate . . . Creatures
of God", but are still counted among the "Mediate Creatures"
because they depend upon the intervening skill and interest of
man. It is knowledge of the "Immediate . . . Creatures of God"
and of the mixed arts among the "Mediate Creatures" that Cowley
finds deficient. The human arts, like divinity, are well provided
for, but not "Inquisition into the Nature of God's Creatures, and
the Application of them to Humane Uses (especially the latter)"
(AEP kZ°). It is these, as part of "Natural Philosophy", that the
proposed "Philosophical Colledge" should provide for. Eventually,
according to Sprat's History, the Royal Society was also to devote
its energies to the remainder of Cowley's "Natural Philosophy", the
human arts, as well. Cowley thought that, as far as the college was
concerned, the "Fountains of Nature" would offer more and better
rewards than the "Cisterns of men" (AEP A4r-V), although he is
interested in the practical human uses of nature. He asserts the
probability that research into nature and what might be termed the
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natural arts will reveal new possibilities for man's wonder and
benefit. Cowley's poem "To the Royal Society", published as a
Preface to Sprat's History in 166?, contains a metaphorical
reference to the fall of man which suggests the direct involvement
of God with nature and man's research into it, and implies that,
to the natural philosopher, the world can appear as a paradise:
The Orchard's open now, and free;
Bacon has broke the Scar-crow Deitie;
Come, enter, all that will,
Behold the rip'ned Fruit, come gather now your Fill.
Yet still, methinks, we fain would be
Catching at the Forbidden Tree,
We would be like the Deitie,
When Truth and Falshood, Good and Evil, we
Without the Sences aid within our selves would see;
For 'tis God only who can find
All Nature in his Mind.°
To acknowledge that it is "God only who can find / All Nature in
his Mind" is to be reminded that God remains the source of all
knowledge, whether "Divinity" or "Natural Philosophy": "All
Knowledge must be of God or of his Creatures, that is, of Nature"
(ASP AP17). Cowley's concise Proposition offers a definition of
"Natural Philosophy" that includes all knowledge not classifiable
as "Divinity" — whether actually part of nature or of the natural
or human "Arts" — and his poem, in suggesting that "We would be
like the Deitie", implies at once the religious relevance and
involvement of natural philosophy and the paradisal promise for
man of his entry into "Orchards" of knowledge opened by the
advancement of Baconian learning.
3. Robert Boyle, Some Considerations Touching the Usefulness of
Experimental Natural Philosophy.
For Boyle, "Experimental Natural Philosophy" entails the
161
''Improving of Men's Understandings" by "the Study of the Book of
Nature" (UEP 2). "The two chief advantages, which a real
acquaintance with Nature brings to our Minds", he claims, "are
First, by instructing our Understandings, and gratifying our
Curiosities; and next, by exciting and cherishing our Devotion"
(UEP 2). He sees natural philosophy as involving a re-acquaintance
with nature on "real" terms. For him, nature and the study of it
acquire in the practice and process of natural philosophy a
special and apparently metaphysical significance. The objects of
nature are not only of practical use and benefit to man, assisting
him as he masters them, as Boyle says; they are also able to
assist man "to become acceptable to their author". Boyle sees man
in a dominant and central position in creation, seeking and
acquiring a special knowledge of nature and, partly thus, but
partly by an inherent rationality or divinity of his own which is
confirmed and extended by this knowledge, communicating in a very
special way with God the creator. As this process becomes more
advanced, through the practice of a very broadly conceived
philosophy of nature, man's divinity and rationality is increased
and advanced so that he himself becomes something of a God-like
figure.
Boyle assumes that God's "principal ends" in creating all
things "were, the Manifestation of His own Glory, and the Good of
Men" (UEP 22). The two are of course connected, partly because of
man's unique nature as a link between God and His creation, able
to recognise the related significance of both. Man's praise for
and appreciation of nature is the means of reconciling the assertion
that God made all things for his own glory, all things for man,
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and. man for Himself. It is possible for man "to define all the
Ends and Aimes of the Omniscient God in His Great Work of the
Creation" (UEP 22), and the apparent inexhaustibility of creation,
made still more evident by natural philosophy, would seem to make
this a valid assumption. It is through man, then, that God's
creation is returned to him. Certainly, Boyle says, "it is no
great presumption to conceive, that the rest of the Creatures
were made for Man, since he alone of the Visible World is able to
enjoy, use and relish many of the other Creatures, and to discerne
the Omniscience, Almightinesse and Goodnesse of their Author in
them, and return Him praises for them" (UEP 25).
Nature, God's creation, and the understanding and appreciation
of it is, for Boyle, a religion: "I esteem the World a Temple . . .
QandH . . . Man sure must be the Priest, ordain'd (by being
qualified) to celebrate Divine service not only in it, but for it"
(UEP 55-56). Boyle's method of understanding and appreciating
nature is "Experimental Natural Philosophy": "the sublimest
Knowledge here attainable will not destroy, but onely heighten
and enoble our admiration, and will prove the Incense or more
spiritual and acceptable part, of that Sacrifice of Praise . . .
wherein the Intelligent Admirer offers the whole world in
Eucharists to its Maker" (UEP 114). The idea of man's praise and
appreciation being improved by his better understanding of God's
creation, and the religious imagery in which this idea is
expressed, are typical of the speculative aspects of seventeenth
century natural philosophy. Boyle regards this as being not a
particular study in its own right but as a form of "Philosophical
Worship of God" (UEP 113). He paraphrases a passage from Galen,
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to the effect that natural philosophy or "the discerning ones
self, and discovering to others the Perfections of God
display'd in the Creatures" is "a more acceptable act of Religion
than the burning of Sacrifices or Perfumes upon his Altars" (UEP
115). Natural philosophy is not only a religion but the best of
religions.
As a religion, however, natural philosophy is not in conflict
with the Christian religion. It can be subscribed to within
Christian terms, and in fact complements and extends these. It
offers a confirmation, by means of reason, of the more traditional
faith: Boyle, like the Cambridge Platonists and John Locke, asserts
"the reasonableness of assenting to the Christian Religion" (UEP 105).
Unlike Henry Power, who asserted that natural philsophy might one
day discover to man "Spiritualities themselves", Boyle admits that
some things must remain unattainable by man. This is no cause for
surrendering to assertions of dogmatic faith over and above reason,
however: man must know what he can know and attempt still further
knowledge. He should admire what he cannot understand. Yet if some
things do transcend his capacity for knowing, the depth of his
knowledge and appreciation of what he can know will help him in the
effort to know the unknowable: "admiration . . . being an
acknowledgement of the Objects transcending our Knowledge, the
leameder the transcendent Faculty is, the greater is the admired
Objects transcendency acknowledg'd" (UBP 114). Man's learning, his
knowledge of the more readily knowable material world, aids and
develops his admiration, or at least his conception, of the
immaterial. God is glorified less by the "vulgar astonishment of
an unlettered Starer" than by the praise of those whose "industrious
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Curiosity hath brought their understandings to a prostrate
Veneration of what their Reason, not Ignorance, hath taught
them to be perfectly comprehensible by them" (UEP 114).
For Boyle, then, experimental natural philosophy becomes a
religion: its temple is the world and man the priest. He "alone
. . . is able to enjoy, use and relish" God's creation to the
full, "and to discerne the Omniscience, Almightinesse and Goodnesse
of their Author" in its objects. All the "Ends of Aimes of the
Omniscient God" can be defined in "His Great Work of the Creation",
and all "Study of the Book of Nature" aids man's understanding,
gratifies his curiosity, and is a vital enhancement of his
worship of God. Boyle particularly admired "Hermes Trismegistus"
as a (natural) philosopher and twice quotes the conviction
expressed in the Hermetic writings that "the Thanks and Praises
of Men, are the noblest Incense that can be offered up to God"
(UEP 115» see also UEP 53)• Experimental natural philosophy will
help man to make this offering.
4. Henry Power, Experimental Philosophy.
Power makes a claim to modesty in his discussion of the
power and promise of experimental philosophy: "As I would not
derogate from the Greatness and Eminency of Man (as being a very
Noble Creature;) so I would not have him arrogate too much to
himself: For though it may be a pious, and morally good conception,
To think that the whole world was made for him, yet I am sure
'tis no real and Physical Truth" (EP 162). Elsewhere, however, he
claims, in terms considerably less modest, man's "Inheritance" to
be "the whole Globe of the Earth" (EP 164) : it is only "Lordship
of the whole Universe" that man must not assume, and even then
he can "attempt and reach out at the Superior and more
mysterious works of [God1si Creation, and therein . . . admire
those things £he isl not capable to understand" (EP 164).
"Certainly", Power says, "this world was made not onely to be
Inhabited, but Studied and Contemplated by Man" (EP I83). Beyond
"this World", while he may "admire" when he cannot "understand",
there remains the possibility that knowledge of this world will
lead man to knowledge of God's greater creations and even
"Spiritualities themselves" (EP 58).
Power initially assumes that experimental philosophy is or
should be confined to the physical world. God, he says, "hath
given us such a large Inheritance, as the whole Globe of the Earth"
and has "Subjugated all things therein to our use and service"
(EP 164). Man should realise, though, that as "our Modem
Philosophers have found", "not onely the Earth, but the whole
Orbis Magnus (which is the Earth's Annual Circle it describes
about the Sun) is but a Point, in regard to the immense distance
of the Fixed Stars" (EP I63). Further, God has "endued our Souls
with such spiritual and prying faculties, that we can attempt
and reach at the Superior and more mysterious works of his
Creation" (EP 164). Power's modesty is already in question, for
this leads directly to the admiration of that which man cannot
understand, and, further, to an attempt to understand even that.
Man's own power and potential is more than adequately realised
despite Power's other modest claims.
Experimental Philosophy can be regarded as a treatise on
microscopy, because it is this which provides the focus for
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Power's more general considerations. It was the "late discoveries
of the Telescope, or Mcrscope"- (SP A3r) which enabled men to
become "critical spectators, surveyors, and adequate judges of the
immense Universe" (EP Blr). This, read in conjunction with Power's
assertion that the "world was made not onely to be Inhabited, but
Studied and Contemplated by Man", shows that man has, since the
invention and development of the telescope and microscope, only
recently entered into or regained a new or his real inheritance.
The world was made to be contemplated by man, and he is now
equipped to fulfil his function critically, as an "adequate"
judge. The "faculties of the soul of our Primitive father Adam
might be more quick & perspicacious in Apprehension, than those of
our lapsed Selves; yet certainly the Constitution of Adams Organs
was not divers from ours" (EP A4r). By judicious use of his
faculties as a critical spectator and adequate judge, equipped
with modern instruments, man might regain, to a certain degree at
least, a prelapsarian vision.
Power seeks to communicate something of this vision in his
treatise, in part intended to communicate to those who are unable
to use microscopes something of the world that is opened up by
them. In his observations he provides continual reference to
and comparison with the readily observable natural world —
"Mites" observed in oatmeal behave like rabbits in burrows. His
enthusiasm for his subject leaves him unable to restrict himself
to simple comparisons. He must draw out a philosophical reference
which implies, in the observation of "Mites in Cheese" for example,
that everything in the natural world is more detailed, more
ordered and more wonderful than the naked eye can recognize, and
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that it is thus to the greater glory of both man and God to
observe it more closely: "What rare Considerations might an
Ingenious Spectator take up here, even from this singular
Experiment? of the strange and most prodigious skilfulness of
Nature in the fashion of so Minute an Animal" (EP 1?). Fower uses
man's philosophical inclinations, applying them to his own
particular observations: he looks beyond the material aspect of
things, and must not only admire but seek to understand the
spiritual. His comparisons with the naturally observable world
become in this context more than simple comparisons: they are
reflections of the simple wonder he senses, or expects others to
sense, in his "Considerations" of the "strange and most prodigious
skilfulness of Nature" in the most apparently simple objects. He
is moved to a mode of expression unconnected with plain observation
(his language is hardly that of Sprat's "Mathematical plainness"):
"It is worth an Hour-glass of Time to behold the Crystal Sands
that measure it, for they seem like Fragments of Crystal ..."
(EP 42). The simple observation of sand produces an elegant
paradox, as consciously wrought as any art: he observes that which
he times his observation by. The sand is crystalline; other objects
appear, under the microscope, like mirrors, silver, needles or
icicles. There is a dimension beyond mere physical observation in
the philosopher's project to "find the various turnings, and
mysterious process of this divine Art" in the "great Machine of the
World" (EP 193)• The world will be newly observed, not only as
awesome evidence of God's power and skill, but also as true "art",
a perfected expression of God's beauty and attributes in even the
meanest things.
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On the basis of the practical interest and utility of the
microscope, then, Power can be seen to overlay a more speculative
attitude to its power and promise. It is consideration of this
more speculative aspect which most arrests attention in the book,
and which prompts from Power enthusiastic language that calls
into question his less marked claims to modesty. The practical
content is contained within the speculative considerations. The
microscope may be of value because it might "make good the
Atomical Hypothesis" (EP 82). But Power is equally if not more
interested in the more general implications. "Virtuosi" and
experimental philosophers will "make way for the Springy Intellect
to flye out into its desired Expansion": the "vast reach" of their
"Designs" represents an attempt "to unriddle all Nature" (EP 191-92).
Power's desire to limit man to examination of the world alone is
forgotten. Consideration of "the overflowing of free Philosophy"
(EP 192) is more representative of Power's book than its intention
of acquainting readers with the practical use and interest of
microscopy. He often seems more interested in the "rare
Considerations" the experiments provoke than in the experiments
themselves.
Despite his modest limitation of man to practical consideration
of his earthly domain, therefore, Power begins to exalt man in his
celebration of "the overflowing of free philosophy". Man will be
able to attain knowledge not only of earthly but of heavenly
things, while this knowledge may eventually become spiritual as well
as material. In "A Digression of Animal Spirits" he refers to these
as "the purest and most aetherial particles of all Bodies in the
World whatsoever (and so consequently of nearest alliance to
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Spiritualities)" (EP ?l-72). The microscope can help man towards
an understanding, perhaps, of the "Animal Spirits", just as it
may confirm the "Atomicall Hypothesis". The notion of "Animal
Spirits" is elaborated: "may it not be probable enough that these
Spirits in the other World, shall onely be the Soul's Vehicle and
Habit, and indeed really that £to soma pneumatikon"!, mentioned by
the Apostle" (BP 71-72). The physical understanding attainable by
use of the microscope may become or extend into a spiritual
understanding. This is more marked in a development from the
consideration of the possible manufacture of microscopes powerful
enough to allow "the Effluviums of the Magnet" (EP 155) to be seen.
If this were possible, "we might hope to discover all Epicurus his
Atoms, Des-Cartes his Globuli aetherii, and all those insensible
Corpuscles which daily produce such Considerable effects in the
generation and corruption of Bodies about us" (EP 155)• Beyond this,
"might not Microscopes hazard the discovery of the Aerial Genii,
and present even Spiritualities themselves to our view?" (EP 155).
This possibility, Power acknowledges, represents "A part of
Philosophy but yet in discovery; and will, I fear, prove the last
Leaf to be turned over in the Book of Nature" (EP 58).
This last assertion reflects the millenial aspect of natural
phlls-ephy and its disooovry or re-discovery of the world or
universe — its promise of a true golden age — as considered, for
example, by Sprat. Power's emphasis on the possibility of the
discovery and actual human perception and understanding of
"Spiritualities" is representative of the assertions that
enthusiastic seventeenth century natural philosophers could make.
The possibilities revealed and suggested by the microscope inevitably
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return to its depedence on and indeed origin in man's mind. The
microscope, promising direct understanding of "Spiritualities" is
an artificial complement to man's "Natural . . . Eyes" (EP 155)•
Only man possesses the "Intrinsick Eye" "that will yet discover
[thel materiality" of "Spiritualities" (EP 155). This "Intrinsick
Eye" is man's "piercing Eye of Reason" (EP 155) : it is through the
"Eye of Reason" rightly applied that true understanding and
perception are attained, and it is therefore through the "Eye of
Reason" that the experimental philosopher may seek, with the help
of the instruments he contrives and uses, to see and understand
"Spiritualities themselves".
Power acknowledges that the speculative aspect of experimental
philosophy "will, I fear, prove the last Leaf to be turned in the
Book of Nature", but he does believe that, eventually, man will see
and understand "Spiritualities themselves". This would be borne out
by much of the book. His celebration of "the overflowing of free
Philosophy" in an "Age wherein all men's Souls are in a kind of
fermentation, and the Spirit of Wisdom and Learning begins to mount
and free it self from drossie and terrene Impediments" (EP 192)
shows that man can and should as a duty to God attain the ultimate
possible knowledge. The world was made to be "Studied and
Contemplated by Man": this is a "homage due to [the^l Creator", a
"Rational Sacrifice to God" (EP 183) made on the basis of and
through the exercise of man's "Eye of Reason". The experimental
philosopher, designing "to unriddle all Nature" and to find "the
various turnings, and mysterious process of this divine Art"
through the exercise of his "Eye of Reason" is making "a Tribute
[he^] ought to pay for being men, for it is Reason that transpeciates
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our Natures and. makes us little lower than the Angels" (EP 183) -
5. Robert Hooke, Hicrographia.
Hooke observes of the Royal Society and its activities that
"the ends of all these Inquiries" they intend to be the Pleasure
of Contemplative minds, but above all, the ease and dispatch of
the labours of mens hands" (MG Elr). The "Pleasure of Contemplative
minds" does have a place in Hooke's attitude to natural philosophy,
as "men are generally rather taken with the plausible and discursive,
then the real and solid part of Philosophy" (MG Elr). It is this
"plausible and discursive" aspect that is more relevant here. For
this the Preface to Micrographia is particularly important and is
alone discussed.
Man, Hooke claims, is especially privileged above the rest of
creation in that he can not only "behold the works of Nature" but
also consider, compare, alter, assist and improve them (MG A3r).
His "deriv'd corruption, innate and born in him" (KG A3r), Adam's
sin, can be overcome by his activity with regard to the works of
nature, God's creation. His sin is, in part at least, "a wilful and
superstitious deserting the Prescripts and Rules of Nature" but he
can set this right by proper application of "artificial Instruments
and methods" to the "considering, comparing, altering, assisting,
and improving them to various uses" (MG A3r). This proper application
can be achieved only by a renewed experience of and attitude to man's
existence and activity, for he has lost a natural purity and
"rightness" in his relations with God and His creation, the world.
"The only way which remains for us to recover some degree of those
former perfections, seems to be, by rectifying the operation of the
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Sense, the Memory, and Reason, since upon the evidence, the
strength, the integrity, and the right correspondence of all these,
all the light, by which our actions are to be guided, is to be
renewed, and all our command over things is to be establisht"
(MG A3r). Natural philosophy offers the opportunities and methods
for doing this, by recovering "some degree of . . . former
perfections". Adam's fall left man in an inherently imperfect
state; natural philosophy can provide man with a new inheritance,
an inheritance comparable to that originally assumed by Adam. Sprat
looks toward the dawn of a golden age, Hooke looks to the recovery
of an original state of purity and truth. Subsequent "deformities
of the Sense" giving rise to "errors of the understanding" can be
put right by the establishment, through natural philosophy, of a
new "command over things".
Micrographia is the more exclusive study of microscopy that
Power's book cannot be. Hooke more readily turns away from the
"plausible and discursive" aspect of natural philosophy. He does
however outline some speculative considerations which surround the
"reformation in Philosophy" (MG A^-V) he conceives as leading to the
recovery of "former perfections". This is a "universal cure of the
Mind" (MG B1V) under the influence of which "all the fine dreams of
Opinions, and universal metaphysical natures . . . would quickly
vanish" (MG B2r). The new philosopher will be guided by "plain
intentions of imploying his Senses aright" (MG Blr). This seems to
carry overtones similar to those of Sprat's plea for "Mathematical
plainness". The reformed philosophy Hooke is proposing can be
recognised, however, to be less concerned with plainness than with
elaboration, the perception and understanding of things and their
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contexts "in a right manner" (MG A3V) as he says, and also
sometimes with the "metaphysical" considerations he elsewhere
denies. Adam's observations were more true, but not necessarily
more plain than those of the erring philosophers about to attempt
Hooke's renewal.
Among the many pursuits of natural philosophy, microscopy,
Hooke suggests, will be among the foremost in opening up the new
and more extensive area of observation. It is new, it reveals the
new: everything, even the entirely mundane and apparently ordinary,
it seems, is greater and more remarkable than ever before perceived
when exposed to the view of the natural philosopher. The "Earth it
self, which lyes so near to us, under our feet, shews quite a new
thing to us, and in every little particle of its matter, we now
behold almost as great a variety of Creatures, as we were able
before to reckon up in the whole Universe it self" (MG A4v).
Without returning to the true observation of nature, an observation
renewed in an attempt to recover the "former perfections" of Adam,
philosophy threatens to destroy itself. The renewal attempted by
natural philosophy can be offered as "a material and sensible
Pleasure" and "a matter of high rapture and delight of the mind"
(MG C2r) which assists and advances "the labours of man's hands"
and contributes to "the Pleasure of Contemplative minds". Through
it man can seek the restoration of at least some of the "former
perfections" that were lost after Adam's fall. "And as at first,
mankind fell by tasting of the forbidden Tree of knowledge, so we,
their Posterity, may be in part restor'd by the same way, not only
by beholding and contemplating, but by tasting too . . . fruits of
Natural knowledge" (MG B3r-V).
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6. Natural Philosophy and Divine Philosophy
Sprat's emphasis on the "Mathematical plainness" of the
language necessary to the study he proposes and defends has
helped to obscure a true aspect of natural philosophy. It was,
for seventeenth century practitioners, a "material and sensible
pleasure", "a matter of high rapture and delight of the mind"
(MG G2r). As Butler observed, Sprat's theory of mathematical
plainness became in practice a not untypical use of "Oratory and
Declamation" as means of expressing both the "high rapture and
delight of the mind" that natural philosophy promoted, and the
theological justification for it. There is an essential duality
to the "true Philosophy of Nature" (KRS 4-5) as it claims to focus
on the "solid substance of Science itself" (HPS 18), for it is also
able to "make way for the Springy Intellect to flye out into its
desired Expansion" (SP 191-92). That apparent duality may however
issue only from later concepts of the supposed mathematical
plainness of scientific pursuit. There may be, in the seventeenth
century, an essential synthesis, representing both "material and
sensible" aspects of one pursuit, "the overflowing of free Philosophy"
(EP 192) in an attempt to "unriddle all Nature" (EP 191-92) by means
of the "rare Considerations" of any "Ingenious Spectator" (EP 17).
These "rare Considerations" were often seen to take the form
of "contemplations". Sprat speaks of the natural philosopher's
"contemplation of God's visible Works" (HPS 375)> his "perpetual
contemplations" (HRS 406). Cowley looks forward to a corporate
rather than a solitary "Contemplation of Nature" (AEP A5r V). Boyle
speaks of the "Contemplation of Natures Wonders" (UEP 2). Power
insists that "this World was made not onely to be Inhabited, but
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Studied, and Contemplated by Man" (SP 183). Hooke says that
natural philosophy is available for "the Pleasure of Contemplative
minds" (MG Elr). "Contemplation" itself carries Platonic overtones,
and there does seem to be a Platonic emphasis in the contemplations
of the seventeenth century natural philosophers: they perceive the
ideal, God, in the essence of the real (or "unreal") world. Traherne's
own emphasis on "the Contemplation of GODs Works, wherin all the
Riches of His Kingdom will appear" (C_ II.3) is precisely of this same
order. For him man is the "Contemplator of the Univers" (C IV.75)•
Whether Platonic or not, the natural philosopher's contemplation
implies at once the general and philosophical attitude available to
all men as their initiation into true natural philosophy.
Natural philsophy was, potentially, a whole philosophy. It
might be defined, in Boyle's words, as the "Contemplation of Nature"
and "Philosophical Worship of God" (UEP 3> 113-1*0 • "The Natural
Philosopher is to begin, where the Moral ends" (HRS 33). Sprat's
phrase was echoed in,Richard Cumberland's De Legibus Naturae (1672),
dedicated to Sir Orlando Bridgeman while Traherne was his Chaplain.
Speaking explicitly of the Royal Society and its "great Genius's",
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Cumberland defines "Natural Philosophy", "in the large sense". In
this "large sense", "the whole of moral Philosophy ... is
ultimately resolv'd into . ... Conclusions of true Natural
Philosophy".^ Natural philosophy "does not only comprehend all those
Appearances of natural bodies, which we know from Experiment, but
also inquires into the Nature of our Souls . . . and at length leads
Men ... to the Knowledge of the first MoverIt is in this sense
— the "large sense" — that natural philosophy, the contemplation
of nature and philosophical worship of God, inspires a whole philosophy,
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a whole basis for apprehension and action, which is not unlike
Traherne's own "Divine Philosophy" (C IV.3).
The aim of Traheme's divine philosophy is Felicity. When
Felicity is achieved the philosopher himself will be God-like,
possessing God's own knowledge of God's own creation. Then "the
best of all possible things are after the Similitud of God
enjoyed" (SM II.2). The physical world itself accounts for a large
proportion of "the best of all possible things", for God made the
world and "The visible World is Wonderfully to be Delighted in
Highly to be Esteemed" (£ 11.97). "Enjoyment of the world" (C I.25)
is an important means to Felicity. "Enjoyment" involves thorough
appreciation through knowledge and understanding, and the rigorous
use of all man's Capacity. "Enjoyment of the world" is attained by
"Prizing" and "Esteeming" things to the full (C_ I.13» I.25); and it
is in "Enjoyment of the world" that "the best of all possible things
are after the Similitud of God enjoyed". There are two aspects to
Enjoyment. Firstly, the world must be examined and known, prized
and esteemed, in a basic, physical sense, for its practial utility.
"The Terrestrial Services of Heaven & Earth are Exceeding Great"
(SM 11.87). "The visible World is Wonderfully to be Delighted in
and Highly to be Esteemed" (C II.97)» and "A Noble Spirit . . . can
Survey it all, and Comprehend its Uses" (£ 11.12). "The WORLD is
unknown, till the Value and Glory of it is seen: till the Beauty
and Serviceableness of its Parts is Considered" (C 1.18), so man
should "break the WORLD into Parts, to examine them asunder"
(£ 1.23). Man himself is by nature "Inquisitive" (C 111.15),
possessed of "A Curiositie Profound and Unsatiable" (C III.42). He
readily becomes "Engaged with Enquiries" (C III.17) about the
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earth, the stars, and. all the "Common Things" (C III.53) of
the physical world. He seems especially equipped for the pursuit
of "Natural Philosophy" (£ III.44). This, "signifying the Lov of
Nature" promotes "Diligent inquisition into all Natures ... so
far forth as by Nature and Reason they may be Known" (C III.44).
It is an inclusive study — more inclusive than that defined by
Cowley (AEP A2r) — for "this Noble Science ... is most Sublime
and Perfect, it includes all Humanity and Divinity together GOD,
Angels, Men, Affections, Habits, Actions, Virtues: Evry Thing as
it is a Solid intire Object singly proposed, being a subject of it,
as well as Material and visible Things" (£ III.44).
There is a second aspect to "Enjoyment of the world". While
the "Terrestrial Services of Heaven & Earth" are "Exceeding Great",
it is still more important in true Enjoyment that man should see
that even "a Sand Exhibiteth the Wisdom and Power of God" (C 1.27).
The physical world is an image of its spiritual creator, and man
is the link between the two. So, "when you are once acquainted
with the World, you will find the Goodness and Wisdom of God,
. . . manifest therin" (C 1.10). The "World . . . Discovers the
Being of GOD unto you" (C II.l), and his "Greatness" can best be
"seen in the vastness of His works" (SM 11.88). Man must "enjoy
this Adspectable world" (SM III.9) in this spiritual as well as
the physical sense. "By studying felicity we are brought to the
Delineation of God's kingdom" (SM III.9), and it is thus that, in
the pursuit of Felicity, "The Articles of our faith are the objects
of Enjoyment proposed to Speculation" (SM III.58). Natural
philosophy is itself "Nobly Subservient to the Highest Ends"
(C III.44) — to man's pursuit of Felicity — but Traheme's
particular recognition of it is less important than the sense in
which his whole "Divine Philosophy" centres on the "Contemplation
of Nature" and "Philosophical 'worship of God".
If natural philosophy is a whole philosophy of nature and
man's experience of it, Traherne's attitude to man's place in the
world is relevant to a consideration of his relation to the work
of contemporary natural philosophers. In an account of his
childhood Traherne implicitly denies original sin: "I Seemed as
one Brought into the Estate of Innocence" (C III.2). "Adam in
Paradice had not more sweet and Curious Apprehensions of the World
then I when I was a child" (C III.l). At one time the world was to
him, literally, a paradise. This "Estate of Innocence", however,
lasted only for a very few years of his early childhood, for he
soon experienced a personal and individual "Apostasie" (C III.2),
an alienation from his natural inheritance comparable to Adam's
expulsion from Eden but brought about not by "inward corruption or
Depravation" but by acquaintance with the "outward Bondage of
Opinion and Custom" (C III,7). He recognizes, after his apostasy,
that "that Divine Light wherewith I was bom" was "the Best unto
this Day, wherin I can see the Universe" (C III.l): his "Infant-Ey
(M 11.86-87), like a "Divine Light", provided the best attitude to
and apprehension of the world. Then "My Knowledge was Divine"
(C III.2). The search for Felicity conducted in his writing is
an attempt to refound the "Pure and Virgin Apprehensions" of the
"Infant-Ey" not in their naive innocence but consciously, on the
basis and experience of the "Highest Reason" (C III.22). The
"Infant-Ey" gives place to the "Ey of Reason" (C I.25), itself
like Power's "Eye of Reason" (EP 155) which "transpeciates our
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Natures and. makes us little lower than the Angels" (SP 183). The
"Highest Reason" transcends "Intuition" (£111.2) having accepted
it as a valuable example.
Before his apostasy Traheme enjoyed the natural world as
Adam enjoyed paradise. He seeks this enjoyment again after his
apostasy: it is not nature that changes ("Natural Things are
Glorious, and to know them Glorious", C III.9) but man. His
"innocent Clarity" is "ecclypsed" by false "Customs and maners"
(C III.7). The natural world known intuitively to the infant eye
and sought again by the eye of reason is "Divine" (C III.9). It
is, for the innocent infant eye, a new world: "All appeared New
and Strange at the first, inexpressibly rare, and Delightfull, and
Beautiful" (C III.2). "I was Entertained like an Angel with the
Works of GOD in their Splendor and Glory" (C III.2). He was
"Inquisitive" (G III.15), possessed of "Curiosity" (C III.22),
"Engaged with Enquiries" (C 111.17) about the earth and its
existence, the stars and the "infinit Space beyond the Heavens"
(C III.18) : "The Skies were mine, and so were the Sun and Moon and
Stars, and all the World was mine, and I the only Spectator and
Enjoyer of it" (C III.3). "I Knew by the Perfection of the Work
there was a GOD" (C III.17).
There is a definite motive behind Traherne's apparently simple
account. He particularly wanted "to see how things stood in Paradice
before they were Muddied and Blended and Confounded, for now they
are lost and buried in Ruines. Nothing appearing but fragments
... It was his Desire to recover them and to Exhibit them again
to the Eys of Men. Abov all things he desired to see those Principles
which a Stranger in this World would covet to behold upon his first
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appearance" (C_ IV.5*0. So, too, as an image of the wonder
inspired by the natural philosopher's re-apprehension of natural
things, Boyle cited the "transport and surprizall of a Maid born
blind when . . . she obtained the first sight of the various objects
of the World" (UEP 3). Traherne begins the Centuries with an image
which reflects these aims — the tabula rasa, the "Empty Book"
which "containeth Nothing" but is "Capable of all Things" (C I.l)
and provides a surface upon which the "Principles which a
Stranger in this World would covet to behold" may be placed and
examined. In this examination it is necessary "to be freed from
. . . Seducing and Enslaving Errors" (C I.36), to see things in
that "Innocent Clarity", the "Divine Light" of which the infant eye,
like Adam in paradise, was possessed. Thus an apparently new world
will be presented to man's restored vision, "almost a new Nature
. . . reveal'd" as Dryden said in looking at the progress of
natural philosophy. This "new Nature" was seen by natural philosophers
as a recovery of the paradisal aspect of the world, a re-apprehension
of the world by a recovered "Innocent Clarity" now enhanced by
reason. For Hooke, Adam's sin was "a Wilful and Superstitious
deserting the Prescripts of Nature", Sprat's "defect in . . .
Knowledge and Understanding" which is the "greatest Blemish of
human Nature" (MG A3r; HPS 350)- Through natural philosophy, however,
it should be possible by the examination and understanding, the
thorough enjoyment, of nature, to "recover some degree of . . .
former perfections ... by rectifying the Operations of the Sense,
the Memory, and Reason"; "upon the evidence ... of all these, all
the Light, by which our actions are to be guided, is to be renewed,
and all our command over things is to be established" (MG kj0). By
true perception and understanding of the objects of creation the
"deformities of Sense" and "errors of the understanding" of fallen
man may be set right. While the "faculties of the soul of our
Primitive father Adam might be more quick & perspicacious in
Apprehension, than those of our lapsed Selves; yet certainly the
Constitution of Adam's Organs was not divers from ours" (SP A4r).
Fallen man must use what Power calls his "Intrinsick Eye", his
"piercing Eye of Reason" (BP 155)» to recapture the view of the
world enjoed by Adam, to restore a prelapsarian state. It is by
his own "Ey of Reason" (C 1.25) that Traherne seeks to overcome his
own apostasy or fall, and to re-establish the "Curious Apprehensions
of the World" (C III.l) of his "Estate of Innocence" on the
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principles of the "Highest Reason". Then "All appeared New, and
Strange at the first, inexpressibly rare, and Delightfull, and
Beautifull" (C III.2). In the attempt by natural philosophers to
"recover some degree of . . . former perfections" "almost a new
Nature" will appear: "there is a new visible World discovered to
the understanding . . . the Earth it self . . . shews quite a new
thing to us" (MG A^v). "New Scenes of Heaven already we espy".^
The "world shall be ... a very Paradice . . . the Temple of God"
(C 1.20): "When you enter into it, it is an illimited field of
Varietie and Beautie where you may lose your self in the Multitude
of Wonders and Delights" (C 1.18).
"Awaken therefore thy Thoughts, and strongly apply them to
see the Glory of Gods kingdom" (SM 11.82), for it is through
Enjoyment of the world that Felicity will be achieved. Man will
attain God-likeness through the contemplation of nature and
philosophical worship of God, through "Divine Philosophy". Sprat
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sought "the utmost perfection of humane nature" (HRS 110-11)
through natural philosophy, through the study of "all the objects
of men's thoughts", "God, or Man, or Nature" (HRS 81). For
Traherne "GOD, THE WORLD YOUR SELF. All Things" are "the Objects
of your Felicity" (C 11.100) and through Enjoyment of them men
will become, as Sprat says, "Gods one to another", able "to look
the nearer into heaven" (HRS 110-11). Traherne, like Cowley, saw
the natural world as a potential paradise, a resource for man's
attempt to be "like the Deitie" through his study of a very
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braodly defined "Natural Philosophy". Traherne's writing itself
seems to represent what Power called "the overflowing of free
Philosophy" (EP 192) which can "make way for the Springy Intellect
to flye out into its desired Expansion" (EP 191-92). Through this,
man's "piercing Eye of Reason" (BP 155) might "find the various
turnings, and mysterious process of this divine Art" in God's
"great Machine of the World" (EP 193) and even perhaps perceive
"Spiritualities themselves" (EP 155)* So Traherne sought, through
his own "Ey of Reason" and by "Enjoyment of the World" (C 1.25)
to "discover all the Mysteries of Heaven" (C IV.81). Like Traheme,
Power appreciated the "use and service" of things (EP 16^-) as they
"sustain your Body and preserv your Life" (C II.l) in a practical
sense; he, too, felt that men, as natural philosophers, were "little
lower than the Angels" (EP 183). Traherne saw ways in which "the
Smallest is Greater than an infinit Treasure" (C III.20), as Hooke
saw through the micrscope that "in every little particle of matter,
we now behold as great a variety of Creatures, as we were able
before to reckon up in the whole Universe it self" (A4V).
It was for Boyle that natural philosophy most explicitly
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became a religion, to which the world was the temple and man the
priest. His quotations from the Hermetic writings, defining the
understanding praise that the natural philosopher should, and is
particularly able to, offer to God, suggest the extent of identity
between his views of man's ability to "enjoy, use and relish"
creation (UEP 25) and Traherne's idea of the importance of
"Enjoyment of the world" (£ 1.25). For Traherne and Boyle, man
can attain the God-like knowledge of the world also common to the
Hermetic image of man. But Sprat's idea of the world as "nothing
else but the instrument of God" and "knowledge of it ... as
Divine" (HRS 351) is common to all the writings examined here.
Traherne lived in what Power called an "Age wherein all men's
Souls are in a kind of fermentation, and the Spirit of Wisdom and
Learning begins to mount and free it self from drossie and terrene
Impediments" (EP 192). "Never so much clear knowledge in any Age"
(CE 283), Traherne exclaimed. Through the contemplation of nature
and philosophical worship of God was sought the utmost perfection
of human nature, whether by "natural" or "divine" philosophy. Men
could become Gods one to another, able to look the nearer into
heaven: God-likeness and Felicity would be achieved.
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CHAPTER 6
The Early Notebook and the Commonplace Book
1. The Commonplace Book
The Commonplace Book occupies the greater part of the "Dobell
Folio" containing Traherne's own fair copies of thirty-seven of his
poems. It dates from circa 1669-1674 and is thus probably
contemporary with work on Christian Ethicks and the Centuries of
Meditations. The notebook is the most substantial of all Traherne's
unpublished manuscripts apart from the Select Meditations.
Traheme's classical education is evidenced at considerable length.
These notes are complemented by references to and quotations from
modern and contemporary authors. Quotation and original material
are closely interwoven throughout; the manuscript does not comprise
a series of direct notes. All the entries are copied under a series
of 142 alphabetically arranged headings, a complete list of which
offers an extensive survey of Traherne's intellectual interests
and thought, even if some of the entries themselves axe scant.*
Given an awareness of Traherne's cast of mind as revealed in his
other writings, the headings alone form a grid upon which it
would be possible to place all manner of reflections about that
mind and its activity. What is proposed here is, firstly, a survey
a some of the shorter notes; secondly, a consideration of some of
the longer entries; and, finally, an examination of some of the
related sources.
The first impression of an examination of the manuscript is of
Traherne's learning and the extent of his reading, particularly in
classical philosophical authors. The first entry itself draws
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attention to his reading of Plato and Aristotle, a reading that
aims not at simple absorption but at a critical awareness of the
respective authors and what Traherne sees as the validity and
problems of their thought ("Aristotle's Philosophy", CB 16V). He
discriminates between the erudition and wisdom of both: "each,
though in different regards, has a pre-eminence over the other".
Lists of authors appear repeatedly, often with only a brief
reference to their opinions on the subject in question: the entry
under "Atoms" (CB 18v), for example, refers to Democritus,
Epicurus, Leucippus, Parmenides, Xenophanes and Zeno. Leucippus
among these is seen to be worthy of note because he "is sayd to
be the first among the Grecians, that asserted Atoms to be the
first principle of all things". For opinions on "Matter" (CB 65V)
Traherne again turns to the ancients, including, as so often,
Plato; but it is clear that these opinions have no prior claim
to being exclusively correct or true. They are read as parts of
necessary knowledge that are sometimes capable of foreshadowing
later discoveries, ideas and developments, or of formulating
seemingly undeniable observations. There is little sense of any
weight of classical authority in the form that this could take in
the seventeenth century, particularly for the "schoolmen" for
whom Aristotle — "their dictator" as Bacon called him — still
represented a valid, indeed almost definitive, outlook on the
world. His opinion might still be cited as valid argument against
observation and experiment, reflecting an overwhelming emphasis
on the value of learning, a pressure of memory and knowledge
from books as against that from nature and speculation upon the
natural world. Traheme does not take up this closed, definitive
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point of view: he seeks as much and as varied knowledge as
possible, to exercise his Capacity to Enjoy to the full.
Traherne, then, speaks of Leucippus in the entry "Atoms"
primarily because he was the first to assert what was then, and
for Traherne, a common belief, that of atoms as "the first
principle of all things". Later, under "Cohasion" (CB 26v) he
deals with "the holding together of the parts of matter".
Consistency of opinion between ancient and contemporary thought
is usually noted, as under "Colours" (CB 2?V): "Plato is herein
followed by the new philosophers, who make colours to be the
various mixture of Light and Darkness". The "new philosophers" of
the Eoyal Society discussed the nature of light and colours at
several meetings in 1671 and 1672, receiving in this latter year
Newton's famous letter describing "his discovery of the nature of
p
light, refractions and colours" made in I665. "Cold", too, is
treated by Traherne (CB 27V) as "it works in several Subjects" —
"Air", "Water" and "Flesh" — notes following on the individual
subjects in order, with reference to "Boyle . . . who . . . first
. . . treated effectually of Cold" and to "Our great Verulam",
3
Bacon.
A subject that seems to have occupied Traherne a great deal
in his reading is the place of the earth in the universe, and
whether it is the stationary centre or a moving element in an
otherwise centred scheme. This has been held as a focussing point
in many studies of the development of science in the Renaissance:
sixteenth or seventeenth century writers have their opinions on
this matter abstracted so as to gauge their "modernity" — hence
the puzzled and unnecessary debate about Milton's use of a partly
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Ptolemaic scheme in Paradise Lost. This is a rather crude approach.
It would seem, for example, that a seventeenth century attitude
to such matters would allow much greater freedom than a late
twentieth century one. There would be an acceptance of shades of
meaning, a manipulation of different schemes to suit different
ends, and personal adaptations and modifications that would now
be rejected as false or inconsistent. What would now be
constituted as a constant element in a positive, advancing and
rigorously defined science, provoking a decision that must be
made and always adhered to, would then be incorporated as part
of a body of knowledge which could be freely traversed in search
of differing "ways of seeing" providing varying materials for
dialogue, debate and artistic use, and a free circulation of
knowledge under different aspects. What is perhaps more important
than the fact that Traherne was aware of the then "correct"
system of the universe (that which is judged "correct" by later
standards) is the extent of Traherne's awareness of the importance
accorded this subject, his own opinion of its importance and, most
significantly, the fact that he was interested in finding out
about the actual physical nature of the universe and what has
been said about it in order to discuss what he perceives of its
nature in his own way but with this information available to him.
On the question as to whether the earth stands still or moves
Traherne consulted Aristarchus, Gleanthes, Echphantus, Heracleides
Ponticus, Leucippus, Plato and Pythagoras among others; he also
surveys more modern opinions s
This Hypothesis of the Earth's moveing has been
since revived by Cardinall Gusanus . . . Eut
more professedly by Nicol Copernicus, who about
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the year 15^0 wrote a book concerning it . . .
Who was followed herein by Johannes Keplerius
. . . Also by Christopher Rothmannus, Michael
Maestlinus, David Origanus . . . Lately
Patricius Galilaeus . . . with William Gilbert,
our English physitian, famous for his book de
Magnete, wherein he asserts this Hypothesis,
having all maint[ainled the same opinion:
which albeit it was condemned by the Cardinals
at Rome, Anno 1616, yet it is still defended
by many of the new Astronomers: Ticho Brahe,
the famous Danish Astronomer went a middle way:
Affirming that both Earth and heavens moved,
though in a differing manner.
("Earth", CB 391)
There is no lack of awareness or thought here: the whole of the
Commonplace Book is a very contemporary document, despite (partly,
it might be said, because of) some incursions into Platonic
mysticism and a little pseudo-science. Traherne's interests did
not lie exclusively the way of Thomas Vaughan's, however. The
most dated feature in this way is Traherne's habit of looking at
things in terms of the four elements. Elsewhere, however, he can
say of "Mathematicks" (CB 66r) that the "Pythagorean method of
beginning with the mathematical sciences has been greatly
applauded by some of our new phylosophers, as a method most
proper for the fixing the volatile vagrant spirits of young
students in their entrance on philosophie". It should also be
remembered that both Boyle and Newton, foremost among "new
phylosophers", took an interest in mystic alchemy. Traherne's own
acquaintance with the work of "new phylosophers" seems to have
been considerable.
There are in the Commonplace Book three all too short
entries which deal with points central to any consideration of
Traheme's writing. "Ethicks" (CB 4lr) he constitutes as "part
of Morall philosophie" concerning the "right government of man's
189
self". There is some material here from Plato and the Hermetic
writings, and the following note attributed to Pythagoras: "the
proper subject of Ethicks, was the human soul, as capable of the
chiefest good", its aim to bring about "a virtuous disposition" in
the soul. These points are offered here in support of the attitude
to ethics discussed in relation to Christian Ethicks: there is a
strong moral and public emphasis in the idea of the necessary
"virtuous disposition" and "right government of man's self", seeking
the "chiefest good" in all aspects of life. There is also a note
in the Commonplace Book on "Contemplation" (CB 28V-29r). This is
perhaps the nearest Traherne comes to an actual consideration of
what constitutes something at least similar to the "meditation"
that has so long haunted studies of Traherne. The first source here
is scriptural: the people of God were "much ravished with holy
contemplations of the glory of god", Traherne records. He turns
to Plato as his main source, for whom the supreme discipline
was the "contemplation" of the "Idea" of "God" and "contemplation"
of the "truth"; its aim the fashioning of God's image in the
individual man.
Several headings deserve consideration at greater length.
There are diverse references under the entry "God" (CB 50~)•
Firstly to Pythagoras, then to Plato on the notion of the "divine
essence" and "one immutable being" which is the "Archetype, or
universal exemplar of all things made". "Plutarch mentions, that
the Divine mind, and Ideas, (which Philo and Plotinus taught) are
the same, and that his wisdome is the nature and substance of all
Ideas: and that the whole series of Ideas is the same with the
immense Sapience of god". Traheme records that, in the opinion
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of many philosophers, "the mind" was the creator of all things.
Such generalisation characterizes his whole thought, aimed as it
is towards the inclusion of all possible thought and action in
some theological scheme allowing maximum intellectual and actual
freedom to man. Mention has been made of the seventeenth century
tendency to seek and constitute a body of knowledge which could
then be freely traversed as the individual mind desired or
demanded. Traherne would perhaps rather formulate a broad and
inclusive philosophy in which the whole and not just selected
parts of this body of knowledge could be contained and apprehended
as a way towards a greater, higher knowledge. The most likely
source for this was a form of Platonism; its ideal, source
perhaps the Hermetic writings and their emphasis on the "Oneness"
that is the state achieved by a filling, a repletion, of any mind'-
with all "thoughts and intellections", thus achieving identity
with any other "Oneness". "Oneness" can be constituted first,
before the individual mind embarks on its project of repletion
as the "Mind", the original. "One" or "God". The "immense Sapience
of God" is the (Divine) Mind and all Ideas, all "thoughts and
intellections", the "One". The "Mind", then, can be the primally
constituted achieved "Oneness", the apprehensive organ of the
individual seeker of "Oneness", the means by which this subject
can attain "Oneness" and the medium through which everything is
known, either on the path to "Oneness" or in the achieved state.
Apart from this inclusiveness this particular development of a
Platonic "Mind" has another advantage in that it can itself be
used to indicate "God" simply as the origin of all things, or any
other god or any other origin. For example: "Pythagoras defined
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God, a mind which communicateth and diffuseth himself through
every part of the Universe, from whom all Animals receive Life,
which accords with Plato's Anima mundi". It is wholly
characteristic that Traheme disputes Xenophanes' opinion that
men are unlike God, but that he seems to agree in concluding,
with "Trismegistus, Plato, Socrates, and others" that "God is an
infinite and eternal Mind".
The entry under "Deitie" (CB 331" V) extends the consideration
of the nature of God into a discussion of the powers and means of
God. The "Mind" in the Hermetic Platonic sense as used by Traherne
exists firstly as a typically Platonic, and here usually
Christianized, god-being (omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent,
eternal, etc.), and secondly as a philosophical notion that is
simply the final explanation for otherwise inexplicable human
power and awareness. Essentially, the "Mind" is an absolute or a
Platonic ideal of the human mind, and is conceived of as an
(incorporeal) mind, as the contents of that mind (all ideas, as
man's mind may contain some ideas but always seeks to contain all
ideas) and as the means by which this content is retained, a means
of knowing (which is the same for the "Mind" itself and for man as
he participates in and strives towards the ideal "Mind"). This
"Mind" is comparable to Traherne's "God". Under "Deitie" he
considers the activity of God, comparable to the activity of "Mind"
(eternal mind and man's own mind) in that it is only through
activity that the "Mind" or God is realised, made real, or exists:
All Power is not the Godhead. Nor will infinit
and Eternal power satisfy the Soul, unless
exerted. Bare power is neither Wise nor Good,
nor Holy, nor Blessed and Glorious, nay tho it
be infinite and Eternal. But it is Transformable
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into any Act, and may becom a voluntary simple
Act, infinit and eternal, for it has power to
be what it will. But simple Power without a
Will is dead and idle. Almighty power therefore
endued with Ghoise, and acting from all
Eternity in the most wise and Glorious manner
is the Deitie. a most pure incomprehensible
Eternal Act, that is never Desolat nor idle,
but the fountain and the end of all Things,
ordering all, and enjoying all, that is God.
Who is a voluntary Being unbegotten from all
Eternity, yet Begotten of himself, and
proceeding by that Generation to all his
Creatures, the father and the first Born, the
virtu and the Beauty of evry Creature.
As man participates in the "Mind" that is the deity, so he shares
its characteristics and functions, mental activity and exertion
being his only means of realising his existence and sustaining
it, of realising his world in proportion to his "Ideas" as God
realises the whole world in proportion to all "Ideas".
The notes on "Man" (CB 6$c) reveal little that is not
traceable in Traherne's other writing but again reinforce the
sense of the influence of Plato and the Hermetic writings.
What Traherne sees as man's striving for God-likeness has its
origin in the Hermetic assertion, quoted from the Commonplace
Book in Christian Ethicks, that "an earthly man is a mortall
God . . . the heavenly God is an immortall man". This is allied
to two central formulations in the Hermetic writings, which are
again implied in Christian Ethicks and noted in two aphorisms in
the Commonplace Book: "first God, secondly the world thirdly man"
and "The world for man, man for God". These embody the adapted
Platonic scheme applied by Traherne: God made man and the world,
and man's search for God and for God-likeness is conducted by
knowing God through the world, the purpose for which it was
created (as God made man and gave him the world, so, given the
world, man must "make" God). Traherne's notes acknowledge the
derivation of such ideas. For Plato, he quotes, man is an "Image
of God" or "a Kind of Imitation of God" striving always to
become real rather than an image, to become the reality of
which he is an image, to become God.
As man participates in "Mind" so does he in "Reason" (CB
82v-83r). "Right Reason is the same with the light or Law of
nature" and man must communicate with this "light or Law" in
order to achieve reason and develop this as a means to God-
likeness. "Reason" is seen to determine the Tightness of actions
and to act as a measure of this, but it can be applied in the
most general as in the most particular sense, to philosophy and
intellectual activity of all kinds as to daily life. There are,
however, two aspects to "Reason" as "the light or Law of nature".
One is "Subjective" and perhaps the most important: it comprises
the "common principles of Moralitie", "common principles fixed in
conscience", that are "Active principles" and part of the
"internall Law of conscience" as this is a human faculty,
comparable to the knowing "Mind". As this is linked to the
Platonic deified "Mind", so is conscience connected with a "Law
of Nature". The second aspect is "Objective" and is said to
comprise what Plato called the "broken traditions of the morall
Law". The "morall law" can frame objectively, if fragmentarily,
the external "Law of nature" to which the "Subjective" aspect of
"Reason" is an internal mirror: there can be "the objective
Light of nature comprized in the morall law" as opposed to
"the subjective light, or law of conscience".
The "Soul" (CB 90r) is also a human capacity open to other
influences. Traherne's notes here, although some are from
Pythagoras, Diogenes Laertius and the Hermetic writings, are
mostly from Plato. "Plato knew many things concerning the soul
of Man its Divine Original, Immateriall, Infinite capacitie,
Activitie, and perfection". The soul has contact with the divine,
as the individual human mind participates in (and by) the divine
"Mind" and reason connects with the "Law of nature". Plato is
quoted as speaking of the "original . . . Idea to which [the
soul]] is akin, i:e: to God". The soul is "simple", "Incorporeal",
"a self-moveing principle", "Infinite or boundless, never
satisfied with any thing, but the first truth, and chiefest good
. . . it . . . contends towards that which is pure, and alwaies
the same, and most akin unto it". It is "nearly allyed to God"
and "in a sober sense participates of a self goodness, and
self beautie with God"; "it becomes the body to serve, but the
soul to Rule, because it is most like unto the Divine, Immortal;
Intelligible, most uniform, and first Being". Traherne writes
of "the Immortalitie of the Soul . . . its Incorruptibilitie . . .
sollicitude . . . Innate appetite . . . uniform self-motion . . .
and connate Idea of God".
This kinship of the human soul with God is stressed in notes
from both Plato and the Hermetic writings: "a soul after it is
departed from the body, having striven the strife of piety,
becomes another mind or God"; "being allied to God, [the soul!
becomes ... a partner of the Divine nature, whence it is in
his manner, and according to its capacity, as God . . . Incomposite
Infinite, incorruptible, Immortal". These quotations are the most
direct correspondences to Traherne's own insistence on man's
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ability, his Capacity, to become, quite literally, God: all
man's faculties can be turned to strive towards their own
Platonic ideal, while God represents the sum of all those ideals
and man's whole ideal as he is created in the image of God.
"Plato gives us a good account of the faculties of the Rational
Soul ... he treats accurately ... of the humane understanding
... He makes the mind to be . . .a plant of the supreme Being,
not earthly, but heavenly". Man's aim must be, by the exercise of
all his faculties, to achieve the full reward of his "heavenly"
endowment.
This last quotation continues: "The proper object of the mind
Plato makes to be the truth". For Traherne "truth" is identifiable
with God, who is its "Original Idea . . . the Eternal Wisdom and
fountain of Light" ("Philosophie", CB 77V-79V). Since philosophy
deals in truth, Traherne says, "it follows that the originall
impulsive cause of all phylosophie was admiration of the admirable
wisdom, power and goodness of god shineing in his works", a form
of "Natural Philosophy" it would seem. Truth, then, having its
origin in God, is revealed and available to man in God's works,
which therefore comprise the matter with which philosophy must
deal. Even as a form of natural philosophy, however, it must
retain a thorough Platonic emphasis, although Traherne does
decry the "Idolizing humour of crying up platonick philosophie".
"Philosophie", as the thorough consideration of and research into
God's works, can include "true Astronomie", but its essential
practice is that of "expounding . . . natures and properties".
Despite, or perhaps because of, its strong Platonic content,
Traherne's "Philosophie", of which the Commonplace Book offers
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an intriguing exposition, remains a very close parallel to
contemporary thought about the natures and relations of God,
the world and man.
2. Theophilus Gale, The Court of the Gentiles
The Commonplace Book, then, offers the possibility of a
discussion of the notes made there by Traherne as if they were
his own work. Traherne is very free in his notation: Carol Marks
has shown that Traherne is careless of detail, freely condensing
and abstracting, and interpolating occasional comment. "Traherne
responded personally to, made use of, even manipulated, his
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sources". The notebook could be studied rather as the product
of Traherne's own mind, situated rather more closely to other
texts (Plato, the Hermetic writings, etc.) than is usual in other
more literary work. It evinces a principle of order and an
imaginative re-creation of material that makes it a more
attractive document than, say, the Church's Year Book, with its
much more direct transcription from sources. A selection of the
more significant notes has been treated somewhat in this manner,
ii
also necessary to draw attention to and examine some ofbut it
the soHirces themselves. Three of these demand attention: works
by Theophilus Gale and Isaac Barrow, and John Everard's translation
of part of the Hermetic corpus, The Divine Pymander. These three,
all near-contemporary, sources can be shown to have a good deal
in common with the matter and manner of Traherne's thinking, and
deserve attention as means of highlighting parallel aspects of
his thought as well as actual sources used and quoted by him.
Theophilus Gale's The Court of the Gentiles is of very varied
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use and. interest. Its full title is "The Court of the Gentiles:
or, A Discourse touching the Original of Human Literature, both
Philologie and. Philosophie, from the Scriptures, and. Jewish
Church, In order to a Demonstration of 1. The Perfection of
Gods Word, and Church Light 2. The Imperfection of Natures Light
and mischief of Vain Philosophie 3- The right Use of Human
Learning, and especially sound Philosophie". It was published
in three parts: Of Philologie (I669); Of Philosophy (I67I); and
The Vanity of Pagan Philosophy with Of Reformed Philosophy (1677).
This last volume, appearing only after Traherae's death, is of
little interest here except in so far as it contains the
fulfilment of an aim announced in the first part: "Plato's
Moral, and Metaphysic or prime Philosophie is reduced to an
useful Forme and Method". The whole project, after numerous and
extended diversions, arrives at a Christian rationalisation of
Plato very sympathetic to Traherne's thought in concept if not
in execution. Little of the work is relevant here, but its
very first chapter, and this almost in entirety, is essentially,
if almost uniquely, interesting in relation to Traherne.
Gale's first chapter of his first book deals with "The
Original of all Arts and Sciences from God". Gale builds his
propositions slowly and from the most fundamental beginnings.
His first aim is to establish the existence of God, here,
typically, and as in Traherne and other contemporary Platonists,
not necessarily a unique Christian-scriptural God the Father.
It is proposed that "That there is one, first, eternal, simple,
and absolutely necessary Being, whom we call God, is evidently
manifest, both by sensible and rational Demonstration" (CG I.l)
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This is very much of its age, and. a form of discussion Traherne
was familiar with. "God" is a "necessary Being" "evidently
manifest" to man's "sensible and rational Demonstration".
Theological propositions such as this are the near contemporary
and by no means rare sources of statements like that made by
Newton regarding "an intelligent Agent", "an intelligent and
powerful Being" who "exists necessarily": this can appear as
the abstracted "sensible" and "rational" assertion of the existence
of a God the non-existence of whom was for the first time
becoming a possibility that might one day be proved and that
must therefore be dispassionately denied."' "God" must be affirmed
by means of those faculties which are applied to the pursuit of
the "new philosophy" or, alternatively, accepted as "given".
Thus Newton, and thus Gale: "there must needs be an infinite
wisdom that frames, orders and disposeth these things" because
the very order of the universe "presupposeth a most sovereign
intelligence and infinite wisdom" (CG I.5). There is a similar
emphasis in Traherne: "I knew by the Perfection of the Work there
was a GOD" (G(iIII.17) for "nothing can be, but it exhibits a
Dietie" (C 11.24).
Also common to Newton, Traherne and other near-contemporaries
is Gale's theory of God realising his existence through activity.
This he announces in the context of a proposition of the
circularity of man's communication with God, a notion also much
used by Traherne ("The Circulation", M 11.152-54; C 1.5,40,88;
III.63,100;IV.66,86). God is "the most pure, independent, and
perfect Act, comprehending all Divine perfection . . . the first
principle, and last end of all things: from whom all things at
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first flow as from the Plenitude of Being: to whom they again
have their refluxe, as rivers to the Ocean" (CG 1.2). God is
"the most pure, independent, and perfect Act" just as for
Traherne he "is One infinit Act of KNOWLEDG and Wisdom ... He
is all Ey and all Ear" (C 11.84), "All Act, Pure Act, a Simple
Being. Whose Essence is to be, Whose Being is to be Perfect"
(C IH.63).^ The idea of "refluxe, as rivers to the Ocean"
connects not only with the theme of circulation but also with
that of rivers, oceans, fountains and flowing in general again
common to Traherne (C I.6,29,42;IV.84). This leads to the
Platonic element in Gale's work: "ev'ry thing is more or lesse
perfect, as it draws near to God [to proton kalonl, the first
beauty and light; the great Archetype and original Idea of all
good, as Plato stiles him, [idea tagathal" (CG 1.2).
Gale continues his reference to the importance of active
self-realisation and contemplation ("to make something out of
nothing, requires an active power", CG 1.2) until what seems
like a discrepancy between his thought and Traherne's appears:
"God being one, pure Act, a simple, Infinite Being, cannot be
comprehended by a finite compound capacity" (CG 1.3) • Traheme
does not conceive of man's Capacity as "finite", nor does God
remain incomprehensible to it. The apparent divergence is,
however, immediately negated by an emphasis that makes the
correspondence between the work of Gale and Traherne still
greater. "God cannot be truly apprehended but in his own light
and workes" (CG 1.3) : by this means of apprehension alone can
man's finite limitations be overcome. This is a more lucid
explanation than Traherne gives of a notion that is inherent in
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his work. For all his emphasis on the partial subjectivity
of perception and man's ability to create or at least alone to
fully realise the significance of the external world, it is
clear that the extent to which this is possible is limited,
that there are certain definite "ways of seeing" that must be
adopted before anything can be "seen" at all. Ultimately, man's
aim is not just to "see" by adopting one of the available
perceptive outlooks but to "see rightly": he must see everything
as an expression of God its creator and sustainer. When man does
"see rightly" he participates in the same effort that God makes
to sustain, to realise, created objects and the world at large.
He thus makes an advance towards the Platonic goal of God-likeness.
Gale is more explicit than Traheme about the origins of this
activity, the making of "something out of nothing", the use of
the "active power" of contemplation. God is apprehended in this
way through "his own light and workes. Indeed, the knowledge of
causes by their effects does comprehend the best, and most certain
part of our Philosophy; how much lesse then may we presume to
contemplate the first cause; the Father of lights save in his own
light, shining in the book of Nature or Divine Revelation? (CG 1.3)•
There is something of Bacon's thought even in this highly
metaphysical debate: the discovery of causes from effects and
from the "oracles" of God's "words" and "works". Gale and Bacon,
unlike Traherne, remain hesitant about man's ability to
contemplate "the first cause". Gale continues with a consideration
of the scheme formulated by many seventeenth century writers as a
notion of perception: "all knowledge supposeth some proportion
betwixt the faculty and the object, in order to the reception of
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its Idea, and image" (CG 1.3)• Traherne quotes Plato as the source
of this same scheme: "as three Things are necessary to Vision, the
Eye rightly prepared, the object conveniently seated, and Light to
convey the Idea to the Eye; so there are three things required to
compleat and perfect Intelligence, an understanding Eye, an
Intelligible Object, and a Light intelligible in which to conceive
it: Which last is GOD" (CE 41). The "Light" is the same as Gale's
"light, shining in the book of Nature or Divine Revelation", by
which man acquires the ability to "see rightly", to see all
things as the creation and partial representation of God.
Gale places God at that point at which the "Eye", "Object"
and "Light" converge in a Platonic unity:
In God (who is pure Act) the intelligent,
intellect, intelligible species, the act of
understanding, and the thing understood are
but one and the same. For God understandeth
himself, and all things without himself which
were, or are, or shall be, or may be, under
any hypothesis as also the several . . .
modes, orders, and respects of all things
among themselves; and that not by species or
abstract images received from the objects,
but in the glasse of his own Divine Essence;
not successively, but by one intuition,
without discourse . . . God contemplating
himself beholds in his Divine Essence or
sufficiencie, by an act of simple intelligence,
the eternal Archetype and Ideas of all things
possible.
(CG 1.3)
Thus, as Plato asserts a usually anonymous "great Exemplar and image
of all singulars" (CG 1.4), so God can stand in this place. Then
"the Divine Understanding and Decrees" will "be the first great
Exemplar or original idea of all things made" (CG 1.4): God is
like the "Artificer" who has "an idea preexisting in his mind,
according to which he frames and formes his work" (CG 1.4). Both
Gale and Traherne suggest that man may participate in this
activity, and himself have the relationship of an "Artificer"
to the whole of God's creation: he must make things as images
of God and have the "idea" of God "preexisting in his mind".
For Traherne this involved becoming God-like. So for Gale
man should achieve the same understanding as God, a "Divine
understanding", and be able to see by "intuition, without discourse"
This pure "act of simple intelligence" has parallels in Traherne,
who speaks of "Liquid Clear Satisfactions . . . the Emanations of
the Highest Reason" by which it may be possible to regain
intuitive "natural" "Apprehensions" (C III.22). For Gale, Traherne
and other Platonic writers, any ultimate "truth" will only be
apprehended by first achieving this Platonic God-likeness. It is
necessary to see why this is so.
Man cannot presume to know God by any "finite compound
capacity" but only through God's "own light, shining in the book
of Nature or Divine Revelation" (CG 1.3)• This is fundamental:
"This whole Machine [the world, the universe! has some prints
and footsteps of the wisdom and skill of this great Architect.
There is not the most inconsiderable part of this great Universe,
but has some beams of Divine Wisdom shining in it. The world is
an universal Temple, wherein man may contemplate natural images,
and pictures of Divine Wisdom and goodness. The Sun, Moon and
Stars, yea this dul element of the earth, furnisheth us with some
Divine Characters, ideas, and representations of eternal Wisdom"
(CG 1.4). It is not enough, however, simply to "contemplate
natural images, and pictures of Divine Wisdom" passively: they must
be seen actively, in a certain way, the "Objects" being taken in
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by the "Eye" in the correct "Light", which must be studied. The
key point is that there are "monstrous defects" in "Nature"
(CG 1.4) and in fallen man — in the fall, Gale says, man was
"greatly wounded in his Intellectuals" (CG 1.7). Thus it is
impossible to "contemplate that natural Wisdom or objective light"
without "a book of Grace" (CG I.?) or "Divine glorious raies of
saving light and wisdom" (CG 1.4). "Object", "Eye" and "Light"
must all be in correct proportion in order to make possible the
true apprehension of the world as an image of God. All do possess
the quality by which "God contemplating himself beholds in his
Divine Essence or sufficiencie, by an act of simple intelligence,
the eternal Archetype and Ideas of all things possible". This
simplicity or purity, in man that God-like "intuition", applied
to "Object", "Eye" and "Light", is the means of overcoming
"monstrous defects" in man and nature. Man needs to attune to
this "simple intelligence" before his perceptions are at all
clear, and before they can begin to lead him to God-likeness.
While divine significance does inhere in created things it cannot
be passively received. He too, in his own way, must acquire and
recognise his own form of divine significance, the capacity to
see and Enjoy this divine message through active realisation of it
as part of a complete Platonic scheme. For Traheme this is
represented by his attempt to regain by the "Highest Reason"
the "Intuition" of childhood (C III.2). Both Traherne and Gale
agree that once man recognises his Capacity to see the divinity
of things and to Enjoy them to the full his range is illimited.
This is the clue to God-likeness and "truth", and for Gale also the
clue to an understanding of all "Arts and Sciences":
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As this Light of Nature or created Wisdom,
which the Father of Lights has imprest upon
the natures of things, is but the reflexe
irradiation or shine of his eternal increated
Wisdom; so all human Arts and Sciences, as
gathered up into systems, or inherent in mens
minds are but the reflexe ideas or images of
that objective light, or internal law
engraven upon the beings of things. For all
Arts and Sciences (whether active or
contemplative) are but general ideas or
notions: and all notions are but . . .
pictures and imitations of things: whence
the regular use of all Arts, is to be . . .
images, manifestations, or notices of things
to the glasse of our understandings. So that
look as those created ideas of light and
wisdom which lie hid in the creature, are but
the parelius or reflexe image of Divine
wisdom, that eternal law, and original idea
of all truth: So all Arts and Sciences are
but the images or likenes of the things they
relate unto.
Whence it follows, that all human Arts and
Sciences are but the beams and derivations
from the Fountain of Lights, created ideas
flowing from, and answering unto that one
simple increated eternal idea of Divine
wisdom; which shining forth in things,
created, receives several forms, shapes, &
denominations according to their respective
natures & Operations: & thence being
gathered up, by the inquisitive mind of man,
under certain general rules and order, they
become universal ideas or notions; and passe
under the denomination of Arts and Sciences.
(CG 1.6-7).
Gale and Traherne evolve a complex Platonic pattern that functions
to formulate a fundamental "truth" which is recognised as being
antecedent to all created things but can be perceived by "an
act of simple intelligence" that reveals a means to God-likeness, ""
which itself is characterised by the "correct" relationship of
"Object", "Eye" and "Light". When that state is achieved and the
"one simple increated eternal idea" is apprehended, all "Arts
and Sciences" will be open to understanding by the simple intuition
of the God-like man: he will in a sense already understand them, in
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essence at least. This state of intuitive truth is a Platonic
goal that must be worked towards: it is a state of knowledge
and a particular form of existence, a state of God-likeness
in which man exercises a "simple" and absolute "intelligence"
in relation to the essential "idea" of all the apparent objects
of creation.
3. Isaac Barrow, The Duty and Reward of Bounty to the Poor
The second important source of notes in the Commonplace Book
is a sermon by Isaac Barrow, Fellow of Trinity College and
at various times Professor of both Greek and Mathematics — he
resigned the latter chair in favour of his pupil, Isaac Newton.
A Fellow of the Royal Society since 1663, he had also been
Professor of Geometry at Gresham College. His sermon on The Duty
and Reward of Bounty to the Poor was preached in London at St.
Mary Spittal on Wednesday in Easter week, I67I: it is thus quite
possible that Traheme was present, although the sermon soon
become available in print. At that time Barrow had yet to become
Master of Trinity (I672) and to publish his Lectiones Opticae
(167*0 which were revised for publication by Newton. Coleridge
7
was to note the "verbal imagination" of Barrow's sermons, and
he was in many ways typical of the learned, ordained academic,
a member of the Royal Society, whose knowledge of many disciplines
and interest in contemporary science was allied to a thorough
study of theology and an imaginative grasp of all manner of
intellectual enquiry.
Traherne would probably not find the cetntral moral of
Barrow's sermon of any great interest. It is a conventional
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reiteration of the "Duty" its title proclaims. Barrow's means
of conveying this moral are original, however, and in manner
comparable to some of the ideas and images found in Traherne's
writing. Barrow takes "Bounty to the Poor" as a central index
of a man's whole religious performance: it is a duty "near to the
heart of Piety" (BP 42) and, as "the special Touchstone of Piety"
(BP 61), an image of all other religious duties. "'Tis religious
liberality that doth prove us to be serious and earnest in other
religious performances" (BP 91)• Barrow's discussion of "religious
liberality" is framed in such a way as to ally him with the
Cambridge Platonists, both in the sense of liberal and
latitudinarian freedom of belief and action (a tendency to see
good as good whatever promotes it) and in the sense of the high
spiritual connections of ordinary moral actions. Traherne shares
this. Barrow propounds the "Duty" of his title through images
the vital emphasis of which is towards "dispersing", so that
"Bounty" represents only one aspect of man's duty to "communicate"
all manner of endowments to others. What is sought is "liberal
communication" of all man's gifts in a form not unlike Traherne's
notions of communion, communication and mutual participation —
a genuine exchange not only of material but of spiritual values:
by "liberal communication" man "disperseth his goods" and "sendeth
them abroad for the use and benefit of others" (BP 7). As in
Traherne, images of communication are associated with those of
flowing: "We are but several streams issuing from one source"
(BP 13l). To be bountiful, Barrow says, is to be good to God,
for he too is involved in dispersal and communication to and
with man: "What is any being in the world, but an efflux of [^God'sl
bounty, and an argument of his liberality?" (BP 106). As
"nothing is more conformable to Gods nature" than "beneficence
and mercy" (BP 105-06), so man should also show these
qualities and thus strive to become like God:
Nature, (i say) Providence and Revelation, do
all concur in testifying this, that there is
nothing in God so peculiarly admirable,
nothing (as it were) so God-like; that is, so
highly venerable and amiable, as to do good
and show mercy. We therefore by liberal
communication to the needy, do most approach
to the nature of God, and most exactly
imitate his practice; acquiring to ourselves
thereby somewhat of Divinity, and becoming
little Gods to our Neighbour.
(BP 107-08).
This is a restrained version of Traherne's emphases on man's
ability and need to become God-like, a suggestion that may be
further reinforced: God "cannot but cherish and treat them well,
who axe the fairest and truest images of himself; no spectacle
can be so pleasant to him, as to see us in our practice to act
himself, doing good to one another" (BP 110). This is further
followed by a passage which would seem to confirm that there is
in fact very close correspondence between the thought of Barrow
and Traherne in this respect: man, Barrow says,
within himself containeth a nature very
excellent; an immortal soul, and an
intelligent mind, by which he nearly
resembleth God himself, and is comparable
to Angels; he invisibly is owner of
endowments, rendring him capable of the
greatest and best things ... he was born
a Prince . . . was framed and constituted
Lord of the visible World; had all the
goodly brightnesses of Heaven, and all the
costly furnitures of eaxth, created to serve
him: . . . Yea, he was made an inhabitant of




Unlike Traherne, however, Barrow stresses the Biblical fall
rather than the individual "Apostasie" (C III.2); but man must
still use all his faculties to strive for the re-establishment
of a state he once enjoyed, naturally and by right:
as all men are in faculties and endowments of
nature equal, so were they all originally
equal in condition . . . all constituted in
a most prosperous and plentiful estate; all
things at first were promiscuously exposed
to the use and enjoyment of all, every one
from the common stock assuming as his own
what he needed. Inequality and private
interest in things . . . were the by-blows of
our fall: sin introduced these degrees and
distances; it devised the names of rich and
poor; it begot those ingrossings and
enclosures of things; it forged those two
small pestilent words, meum and tuum, which
have engendered so much strife among men,
and created so much mischief in the world.
(BP 120-21).
The accumulation of wealth only leads to a situation where
man "doth pervert that equity which God hath established in
things" (BP 126) and abuses other men because, as "every man is
not only our Brother, but (as Aristotle saith of a friend) [alios
autos"), another one's self" (BP 133)» so "every man hath still a
competent patrimony due to him, and a sufficient provision made
for his tolerable subsistence" (BP 123).
Although the fall is stressed it is held within an optimistic
and essentially benevolent view of things: Barrow's image of the
world remains close to Traherne's earthly paradise. What he points
in this sermon is the necessity of maintaining the paradisal
aspect of things by a constant practice of "Bounty" and all the
other virtue of which it is an image, aiming always to imitate
God and thus "acquiring to ourselves thereby somewhat of divinity".
In the dutiful practice of bounty to the poor, Barrow asserts, men
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axe capable of "acquiring . . . somewhat of divinity, and
becoming little gods". Men truly can "approach to the nature
of God" and "imitate his practice" : they are already "the fairest
and truest images of himself" and all men are born "capable of
the greatest and best things". Each man is "framed and constituted
lord of the visible world". Barrow's view of man in the world is
almost identical to that of Traherne: "he was made an inhabitant
of paradise, and Possessour of felicities superlative" with,
ideally and originally, "all things . . . promiscuously exposed
to the use and enjoyment of all". His only problem is the best
use of his faculties and endowments and the best ends towards
which these should be directed. In The Duty and Reward of Bounty
to the Poor Barrow expounds a philosophy of activity and
communication! man must "practice" and "act" like God and himself
seek to be truly "godlike", to attain once more the "felicities"
he once enjoyed, and may again enjoy, as "an inhabitant of
paradise".
4. The Divine Pymander
Under many of the headings in the Commonplace Book there are
quotations from The Divine Pymander, John Everard's translation
of part of the Hermetic corpus. This translation, first
published in I65O, has contact with the political and religious
beliefs of several groups of interregnum radicals. Everard
(1575-C.1650) translated several mystical and Platonic works and
held a magical belief in the divinity of man and nature. He had
been imprisoned as a heretic but was admired by John Webster among
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other interregnum reformers. The Hermetic idea of the magus, the
divine man possessing absolute and special spiritual authority,
chosen to command, to lead ordinary men to a better life and
true salvation — to reveal a special "light" to the world —
was echoed in other radical ideas and heresies during and just
after the Civil Wars. The Hermetic magus also, and particularly
in The Divine Pymander, achieves his God-like state through
knowledge and appreciation of God's works, creation, all "the
things that axe" (DP 1.2). This idea found favour with later
natural philosophers. Thomas Sprat said that natural philosophers
should be conversant with "all the objects of men's thoughts:
which can be nothing else, but either God, or Man, or Nature"
(HRS 81). The Divine Pymander states that "There can be no
Religion more true or just then to know the things that are"
(DP 1.2): these being "First, God; Secondly, the World; Thirdly,
Man" (DP 1.25). For Traherne too, "GOD, THE WORLD YOUR SELF. All
Things" are "the Objects of your Felicity" (C 11.100). Among other
natural philosophers, Robert Boyle actually read The Divine
Pymander in Everard's translation and quoted "Hermes Trismegistus"
as a sound philosopher (UEP 53)* The idea of the Hermetic magus,
achieving God-likeness through his knowledge of creation, is
highly sympathetic to the philosophies of Sprat and Boyle as well
as to Traherne.
More than 200 paragraphs from The Divine Pymander are quoted
in the Commonplace Book. Many of these appear as direct
transcriptions in Chapter 28 of Christian Ethicks, "Of Magnanimity"
Traherne seems to have found in the Hermetic writings a very close
correspondence to his own philosophy: his extended direct
quotation suggests that he offered this as confirmation or analogy
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rather than as a source for his own thought. The name "Pymander",
or more usually "Poemander", stands as a heading to the first
book of the Hermetica but was frequently taken to be the title
of the whole work, often thought to be by the mythical "Hermes
pccau^cplwc,
Trismegistus". The procumptiivc title may derive from the Greek
[poieoH, to make, produce or create (the source of the word "poet",
or "maker") and from [aner, andros7, man: the text itself suggests
this as an appropriate etymology, for it is concerned with both
the creation of man by God and, effectively, with the creation
of God by man. This continual circularity (God makes man, man
makes God) is an essential feature of the book and an interesting
reflection on Traherne's own theory of "The Circulation" (M 11.152-5^)
and on his whole attitude to God, man and the world.
The ideas of The Divine Pymander, much quoted by Traherne, may
be examined here as close parallels for Traherne's own thought.
Book One begins by asserting that "There can be no Religion more
true or just, than to know the things that are; and to acknowledge
thanks for all things to him that made them" (DP 1.2), There are
three aspects to knowledge of "the things that are " ("First,
God; Secondly, the World; Thirdly, Man", DP 1.25) all of which
participate in a system of circulation or communication." "The
World for Man, Man for God". Man has two souls, the "Sensible"
soul which is mortal, and the "Reasonable" soul which links him
to the divine order: "The Minde in God. Reasoning (or, disputing,
or discovering) in Man. Reason in the Minde" (DP I.37~39).
"Communication", "Participation" and "Circulation" are important
notions here as in Traherne. In the Hermetic scheme man participates,
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by may- of his reason, in the "Minde", an aspect of God. This state
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is realised in a physical sense in the parallel existence of the
world to that of "Minde" — doth are shared by God and man.
In Book Two begins a vision in which "Pimander" ("Poemander",
the "Minde", the "Light", "God") comes before the author, who asks
for knowledge about "the things that are". "And I saw an infinite
sight, all things were become light" (DP II.4). Man has "power of
all things", God decreeing that he should learn "all things that
are": this is a necessary motive for gratitude. "Blessed are thou
0 Father, thy man would be satisfied with thee, as thou hast
given him all power" (DP 11.98). The "Son" is the "Word from the
Minde" and was separated from the "Father" because the "Workman
. . . would needs also himself fall to work". This stress on
work, creation, activity, much emphasized by Traherne, becomes
more explicit: God's "Operation or Act, is his Will, and his
Essence, to will all things to be" (DP IV.4). The world, all
things, "appears", and God "appears" in all things. They are not
actually made, but, as it were, made to appear: "in fantasie
[God! fantasieth all things, or in appearance he maketh them
appear" (DP V.6). God thus "appears" throughout the whole world,
just as he makes the whole of this itself "appear", so "if thou
wilt see him, consider and understand the Sun, consider the course
of the Moon, consider the order of the Stars" (DP V.13). God
"being himself the onely Workman, he is always in Work, himself
being that which he doth or maketh" (DP X.98).
God exists (appears) and makes things exist (appear) by his
activity, by making appearances. Man possesses complementary
potentials and can participate at all levels in the divine
activity: "the beams of God are operations; and the beams of the
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World are Natures; and the beams of Man are Arts and Sciences"
(DP IV.80). "Man is a Divine living thing"; "an Earthly man, is
a mortal God; and . . . the heavenly God, is an immortal Man"
(DP IV.89-90; quoted by Traherne, GE 225). Like God, man must
make things appear, and himself appear as an image of God. The
system suggests that concepts such as "man" and "God" are
manipulated as images rather than discussed as facts: while "man"
and the "world" are part of the "One" (DP IV.9*0 the continual
circulation of the three elements in the scheme (God, world and
man) means that it becomes difficult to propose any fixity at
all. The circulation becomes literal and complete, and no single
hierarchical order emerges. "God is not intelligible to himself;
for not being any other thing from that which is understood, he
cannot be understood by himself" (DP IX.22): God is understood,
known, only by man, who becomes, literally, like God — "the
Sense and Understanding of the World is One, in that it makes
all things, and unmakes them again into it self, for it is the
Organ or Instrument of the Will of God" (DP XIII.31). "Sense",
"Understanding", whether of God or man, is always the same, a
property of the "Minde" behind which is God but in which man
participates. Ultimately all elements in the scheme are subsumed
into the concept of the "One", an absolute unity of all; at once
the whole of existence, all existents, and the negation of the
possibility of existence, which are only the product of the
activity of the separated aspects of the "One" as they strive
for oneness.
The foundations of the philosophy are laid less in the
three-fold division of being (God, world and man) than in the
all-pervading constants like the mind, the soul, wisdom and
knowledge, which are available to either God or man in their
mutual participations. The sum of these constants becomes a
Platonic "Oneness", and it is in this that the three elements
act and may be said to exist by this action — not in "God", a
notional being having existence only as the result of activity
within the larger, all-inclusive Platonic scheme. "Oneness" is
equally attainable by God or man: it is available to anyone
capable of filling his individual mind with knowledge and
apprehensions of things and thoughts to an ultimate degree of
all-inclusiveness where all beings attaining this state, the
Platonic ideal realised, become identical, become simply "One".
They are identical because absolute and complete, whether
decribed, nominally, as "God" or "man".
Traherne says, in Christian Ethicks, that "Trismegistus (or
whoever else was the Author of that Book)" (CB 230) saw the "deep
Capacity" of the soul but did not understand its end. Traherne's
thought, though, implies a system similar to that found in the
Hermetic writings, where ideas of God, the world and man are only
parts of a larger scheme in which ultimates are discussed rather
as states of knowing, being, thinking or feeling than as actual
physical existents. This position arises out of the difficulties
and ambiguities which surround the idea of "God" when it is
insisted that man is capable of becoming God-like in a complete
sense, that he is truly and thoroughly the image of God. Traherne
quotes the Hermetic scheme of God, world and man and the idea of
man as "a divine and living thing" comparable only "to them that
are above . . . that are called Gods. Nay rather ... he that is
a KAN INDEED is above them!" for "an Earthly Kan is a Mortal God,
and the Heavenly GOD is an Immortal HAN" (CE 225)• The Hermetic
writings suggest that, in so far as all things are, finally,
mental realisations ("Thoughts and Intellections", GE 228), it
may be true to say that if God made man, then man made God. There
is considerable evidence to suggest that Traherne would endorse
some similar emphasis on man's Capacity. He quotes, for example,
a further passage from the Hermetic writings that is very close
to his own thought: "If . . . thou wilt not equal thyself to GOD,
thou canst not understand GOD ... If thou believe in thy self
that nothing is impossible, but accountest thy self Immortal,
and that thou canst understand all things, every Art, every
Science, and the manner and custom of every living thing . . .
thou maist . . . understand GOD" (CE 226-27). Kan may, or must,
know everything, the one condition of his knowledge being that
he must know in the right manner, must see everything as the
creation of and as a means towards knowing God, the ultimate
good of which man is capable of conceiving. "Magnanimity", in
Chapter 28 of Christian Ethicks, is "all that belongs to a Great
Soul ... an infinite Hope; and a vast Desire; a Divine, profound,
uncontrollable sence of ones own Capacity" (CE 224). By knowing
all things "in the strait and divine Way", "the Soul will by
that means be . . . the Temple of the God-head . . . then it
must needs be present with all things in Heaven, and in the Earth,
and in the Sea, as GOD is: for all things will be in it, as it
were, b£ Thoughts and Intellections" (CE 228). Man, filled with
these "Thoughts and Intellections" of "the things that are", of
"All Things" "the Objects of . . . Felicity" (C 11.100), will
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become God-like, will become God.
5. The Early Notebook and De Augmentis Scientlarum
The Commonplace Book is the most useful adjunct among
unpublished materials to the more central Traherne texts, but
even with this inherently interesting and highly organised
manuscript the benefits obtained from a study of the sources
rather in their own right than exclusively as they are treated
by Traherne are considerable. The manuscript is valuable in
itself, for certain sections serve to focus central aspects of
Traherne's thought, and his list of headings, under which the
notes are disposed, is itself a neat index of his preoccupations.
A wider intellectual scope can however be perceived by turning
to the sources of the notes. The evidence in the Early Notebook
for Traheme's reaction to what it would be useful to regard as
a potent intellectual influence, Francis Bacon's De Augmentis
Scientiarum (1623) is, initially at least, somewhat disappointing.
There are, however, interesting observations to be made about
Traherne's relation to this book. Traherne made extensive notes
on Bacon's work less than forty years after its publication,
probably soon after taking his B.A. degree at Oxford in I656.
These notes follow some representative undergraduate notes and
occupy a significant proportion of the notebook: 101 pages are
devoted to the notes from Bacon's work, ^-8 pages to the other
subjects.
The fragmentary style of annotation common to the Early
Notebook continues through most of the section from the De
Augmentis. There is occasional evidence of a more thorough
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reaction on Traherne's part to Bacon's text, however. Bacon's
discussion of "Philosophia Prima" prompts an extended comment
from Traherne:
General learning & Philosophia Prima, is as it
were the Aquarum scaturigines which nourisheth
& repletes all the other fountainnes & streams,
or rivers of any particular sciences & without
a supply from that the other will quickly wax
drie ... As there is Aurea Catena Virtutum
so is there likewise Scientiarum. Noe
one vertue can be in the mind unlesse attended
with the whole Chore nor one science enthroned
in the soule unlesse honoured by all the other
Attendants.
(EN 102).
Bacon mentions "Philosophia Prima" towards the end of Book One of
De Augmentis, where he regrets the decline of "universality"
among philosophers: "after the distribution of particular arts
and sciences, men have abandoned universality, or philosophia
prima; which cannot but cease and stop all progression. For no
perfect discovery can be made upon a flat or level: neither is it
possible to discover the more remote and deeper parts of any
science, if you stand but upon the level of the same science, and
ascend not to a higher science" (WFB III.292). It is interesting
that this is almost the only point which draws an explicit
comment from Traherne, one which indicates his agreement with
Bacon as to the lack of "universality" among contemporaries.
Traherne would seem to acknowledge the need for learning of a
"Philosophia Prima", an idea which suits his generalised attitude
to all intellectual pursuits and his continual search for the
infinite in all things. In some respects "universality" is a
characteristic reviTed by the virtuosi of the later seventeenth
century, and could, for example, be used to designate the
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activities of the Royal Society, attempting to mount a newly
researched and perceived view of things; and of Newton, who not
only did produce a new view of, literally, the universe, but also
engaged in a serious and experimental study of alchemy as part of
his hope for providing both a more scientific or quasi-scientific
gloss to the spiritual affirmations rather uncomfortably
attached to his material system and a complete account of creation
in all aspects.^ His may be seen as one particularly successful
attempt among many to give a universal account of all things.
Traherne's affirmation that "Logick, Ethicks, Physicks, Metaphysicks,
Geometry, Astronomy, Poesie, Medicine, Grammer, Musick, Rhetorick,
all kind of Arts Trades and Mechanismes that Adorned the World
pertained to felicity" (C III.36) is part of his individual
contribution to a "Philosophia Prima". His own search for
"universality" — already touched upon in an examination of The
Court of the Gentiles and The Divine Pymander and their relation
to Traherne's thought — can be further discussed at a later
stage, particularly in relation to Bacon's definition of
"Metaphysic".
Traheme's early reading of Bacon's De Augmentis seems
preoccupied with the abstraction of convenient aphoristic phrases
from Bacon's text. These literal notes may often have little
obvious relevance to what might otherwise be perceived as Bacon's
main argument, and only in relation to "Philosophia Prima" does
Traherne begin to practice something like the mental and
imaginative re-organisation that was applied to the sources of
the Common-place Book. It is still, however, too easy to ignore the
fact of Traherne's having read De Augmentis closely. Margoliouth,
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in his now standard, edition of Traherne texts, did not identify
the notes in the Early Notebook as being from Bacon (M I.xx-xxii:
he calls this "Philip Traherne's Notebook" although he recognised
that most of the notes were written by Thomas). The notes
themselves do not provide a framework upon which to mount a
discussion of Bacon's thought as it appears in Traherne's work,
but it is still necessary to stress that Traherne was exposed to
the intellectually re-orientating experience of a reading of
De Augmentis and to see what materials and ideas were thus
available to him. Even that he was motivated to undertake this
reading — particularly at Oxford in the l650's — is significant,
not least because the fact that he was so motivated would seem to
be largely incompatible with many of the modem critical assumptions
that are made about Traherne's work. It is possible to offer here
something of an abstract of the text made with some attention to, or
at least experience of, Traherne's later writing. Only through such
a reconstitutive approach can use be made of what promises to be
valuable material: otherwise discussion would be hampered by the
fragmentary nature of the notes, and by the existence of several
blank spaces in the manuscript (EN 77-85> 104-113). These are
interesting in themselves, and could be said to indicate that
Traherne intended to return to his study of De Augmentis at a later
date. This is conjecture. However, while one blank space would
account for the omission of notes on part of Bacon's discussion of
the errors of learning and the dignity of true learning (EN 104-113;
WEB 111.293 f?')> the other would otherwise cover Bacon's discussion
of man's thirst for knowledge, God's intention that man should study
His works, the pursuit of knowledge to the right end, and the
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tendency of learning to increase devotion to God (EN 77-85#
WFB III.269-273)" In 'the context of Traherne's later writing it
would seem that these omissions are due to a heightening rather
than a lack of interest on Traherne's part, an interest that he
may have intended to fulfil by particularly close attention to
these passages at a later date.
The most interesting book of De Augmentis for the purposes
of this study, and the one to which Traherne gave most attention
in his notes, is the first.In speaking of the "intellectual
re-orientation" likely to be the result of a reading of Bacon, it
is possible to begin discussion in general terms. When Traheme
uses words like "truth" and "reason" critics seem inclined to
half-ignore the usual weight of these and accept them — or even
tolerate them — as Traherne's attempts to apply a quasi-
philosophical gloss to his "mystical insight". Such words may
have more importance and a more philosophical emphasis, however.
The whole purpose of the Centuries is seen by Traherne as the
communication of "Truths": "I will fill [this book^ with . . .
Truths . . . with those Truths which . . . shall shew my Lov: To
you, in Communicating most Enriching Truths; to Truth, in Exalting
Her Beauties in such a Soul" (£ I.l). "Truths" here are "religious"
or "spiritual", but they may be reinforced by a deeply thought
sense of these "Truths" as part of a whole individual philosophy,
the end of which is the Felicity which both the Centuries and
Christian Ethicks aim to teach. It may indeed be possible that
what seems now to be accepted as an inherent difference between
the truths of "science" and experiment and the truths of "religion"
or philosophical speculation may, in the seventeenth century,
simply not have existed in men's minds. "Experimental Natural
Philosophy", for example, would be open not only to microscopical
and telescopical examination of nature but also to the theory
and motivation behind such research into God's creation. Thomas
Sprat was to see the concerns of the "Natural Philosopher" as
extensions of those of the "Moral" philosopher (HPS 33)• Traherne
speaks of "Reason" as of "Truth" (and in conventional literary
history his older contemporary Dryden is often cast as the
precursor of the "Age of Reason"): "Reason is a transcendent
faculty, which extendeth to all Objects, and penetrates into all
misteries" (CE 109). "Reason" may be seen as "transcendent" and
to be concerned with "misteries", but these it "penetrates" as
it "extendeth to all Objects". More important is the use of
"Reason" at, for Traherne, a vital point of argument: "if we
cannot see some Reason in his ways, we are apt to suspect there
is no Deity" (CE 3^0 • "Reason" is here proposed as a universal
abstract faculty apparently antecedent to "God". Traherne's more
usual and general proposition is of a Platonically conceived
faculty of which God may be regarded as the ultimate or ideal
realisation but in which man is capable of participation: "I
easily perceiv that my Soul was made to live in Communion with
GOD, in all Places of his Dominion, and to be satisfied with the
Highest Reason in all Things" (C III.18). Within this conception,
however, there remains room for a notion of "Reason" as a
dominant characteristic and impulse in all human activity:
"Reason, which is the formal Essence of the Soul of Man, guides
Him to desire those Things which are absolutely supreme" (CE 14).
It is by the "Highest Reason", in fact, that Traheme seeks
Felicity (C III.2).
"Truth" and "Reason" are the constantly reiterated themes of
Bacon's work and, for him, the aim of all philosophy: "hooks,
such as are worthy the name of books, ought to have no patrons but
truth and reason" (WFB III.281). In suggesting that there is more
to Traherne's use of these words than is commonly recognised his
albeit early reading of Bacon provides the best ground upon which
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to prospect for a philosophical depth that is otherwise realisable
only through isolated analysis of the writing itself. While a
J
direct relation of "influence" cannot, and need not, be
established, there is room for an adjustment of awareness of
Traheme's writing in relation to that of Bacon.
In Book One of De Augment!s Bacon's own concerns define
themselves only against a background of current "vanities" of
learning, the three main "vanities" being "fantastical learning",
"contentious learning" and "delicate learning" (WFB III.282). He
discusses these in reverse order.
Firstly, Bacon's analysis of "delicate learning" emerges as
an attack on the misuse of rhetoric, itself an "affectionate study
of eloquence and copie of speech" which can be used "to clothe and
adorn the obscurity even of philosophy with sensible and plausible
elocution" but when excessive tends "rather towards copie than
weight" so that "men study words and not matter" (WFB 111.283-84).
Bacon's position becomes clear. He has "truth" to communicate, and
he intends to do this without interference from words which have
no "reason". For him "words are but the images of matter; and
except they have life of reason and invention, to fall in love with
them is all one as to fall in love with a picture" (WFB III.284).
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Excessive attention to words leads to a state where what for
Bacon is a means of expression available to him as a transparent
reflection of his "truth" becomes an end in itself. Advanced
rhetoric is "capable of no divineness" and becomes a hindrnace
to "the severe inquisition of truth, and the deep progress in
philosophy" (WFB III.284). Language has a purely functional aspect
for "the more severe and laborious sort of inquirers into truth"
(WFB III.284) and other than as an adornment words, "images", have
little use for philosophy beyond a certain indeterminate level of
plain "expression". Philosophy itself can be seen in these terms
as the pursuit of "truth" by the means of "reason", a "deep
progress" by "severe inquisition", the results of which become
constituted primally in the philosopher's mind without awareness
of linguistic formulation. Bacon does not distinguish between
words which do have "life of reason" and those which are merely
"images", but it is clear that, as he claims to use it, language
has the simple function of the expression of a "truth" which
remains outside and is constituted before discourse but can be
directly and precisely transferred into discourse and communicated
in an exact representation of this "truth". Once the philosopher's
mind has conducted its "severe inquisition" neither it nor the
philosopher himself are seen to play any real part in the
discourse presented to the reader.
For Bacon, then, a sequence from objects to thoughts to words
should be direct and, it would seem, this cannot be short-circuited
by language, if it is properly used. When excessive attention is
paid to language, however, this can produce uncertainty in the
objects—thoughts—words sequence because the progression from the
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first to the last of these may be reversed if some weight is
allowed to language other than that of plain "expression" or
"description" ("decoration" would be the first step away from this
simple aim) : thoughts might be determined by language rather than
by "severe inquisition" of objects. Bacon may have recognised
aspects of language that are beyond the merely instrumental, but
he refused to acknowledge these. He could not acknowledge them,
for to do so would undermine the aims he pursued in his work. He
admits elsewhere, in the analysis of the "idols" of the human
world, only that "words plainly force and overrule the understanding,
and throw all into confusion, and lead men away into numberless and
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empty controversies and idle fancies". Thus language
must be kept in its place, as an instrumental tool, a means of
direct communication. Man must dominate language and not run the
risk of being dominated by it. Recent analysis, however, has shown
the extent to which Bacon himself was subject to what might be
termed the constitutive powers of language and writing. One
modern critic traces the determining use of dominant organisational
and structural patterns, rhetorical and aphoristic devices,
classically derived syntactical symmetry, and imagistic (the
image sometimes running ahead and determining the thought) and
argumentative patterns, the latter derived from Bacon's experience
IB
in law and parliament. v This is to see Bacon writing imaginatively
rather than rigorously in a career much concerned with persuasion.
It has been said that "his mind did not go on to grasp firmly a
world which lent itself to mathematical treatment; instead, it
clung to a whole mode of apprehension that would ordinarily be
lb
called more poetical". "Induction becomes for him not so much a
225
useful mechanism for the discovery of certain limited axioms,
but rather a mystic path, an ultimate revelation and a millenial
hope":*"' "the whole end of his philosophy is a non-rational
vision of man's unlimited capacity to dominate the universe".^
While 3acon sets out to establish the rigorous and "objective"
principles of a new knowledge, learning or science, his argument
can be analysed as being itself determined by his own
preoccupations and practices. He cannot, ultimately, force language
to be merely instrumental, and so it remains "subjective" and is
as much constitutive in Bacon's writing as in more particularly
"literary" work.
In De Augmentis Bacon's attention focusses secondly on
"contentious learning". It is interesting that the Traherne notebook
containing his most scholastic studies should also evince his
reading of one of the most famous attacks on the "Schoolmen", for
it is their learning that Bacon exemplifies as "contentious":
This kind of degenerate learning did chiefly
reign amongst the schoolmen; who having sharp
and strong wits, and abundance of leisure, and
small variety of reading; but their wits being
shut up in the cells of a few authors (chiefly
Aristotle their dictator), as their persons
were shut up in the cells of monasteries and
colleges; and knowing little history, either
of nature or time; did out of no great
quantity of matter, and infinite agitation
of wit, spin out unto us those laborious webs
of learning which are extant in their books.
For the wit of man, if it work upon the matter
which is the contemplation of the creatures of
God, worketh according to the stuff, and is
limited thereby; but if it work upon itself,
as the spider worketh his web, then it is
endless, and brings forth indeed cobwebs of
learning, admirable for the fineness of the




In short, "vain learning is worse than vain words" (WFB III.285),
"contentious learning" a greater threat to the philosopher than
"delicate learning". Again the fundamental concern is for "truth":
the Schoolmen's method "rests not so much upon evidence of truth
proved by arguments, authorities, similitudes, examples- [the
"deep progress" by "severe inquisition"^, as upon particular
confutations and solutions of every scruple, cavillation and
objection" (WFB 111.286-87). The "generalities of the schoolmen
are for a while good and proportionable; but when you descend into
the distinctions and decisions, instead of a fruitful womb for the
use and benefit of man's life, they end in monstrous altercations
and barking questions" (WFB 111.286-87). Any inclination to
"monstrous altercations" is deliberately shunned by Traherne
(C 1.4), although he is inclined more to "generalities" than to
"distinctions and decisions". One critic has however noted
"a utilitarian emphasis, trnasfigured yet discemable in the
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mystic's doctrine of felicity". The notion that the philosopher's
"deep inquisition" reveals "a fruitful womb for the use and
benefit of man's life" might find an echo in Traherne's concern
for "Use" and "Services" (CE 182) which, together with his
notions of "Fruition" and "Prizing" are seen as part of the
process of understanding and appreciation that is Enjoyment and
leads to Felicity. "Fruition", the realisation of "the use and
benefit of man's life", perhaps, is sought in the progress
towards Felicity, so man should "grasp at . . . fruition, with a
faint kind of Promise, that it shall at last be ours" (CE 122).
"Fruition" does have a connected stress on the "subjective"
activity of the mind (in conjunction, at least, with "the
contemplation of the creatures of God"), but, as Traherne sees
man's life in terms of intellectual Capacity, "Fruition" is the
recognition and realisation of objects as they are useful and
serviceable in man's progress towards Felicity, a state of
thorough human fulfilment and intellectual repletion. Bacon
attacks the "laborious webs" of the Schoolmen's intellectual
wrangling and proclaims a plain "truth". The Schoolmen, he
claims, "in the inquiry of divine truth", "leave the oracle of
God's word and . . . vanish in the mixture of their own
inventions, £andl so in the inquisition of nature they ever left
the oracle of God's works and adored the deceiving and deformed
images which the unequal mirror of thdir own minds or a few
received authors did represent unto them" (WFB III.28?). Traherne'
position can be seen as a compromise. He is as much concerned as
Bacon with the "oracles" of God's words and works, but he places
a continual emphasis on the importance of his own mind without
which neither of these could be realised (fully known, or made
real). "Truth" for him is neither given nor absolute, but is
rather a (Platonic) state of mind or being that can be worked
towards, actively and mentally, and to which study of God's words
and works contributes. For him what Bacon calls "divine truth"
and the "inquisition of nature" are parts of one effort to
attain a greater "truth" (which Traheme might call God-likeness
or Felicity), an effort which is made "subjectively" and demands
the perception or perceptive appropriation by the subject (the
"Infant-Ey", M 11.86-87; or, later, the "Ey of Reason", C 1.25)
in a particular manner (as a means towards understanding and
towards God) of what Bacon proposes as "objective" knowledge, the
"truth" of which, for Bacon, exists outside man's world (it
exists whether there is language, a name for it, or not). To
Bacon this "truth" is available for direct translation into his
world by the use of reasoning and discriminatory powers, by a
"true" reflection rather than an appropriative mental exercise
and active realisation. There is less a difference of manner
than of degree, the degree to which "inquisition" (—perception,
—mental realisation) remains "rigorous" and "objective".
Traherne emphasizes its "subjectivity" from the first ("An
Object Seen, is in the Faculty seeing it, and by that in the
Soul of the Seer, after the Best of Maners", C 1.100) while
Bacon's work attains some of its power from the dedication with
which he pursues its ultimately elusive "objectivity".
This different approach to the means and methods of
perception should not obscure a more positive correspondence
in the attitudes of Bacon and Traherne. Bacon says that "the
mind of man" should be directed towards "the contemplation of
the creatures of God", and he implies that the twin "oracles" of
God's words and works should be the main preoccupations of the
philosopher. Traherne, like Bacon in his critique of the
Schoolmen and their "laborious webs of learning", rejects
written authority for its owsake — the "Ey of Reason" seeks
to recapture the intuitive insight and perception of the
"Infant Ey" on the principles of the "Highest Reason" (C III.22).
In this process thorough and fundamental emphasis is placed on
the "contemplation of GODS Works" (C II.3) and on "Diligent
inquisition into all Natures" (C III.44). Traherne is inclined
to deism, for it is the created world which is for him the best
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indication of the attributes of God: scriptural evidence seems
secondary to this. He accepts scriptural authority but not
without question: it is the material world rightly perceived
that provides him with over-abundant evidence of its truth. It is
in the material world that Traherne finds the most convincing
and the most stimulating evidence of God's attributes; "the
contemplation of the creatures of God", of the "oracle" of
God's works, and consideration of "the oracle of God's word" are
complementary. Bacon feared the results of this attitude. For him
the truths of God's works, scientific truth, were not the same as
the truths of God's words, theological truth. Both were true, but
in ultimately incompatible ways, and if they were held as parts
of one inclusive truth this would be insecure and uncertain,
possibly invalid. His argument has been seen in terms of a
philosophical problem concerning a conflict between "reason" and
"faith".*® For Traherne, as for the Cambridge Platonists,*^ both
would seem to be valid within a system based on the mutual
confirmation of works and words when "contemplated" by the mind
capable of perceiving or realising, actively and "subjectively",
the "truth" that is to be drawn from them.
Thirdly, in De Augmentls, after "vain words" and "vain
matter", Bacon examines the most dangerous of the vanities,
"untruth" itself, the condemnation of which brings about Bacon's
most explicit statement of his attitude to "truth": "the essential
form of knowledge ... is nothing but a representation of truth:
for the truth of being and the truth of knowing are one, differing
no more than the direct beam and the beam reflected" (tfFB III.287).
Hence the importance of learning, the task of which is to uncover
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and represent (as in a mirror) an absolute and original "truth",
which comes directly from either of God's "oracles". Eacon admits
that the "end or pretences" of "Astrology, Natural Magic, and
Alchemy" are "noble", but cites them as central examples of
sciences which "have had better intelligence and confederacy with
the imagination of man than with his reason" (WFB III.289) — they
are not representations of "truth", to which man's "reason" is the
means. "Truth" and "reason": Bacon argues, continually and
thoroughly, for their establishment as the end and means of
philosophy and learning. Man's task, he insists, is the
representation or disclosure of "truth" (whether theological or
natural) by innate and neutral discriminatory powers (by "severe
inquisition") without colouring or distortion from his own mind?
the reflection of an absolute and primal "reality".
This is not Traherne's attitude. For him objects known are
fully realised and .constituted only in the mind of the knowing
subject. "An Object Seen, is in the Faculty seeing it, and by that
in the soul of the Seer, after the Best of Maners . . . Dead
Things are in a Room containing them in a vain maner; unless they
are Objectivly in the soul of a Seer" (C 1.100). Traherne is very
nearly an idealist. Yet for all the difference it is possible to
see some common impulse behind Bacon's definition of "truth" and
its agents and objects, and Traherne's search for Felicity by
means of Enjoyment. Perhaps this is simply because they both share
impulses common to much if not all philosophy. If, however,
Traheme can be considered as a philosopher in the company of
Bacon this essay has more than achieved its aim. Bacon measures
learning as it contributes to "the disclosing of nature" or the
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"uses of man's life" (WFB III.289). Traherne might measure
experience by the same criteria, as the first is synonymous
with knowledge of God through his creation and the second, in its
fullest sense, with Felicity, man's ultimate good. "Truth" for
Traherne has as deliberate an emphasis as it has for Bacon, but
his definition would be very different (neither actually attempts
a definition): something like "those thoughts and intellections
experienced in relation to God and his creation by any creature
that has achieved God-likeness". His writing seeks the way to
God-likeness. Bacon's "truth" might be "that which is evident and
constant to the mind of the reasoning man". His writing is an
exposition of the reasoning process. Man's reason acts as a
reflecting mirror for the truth Bacon's philosopher discovers
by inquiry. Traherne's truth is a state of mind and needs a mental
formulation to produce am active realisation of what are otherwise
"Dead Things" — truth inheres not in the things themselves but in
the mind of the "Seer" when engaged in contemplation of them. This
active realisation, the almost literal creation of the perceived
objects in their true context and significance, requires an effort
of mind different to that involved in Bacon's more passive,
discriminatory reflection of that which is found out by "inquisition".
A form of "universality", it has been suggested here, is part
of Traherne's striving for Felicity. As the Hermetic Platonism
studied by Traherne requires that the potentially God-like soul
fills itself with knowledge, "Thoughts and Intellections", of all
things, thus making itself "divine" in knowledge and experience, so
Bacon requires that the philosopher should make himself open to all
aspects of learning, the root of which must be "truth". Both of
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these views can be contained within Traherne's attitude to human
aspiration and endeavour — his idea of man's Capacity and
"Insatiableness" — and both permit the abstraction of a Platonic
scheme which is fundamentally similar in structure. Bacon's
discussion of "Metaphysic" in De Augmentis is in fact conducted
in terms of a Platonic ascent from "lower" to "higher" forms of
knowledge:
it is the duty and virtue of all knowledge to
abridge the circuits and long ways of experience
(as much as truth will permit), and to remedy
the ancient complaint that "life is short and
art is long". And this is best performed by
collecting and uniting the axioms of sciences
into more general ones, and such as may
comprehend all individual cases. For knowledges
are as pyramids, whereof history and experience
are the bases. And so of Natural Philosophy the
basis is Natural History; the stage next the
basis is Physic; the stage next the vertical
point is Metaphysic. As for the cone and
vertical point ("the work which God worketh
from the beginning to the end", namely, the
summary law of nature) it may fairly be doubted
whether man's inquiry can attain to it. But
these three are the true stages of knowledge
... to those who abasing themselves refer all
things to the glory of God, they are as the
three acclamations: Holy, Holy, Holy. For God
is holy in the multitude of his works, holy in
the order of them, and holy in the union of
them. And therefore the speculation was
excellent in Parmenides and Plato . . . "that
all things by a certain scale ascend to unity".
So then always that knowledge is worthiest
which least burdens the intellect with
multiplicity; and this appears to be Metaphysic,
as that which considers chiefly the simple forms
of things (which I have above termed forms of
the first class); since although few in number,
yet in their commensurations and co-ordinations
they make all this variety. The second respect
which ennobles this part of Metaphysic, is that
it enfranchises the power of men to the widest
and most extensive field of operation. For
Physic carries men in narrow and restrained ways,
imitating the ordinary flexuous courses of
Nature; but the ways of the wise are everywhere
broad; to wisdom (which was anciently defined to
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be the knowledge of things divine and human)
there is ever abundance and variety of means.
(WFB IV.361-62).
In Bacon's terms Traheme might be called a metaphysician, capable
in his own way of "deep progress" as he himself saw the importance
of "Diligent inquisition" (C III.44) and sought "the greatest
liberty . . . and most extensive field of operation" for his
intellectual realisation of man's Capacity. Near the point of
the pyramid of knowledges Bacon's own definitions begin to
cloud, for "it may ... be doubted whether man's inquiry can
attain to" "the work which God worketh from the beginning to the
end". In The Divine Pymarder God is defined as "the onely Workman,
. . . always in Work, himself being that which he doth or maketh"
(DP X.98) and it is in this work which Traherne says man must
strive to participate as he seeks to realise his own Felicity.
If it could be allowed, as the Hermetic writings and Traherne
allow, that man most certainly could attain to this, would not
Bacon's notion of "the truth of being and the truth of knowing"
being one mean that "truth" itself would depend less upon the
proposed inherent truth or reality of objects than upon the
"Thoughts and Intellections" of the God-like man, himself
engaged in "the work which God worketh from the beginning to the
end" and, in Traheme's terms, Enjoying Felicity? The practical
aspects of Bacon's knowledge, the lower forms on the pyramid,
advance towards and are included in the ultimate realisation of
the "cone and vertical point". Bacon commends "Metaphysic" but
questions whether man should advance further. Traheme, quoting
The Divine Pymander, might reply, "If . . . thou wilt not equal
thyself to GOD, thou canst not understand GOD . . . [but! . . .
234
If thou believe in thy self that nothing is impossible, but
accountest thyself Immortal, and that thou canst understand all
things, every Art, every Science, and the manner and custom of
every living thing . . . [then*] . . . thou maist understand GOD"
(CE 226-2?). Bacon thought it wise to avoid such confidence and,
by resisting any temptation to advance to "the cone and vertical
point" of his pyramid, shunned the further reaches of metaphysics
and won for his work a long unassailable reputation for objective
scientific thought. Traherne made the further ascent and won for
his writing a seemingly inescapable reputation for perverse
mysticism. There remains the possibility, however, that, Bacon's
objectivity suspected as an illusion and his "non-rational
vision" perceived, Traherne's celebration of "man's unlimited
capacity to dominate the universe" may be seen to have as basis
a knowledge and experience no less deep than that required by
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The first complete paragraph in the extant manuscript of the
Select Meditations focusses a common emphasis of this writing as a
whole. The thought of the Centuries of Meditations and Christian
Ethicks is adequately prefigured in the celebration of man as
"Lord and Heir of the world", a man "redeemed, exalted & in
communion" (SM 1.82), but there is another theme closely involved
with this, manifest immediately in terms of a prayer: "Save this
nation . . . Let me 0 Lord rejoyce in the felicity of thy chosen"
(SM 1.82). The Felicity of the Select Meditations, more explicitly
than that of the later writings, has a public as well as a private
significance. As an ideal it represents, as did Plato's ideal, the
moral ambition of both individual and state. Both are closely
inter-involved and even identical.
The affirmation that God desires peace in his kingdom (SM 1.88)
does more than connect with the exhortation to follow "the Gentle
Ways of Peace and Lov" (C 1.4) in the Centuries. By 1669, when the
Centuries were to be written, experience of exactly the opposite
of "Peace and Lov" was too great to allow anything but a deliberate
reaction against a more explicit public concern: national peace and
love are by then recognised as difficult, so difficult as to make
a public plea irrelevant. The Select Meditations, written most
probably before the Dutch Wars and before the aggressive
individualism of the Restoration years had become too obviously
manifest, could confront the national problem more directly. Peace
and love could represent a genuine national hope as well as an
individual one: war and conflict — the self-divisive national
conflict of Civil War — were in the past, and might with the
restoration of the monarchy become no more than history in a
genuine movement towards what Cowley, for example, saw as a
peaceful and paradisal national union:
'Twas a right Season, and the very Ground
Ought with a face of Paradise to be found,
Then when we were to entertain
Felicity and Innocence again.^
The immediacy of the Restoration, as the possible conclusion of a
cycle of events that worked against a desire for mutual peace and
love, must be remembered, as also should the recognition of the
return of a king as a historical and religious apotheosis of
universal import. Evelyn focussed this in his diary, a conscious
chronicle of an occasion in the destiny of a nation: "it was the
Lord's doing, for such a restauration was never mention'd in any
history, antient or modern, since the returne of the Jews from
the Babylonish captivity; nor so joyfull a day and so bright
ever seene in this nation, this hapning when to expect or effect
2
it was past all human policy". August predictions were not to be
fulfilled, however, and the Centuries reflect a turning away from
the pursuit of the "felicity of thy chosen" as a nation to the
Felicity of the individual in a corrupt society: the plea that
God might "Save this nation" (SM 1.82) is recognised as hopeless
as "Magistrates and Christian Laws", Publick Courts" and "Solemn
Assemblies" (SM 1.86) yield little progress towards a true public
ideal.
It is the use of Felicity in this conext which assures its
credence as a public as well as a private good, the ideal of a
nation as well as an individual. Cowley, in his ode "Upon his
Majesty's Restoration and Return", imagines precisely that ground
that was to form the basis of Traherne's ambition: the conversion
not only of an individual but of a nation (not only as a mere
collection of individuals) to the serious entertainment of
"Felicity and Innocence", "the very ground" which "Ought" to be
and in Traherne's writing actually was recognised as having "a
face of paradise". Traherne had lived through the Civil Wars as
a child, probably in the once besieged city of Hereford; he had
been twelve years old when "King Charles the Martyr" (C 1.61) was
executed; and he had cast his "Ey of Reason" (C 1.25) upon the
events of the Interregnum. At the Restoration he, like Cowley,
Evelyn and others, foresaw the possibility of the achievement of
a national Felicity, for which he earnestly prayed. By 1669 or
after he could face only the problem of the individual in a
"Barbarous . . . Christian world" (C III.12)» and offer only a
personal Felicity with a distant hope of more universal fulfilment.
By then "it did not so much concern us what Objects were before us,
as with what Eys we beheld them" (C III.68).
Felicity has, if only, later, in an individual distillation,
a public as well as a private emphasis. It is a notion of ideal
and of general "good", of the Good in a Platonic sense. It is
compounded of this Platonic ideal and Aristotelian practice.
"Aristotle Describeth Felicity when he saith Felicity is the
Perfect Exercise of Perfect Virtu in a Perfect Life" (C III.68).
"Felicity is rightly defined, to be the Perfect fruition of a
Perfect Soul, acting in perfect Life by Perfect Virtue" (CE 19).
Seeking an ideal Felicity, complete contentment in fulfilled
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happiness, a perfect soul pursues perfect virtue actively, by
exercising and bringing it to "fruition" in a perfect life, a
life to which there is a social and national as well as an
individual aspect.
The concern for the national aspect of this Good continues:
"0 let thy Glory Abide among us, Thy praises in our Assemblies,
let Thy Citties prosper, and villages flourish, our children
Grow up in fear of thy Name . . . Soften our Kings Heart, Teach
our Senators Wisdom . . . giv our young Men and Maydins knowledg"
(SM 1.82). The national concern is interwoven with more individual
concerns — for personal morality, of "Kings" and "Senators" as of
all men, and for "knowledg" among "young Men and Maydins". So too
the nation, like the individual, should strive to achieve communion
with God (SM 1.87) while personal ambition for understanding
is bound up with religious and national themes: "0 make me
comprehensive of all thy Gloryes. and Let me See External
Governments and the Beauty of Temples, in a land consecrated by her
Laws unto Thee" (SM 1.8?). Traherne supports the Church of England
as re-established by the "Clarendon Code" of the early 1660's less
as an ideal Church than as an adequate focus for a much needed unity
of religious attitude and practice: he exclaims against "the
wickedness of Ignorant zealots! who contemn thy Mercies and Despise
the union the Beatiful union of thy National Church!" (SM I.85). It
is the "union", unity, wholeness, oneness, peace in communion, that
is stressed (as again in SM III.25). Behind this may be the memory
of the Civil Wars, of civil disorder and public strife since: if
Charles and the re-established Church are not ideal they at least
offer the possibility of peace and union, which may in turn offer
the foundation for the ultimate communion, for the achievement
of Felicity in all senses. Later, Traherne asserted that he would
"not by the Nois of Bloody Wars, and the Dethroning of Kings,
advance you to Glory" (C 1.4). The Select Meditations contain a
more powerful recognition of the destructive nature of recent
history as apparent to one concerned with the peaceful achievement
of "Glory" which, he says, can be extended to the nation as to the
individual:
Thy Holy Gitties are a Wilderness, Zion a
wilderness, Jerusalem a Desolation our Holy
and our Beautiful house where our fathers
praised Thee is burnt up with fire and all
our pleasant Things are layd wast ... 0
profane not the Throne of thy Glory, let not
the Heathen Trample it under foot. Much less
let Christians Defile it with their Bloud!
(SM 1.85).
The plea for peace and unity does not, however, account for
Traherne's somewhat apocalyptic view of recent history. Rather than
condemning the Civil Wars in religious terms he may be insisting on
the danger of sectarianism of any form to a Platonic religious
ideal: "His voyce Daylie Sounds in the Temple, His preachers cry
a-loud but non regard it. They call us to Repentance for all
Abominations . . . they call us again to the Knowledge of God but
He hath brought up children and they have Rebelled against Him"
(SM 1.84). Ultimately, the explanation for Traherne's view of the
"Desolation" of his country (SM 1.85) must be sought other than in
purely political and/or religious terms. The explicit national
concerns are generalised into the more abstract philosophical
terms typical of Traherne's later writing. These terms have
absorbed and may therefore always contain the more historical
viewpoint, the public concern: in all three major prose works
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Traherae propounds an ethic of all human behaviour. Here,
however, "Thick Darkness covereth the Nations, & Gross
Darkness the people, which is cheifly contracted by their
Inventing and following other Treasures" (SM II.11). Observing
the "power of prevayling Customs" (SM II.13), "They will . . .
not feel the Nature joy and Glory of ^God's^] Image in them
Selves" (SM 1.84). The "Customs and maners of Men" (C III.7),
their common behaviour in the false but ever present life of the
world, are already recognised as a threat to the true "Heir of
the World" and to the pursuit of Felicity.
The idea of man as the image of God is common to the Select
Meditations as to all Traherne's writing. Already formulated, too,
is the notion that man's naturally pure and innocent inheritance
as the image of his creator is lost and obscured by the perverse
and consistent pursuit of false ends. Men persistently create
false treasures, Traherne insists (SM III.12), and it is this
tendency that civil war evinces on a national, even apocalyptic,
scale. Alienated from his true inheritance by the pursuit of
false treasures man has no conception of the intuitive grasp of
the ideal experienced by all children — as a child, Traherne
says, all things were glorious because he "had not learned to
appropriat any thing other way" (SM III.29) — or the doctrine
of Felicity perceived through the "Highest Reason" (C III.2) by
means of which Traherne seeks to retrieve and enhance this;
"the modestie of Man is an Injurious counterfeit, not modestie,
but Ignorance, Ingratitude and Thraldom for such is that that is
afrayd to acknowledge the Benefits of God; and unwilling to
perveiv the Good" (SM III.67). The apprehensions enjoyed by the
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intuition of the child can be sought again, and improved upon,
by the "Highest Reason", so that "Ignorance" is a real hindrance
to this process, situated as it is within man's "understanding",
the area of his activity and experience in which the
consciousness of Felicity can, if rightly sought, be most fully
achieved. Thus "The Reason why man is a feeble worm is because
He despiseth His understanding, and lives only by His fleshly
Body, would He live by his understanding He should soone perceiv
Himselfe an infinite creature" (SM 11.27). The rejection of his
"understanding", the overwhelming of it in false desires for
false treasures, is representative of man's withdrawal from the
world of ideal values in which Felicity ("the Good", SM II.67)
and communion can be achieved. Mankind is more worthy of love than
heaven and earth, but the actual behaviour of men makes this
difficult for they damage and effectively repudiate any doctrine
of the pursuit of Felicity by the "Highest Reason" "by withdrawing
their love from [God^ and me, and by Swerving from His Image"
(SM II.9). Thus
It is impossible at once to be present with Men
and Thee my God . . .for they are so far Like
Runnagates run from thee . . . The Heavens and
the Earth are Annihilated in their
understandings, thy laws forgotten, and thy
wayes unknown ... if they will not come to me,
0 let me not goe back again to them, but weep
in my secret places; and pray for them.
(SM 11.100).
In renouncing the world (as he does again in SM IV.14) Traherne
renounces only that false world of men, which is known only in
"Ignorance, Ingratitude and Thraldom" (SM II.67) and not in true
"understanding" as this shows man to be "an infinite creature"
(SM 11.27) and the image of God. In turning to the values sought
and known by understanding Traherne realises his own inadequacy,
for he too is subject to the pursuit of false treasures engaged
in by men. He prays that this may be made good: "I have deserved
to be vile in mine own eyes, And I abhor my selfe in Dust and
Ashes ... 0 manifest thy Selfe, and Dwell within me!" (SM 11.3^).
Traherne's affirmation in the Select Meditations of the
purity of the childhood vision of the world as described also in
the Centuries has been quoted here (SM III.29 etc.; see C III.l ff.)
Traherne says that he himself experienced the obscuring of this
childhood vision. Life in the world and education are here held
to be responsible for this. In SM III.30 he says that his education
brought false apprehensions and that, being brought up in the city,
he only learned "truth" in the country. In his "close Retirements"
he was "some years as if no Body", but on returning, when he "came
among men", he "found them to be superadded Treasures" (SM III.69).
His attitude to his education at Oxford is ambivalent, as in the
Centuries where he says he learned "Glorious Secrets" (C III.36)
but found no-one "that did professly Teach Felicity" (C III.37).
In the Select Meditations he complains that he came "from the
scholes, haveing there heard them dispute De ente De forma materiali
D[e[ Quid-ditate, and such like Drie and Empty Theames" (SM III.30).
He later affirms, however, that "I have been nourished at
universities in Beautiful Streets & famous colledges . . . [and"]
... am sent thither from God Almighty the maker of Heaven and
Earth, to teach Immortal Souls the way to Heaven" (SM III.83). The
fact that Traherne was at Oxford during a notable controversy
between scholastic dogma and the "new philosophy" might account,
in part at least, for this ambivalence. His intention to teach,
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fundamental in all his prose writing, is here most clearly seen
as part of a conscious autobiography.
Certain forms of education, then, and experience of the world
of men, as opposed to that of God, tends to bring about the
obscuring and loss of the child's special vision. If this can
be recaptured and enhanced by the "Highest Reason", though, the
world of nature can be appreciated anew. Without this effort of
the "Highest Reason", there is only "Spiritual Idleness", "an
Alienation of the mind from its proper objects" (SM 11.78). This
is part of man's dual nature, the narrow and confined aspect of
which is seen in his alienated life in the false world he himself
makes: "There is in man a Double selfe, according as He is in God,
or the world. In the world he is confined, and walketh up and Down
in Little Rooms: but in God He is evry where" (SM 11.92). Ken need
to realise their Capacity in the real world, that of God and
nature, "In his Similitude" (SM 111.58). Then they will see
themselves as "Heirs of the world" (SM 111.58), of the real world,
the world truly apprehended and known as pure, unalienated treasure.
"In the world", then, man "is confined, and walketh up and
Down in Little Rooms" (SM 11.92); but in reality his soul is "An
extensiv and Immaterial Being which is Like an Indivisible Atom
without Bulk, All eye and sight" and "is therefore every where,
because its sight is so, which it selfe is" (SM 11.92). Traherne
asserts here the need to transcend physical limitations and to
exist in "spirit" through all eternity and infinity with and for
God. Later he discusses the practice of "meditating" as part of
"The Activity of my Soul" (SM III.72): "we speak not here of
outward power, but Inward" (SM III.77)- Although "all the Reality
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of Happiness and woe consists in the Inward and Spiritual Estate,
of the Soul with God" (SM 1.88) the poem inserted in SM I.90 asks
"Can He be Quiet that Doth all Enjoy?". The "Inward and Spiritual
Estate" and the knowledge and comprehension belonging to it moves
constantly towards the exercise of "outward power" (SM 1.88; III.77)
which has its issue in the most vigorous passages of Traherne's
writing, celebrating, for example, "man's Dominion over the world"
(SM III.IO). That this "Dominion" is conceived finally in a
"Spiritual" sense retains the connection with the "Inward" power
but does not hinder the energetic intellectual pursuit of knowledge
and experience which overflows continually throughout the writing.
"Man is made to appear in Glory, as well as to inherit all Treasure.
And therefore is Endued with Liberty of Will as Well as comprehension.
He is Glorious in Abilitie in respect of Life power and Intelligence"
(SM 11.32). God provides for "man's Dominion over the world"
(SM III.10) by making him "Lord and Heir of the world" (SM 1.82),
"The Sole possessor of all his Treasures" (SM IV.43). The physical
world and its "Treasures" can be allied with the "Spiritual Estate"
and its "Treasures" as part of the "Glory" of man's "Liberty of will
as Well as comprehension" (SM II.32): man "is the Inclusive Head of
all Spirituall and Material perfection" (SM III.9) and he is vital
to God and His creation. God created "infinit varieties and kinds
of things" "for his Image to Enjoy" (SM III.9) and it is for man
to Enjoy them in the fullest sense, to know and appreciate them:
"he that is a Thanksgiver and Lord over them is meet for God and
can return unto Him" (SM III.9). "Had there been noe creatures made
that could need the sun, the sun could never have been made a
Treasure" (SM III.9). Only man makes physical objects into
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"Treasures" and gives them real significance; only through his
mind and activity as he seeks to Enjoy the objects of creation
do these objects achieve God's full intention in creating them.
"Angels can Adore Giv Thanks and lov yet without the Interposure
and mediation of man cannot enjoy this Adspectable world" (SM III.9).
The "Adspectable world" is that available as a physical entity to
man, the only link in creation between material and spiritual
things, for him to reflect upon and Enjoy, returning it to God,
from whom it originates, in his "Thanksgivings". As "the Inclusive
Head of all Spiritual and Material Perfection" (SM III.9) man's
commitments to "Inward" and "outward" power are co-extensive,
although, finally, the "Inward and Spiritual Estate" may be said
to determine the activity of the "outward power".
In this combined exercise man Enjoys his "Dominion over the
world" (SM III.10) and it is through this that he can realise his
dual Felicity as both heir of the world and image of God. That God
made man "Lord and Heir of the world" is clearly asserted, but,
ultimately, man approaches God and his own God-likeness itself
through his "Dominion". It is as the image of God that man can see
that he is able to become "comprehensiv of all [God'sH Gloryes"
(SM 1.8?). Man "is Himselfe a God to God" (SM 11.26) and "Being
restored to glory . . . may again live in the Similitude of God"
(SM II.7).
The theology of these ideas is worked out by Traheme. God,
he says, can do nothing greater than to make his own image. In
creating man he has done just this (SM III.91)• God and man are
linked, mutually involved, by their mutual love (SM IV.?), and
God exists for man as an ideal whose perfection he strives,
Platonically, to achieve: "0 that we could live the life of God"
(SM IV.36). But this perfection is not as distant as conventional
theologies might require, for, in asserting that men are the
"Sons" and "Heirs" of God (SM IV.4), made in all respects in the
"Divine Image" (SM IV.4), Traherne does not hesitate to assert
that they have, potentially and literally, all the attributes of
God (SM IV.6). "He Deifieth us in making us the End of all his
Doing", he says (SM IV.7): God "Intended that thou shouldst Live
Like a God" (SM 111.15) so, Traherne urges, "be as God Himselfe
who enjoyeth by Seeing and by Loveing" (SM III.43). This applies
only to the man seeing and understanding, Enjoying, the world
"aright", the man capable of adjusting his apprehensions in
accordance with the Platonic image of God and of living the life
that the pursuit of this ideal requires him to live. The promise
of the state of God-likeness is held out as a motive for the
reformation of life and apprehensions necessary to the
Platonically conceived ascent to deification. It is in this way
that Felicity becomes a term not only for the fulfilment of
Platonic aspiration but a notion affecting moral life and every
aspect of human activity and the way in which this is viewed.
The "Estate" granted to man by God necessarily requires for its
true realisation, a thorough moral effort on the part of man.
Such is God's love, however, that this effort is itself, ideally,
the Enjoyment of Felicity. This is no light undertaking, in
Traherne's view, for it is conceived as a means of organising
the whole of man's life; but it does indicate the extent of
God's generosity to man, who has no excuse for failure or
unhappiness. His happiness and his ultimate "complacency" (SM II.51)
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in God and as God, the achieved Enjoyment of Felicity, is his
own responsibility.
Initially, therefore, the pursuit of Felicity is
motivated by the love of man for God, itself a return of God's
love for man. Man's mind must be prepared, adjusted "aright", for
the true Enjoyment of the world that will lead to this
achievement of Felicity. So Traherne prays that God will "Give
[him] those Sences, Thoughts and Apprehensions" (SM III.IOO) that
he most needs: "fill me with a Divine and Holy Sence, That I may
be made possessor of thy Heavenly Treasures, Give me Gontinuall
and Repeated Meditations, Livly Praises and Powerfull
Thanksgivings every day" (SM III.IOO). The subject desires to
become the "possessor of [God's] Heavenly Treasures": even here
the heir of the world demands the appropriation of the whole of
creation. His "Meditations" on and "Thanksgivings" for this are
an enhancement of God's glory, for it is God who gives the objects
of creation and, more importantly, a creature so wonderful as man
to Enjoy them:
0 what incredible Things hast thou don for Men!
Made every Soul almost a God, Like God unto
Thee. For thou art in us as we in Thee, every
Soul is an Infinit Centre A Temple of Heaven
and Eaxth . . . Each one . . . more Beloved
then if Himselfe Were made a Dietie.
(SM 1.83).
The argument for man as a proof God's greatness is developed and
the greatness of man celebrated to such an extent that it becomes
difficult to overlay this with more conventional ideas of the
omnipotent Godhead. "A creature" such as man "that can enjoy
Infinite Blessedness has unlimited comprehension for all Eternity:
and very clear and distinctive powers to penetrate the Bowels of
every centre" (SM 11.26): "in every poynt", "Ke findeth a Diety"
but "is Himselfe a God to God" (SM 11.26). God "made the Soul
Empty, as if there were noe Infinity within us, no . . . world,
no God, no Being" but if he will "meditate upon it" man's soul
will "have a Power to Creat these Things and Seat them in
itSelfe. as God did by Thinking creat all in Himselfe" (SM IV.13).
Man has not only "unlimited comprehensions" (SM 11.26) but
"a Power to Creat . . . Things" (SM IV.13) by the activity of his
mind. Traherne is very nearly an idealist. "Thoughts constitut the
cream of all Things, the very flower prime, and Top of Beings
. . . without them all the world would be a Dead and Desert
wilderness" (SM IV.13). "The World" and the objects in it do have
real physical existence, however: "The world is a thing of infinit
value as it Proceeds from [God^" (SM IV.13). The importance of
"Thoughts" is that through them the world is realised and
apprehended as the creation of God. "The world is a thing of
infinit value as it Proceeds from Him. but in returning to Him
can be of none but by our Thoughts" (SM IV.12). God created the
world which, although it has a definite physical existence, is
"Dead" or "Empty". Man learns to appreciate the world, to Enjoy
it through knowledge and experience of it, and thus, in his
thoughts, return it to God through praise and thanksgiving. The
world must be "received by our Thoughts and Exprest within" for
it is not "at all Profitable, till it is so understood, as to
be enjoy'd, and to be come the Ground of infinit Thanksgivings"
(SM IV.12). It is thus that, in respect of the objects of creation,
God "hath given them to us by giving us a power, to produce Things
into Being" (SM IV.14) and thus, quite simply, that "material"
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things, being known and Enjoyed aright, have "spiritual"
meanings and are returned to God enhanced by the understanding
and realisation, the "making real" or "making meaningful", of
man's Enjoyment.
Man, a physical and spiritual being, is released upon the
physical universe and, with his "unlimited comprehensions",
given liberty to exercise his Capacity to the full:
I can comprehend in my understanding the
Magnitude of a Room, the wideness of the
Hemisphere, and Spaces Extant a bove the
Stars ... my Soul exceedeth all Limitations.
It is so Like God Almighty, that it
comprehendeth the Heavens ... I can plainly
see infinit Space, and am a creature Able to
Enjoy Infinity.
(SM IV.3).
Finally, however, the idea of God within the otherwise
apparently anthropocentric universe cannot be escaped: "in
evry point of Space God wholy is, and wholy is there by me to
be Enjoyed" (SM IV.3). Even God, though, is "by me to be Enjoyed",
so complementary is the mutual relationship between God and man.
This, like the insistence on eternity and infinity, hints at
Traherne's conception of the "Oneness" of all existence, in
which it remains significant that, while man is realised in his
writing as a physical as well as a spiritual being avidly
Enjoying the "Adspectable world", God remains merely an idea.
The mutual relationship of "God" and "Man" involves, on
man's part certainly, more than a sense of "spiritual communion".
The Felicity that must be achieved by the man seeking "complacency"
in God-likeness has been shown to be a doctrine of the Good in a
Platonic sense, but one also closely involved with an
Aristotelian sense of "perfect Life". Man's relationship with
his God can be charted through a realisation of "perfect Life"
that shows the nature of the endowments that he, as heir of the
world and image of God, has received from his creator. "The
best of all possible lives is that wherein the best of all
possible things are after the Similitude of God enjoyed" (SM II.2).
"The best of all possible things" are "God, His essence, Attributes,
works, counseils, Laws . . . And whatsoever else is included in
these" (SM II.3), so, in "perfect Life", it is to Enjoyment of these
that man must apply himself. The "Similitude of God" is "the best of
all possible manners" in which Enjoyment can be undertaken. Among
"whatsoever else" should be included — as well as God's "essence,
Attributes, works, counseils, laws" — the physical world
as God's creation. So man's activity in the pursuit of true
Enjoyment becomes practical as well as contemplative: "the world is
an Hous wherein I am placed in communion with God so to enjoy" all
of his works (SM II.3). This is the outline of a major area for
the pursuit of Felicity, for "By studying felicity we are brought
to the Delineation of God's kingdom" (SM III.53)•
A list of objects of Enjoyment is offered in SM 11.82. These
include villages and cities, "assemblies", and the sky. Here,
specifically, the doctrines later pronounced in Christian Ethicks
and the Centuries carry a sense of real human community and a
genuine public emphasis: these definitely form part of a real and
practical "perfect Life". Here also man should strive to "enjoy all
things", all the infinite "Treasures of God", "And God wholy in
every thing to be enjoyed" (SM 11.29). The whole world, the whole
universe, is "a Temple Worthy of God", and in examining the
furnishings of this "Temple" man, or at least "an Excellent Man",
"feasteth always on the Sight of the Dietie" (SM 111.13). It is
through the objects of God's creation that man can most readily
understand and approach his idea of God, for they all bear witness
to the ideal nature. It is a common emphasis, found also for
example in Bacon, that there could be said to be a gospel of God's
work as well as of his word. Traherne follows this doctrine in
his reiteration of the whole created universe as a "Temple" of
God. "Wise and Holy must man be to all the Creatures in Heaven
and Earth" (SM 1.92), for the creatures, all created things,
carry in them some aspect of God which is holy in itself but,
more importantly, can be used by man as part of his effort to
understand God. Man must make positive and active use of all these
things. This is done by means of his "Power to Creat . . . Things",
not from nothing but in their "true" aspects. In studying God's
creatures in his "Temple", the world, man must use this power and
remember that "The world is a thing of infinit value as it Proceeds
from [^God]]. but in returning to Him can be of none but by our
Thoughts" (SM IV.12). Man's thoughts become of almost equal
importance with the original fiat that ordered the creation of
the world:
as God by a perpetual Influx of Beuty and power
upholdeth the world: in which respect every
moments consirvation is fittly stil'd a new
creation: so will he have us by a perpetual
Influx and Activity of thought to maintain all
Things and in our selves to uphold our
Treasures.
(SM III.5).
Man is therefore important to God, and creation is only sustained
by the mutual activity of both, man enhancing its objects before
he "returns" them to God. "The world is in Him upheld by him, the
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world in us is upheld by us" (SM III.5). This thought overlays
the Enjoyment of the physical world in a physical sense. "All
Things are Treasures" (SM III.3) and "God is enjoyed" "in evry
thing" (SM III.8), but over and around the material Enjoyment of
things there is an immaterial but equally active Enjoyment of
things that involves mental appreciation, realisation, in order
that man may offer things to God enhanced by his own reflection
on and of them. This in turn leads to a "spiritual" aspect, as
"reflections" become "meditations" which "Transport Qthe"! soul
and make it even to Dwell in Heaven" (SM 11.82). These
"meditations" require that a man should "Awaken . . . C^is]]
Thoughts, and strongly apply them to see the Glory of Gods
Kingdom, the pleasing Excellencyes of his works and ways"
(SM 11.82). It is to "Gods Kingdom" that man must direct his
"Thoughts", acknowledging and appreciating the "pleasing
Excellencyes of his works and ways". By his mental elaboration
and enhancement, his complete Enjoyment, of the objects of
creation, man achieves the "meditations" which "Transport [hisl
soul and make it even to Dwell in Heaven". These "meditations"
refer specifically to his "Thoughts" and the objects to which
they are directed: the mental "transport" comes from the avid
elaboration of those "Thoughts" exercised almost violently upon
the objects of God's creation. He must "Awaken" those "Thoughts":
"meditation" is an awakening to full awareness of the ever-present
physical world, not a withdrawal from it. The world can be
transcended in the act of knowing it, knowing it thoroughly. It
is thus that man, the spiritual and physical link between God and
his creation, Enjoys the physical world as a means to his complete
253
Felicity, finding in physical objects a spiritual clue to and
confirmation of his own spiritual potential.
It is thus that, his body remaining in the world, man's
thoughts may be said to leave it. This is achieved by a "true"
understanding of the things of the world, and a sense that
"Heaven and earth is full of the Majesty of [God'si Glory"
(SM III.4) and not by purely spiritual or abstract meditation.
Traherne's contemplation begins in the physical world and includes
or involves a physical sense and starting point for the elaborate
Enjoyment that develops from this. The physical world and man in
his Capacity contain in embryo the full potential of all
"spiritual" realisations: the spiritual life represents the
dynamic and kaleidoscopic interaction and connection of Capacity
and potential released in man's contact with the objects of God's
creation, an elaboration of the "physical" means for "spiritual"
ends.
Man must also retain a full realisation of his own Capacity and
its powers and implications. He must know of "The marvellous use and
Excellency of his comprehension" (SM III.59) and "enjoy Himselfe"
(SM III.24), realising and appreciating his Capacity so as to
"Infinitly Delight in Himself" (SM III.25). He must know that "it
is impossible that a Creature more Glorious then Himselfe could be
made" (SM 11.24) for his achievement of Felicity cannot become real
until this is appreciated. There is a state of "complacency"
(SM 11.24), a satisfaction in the knowledge of his own powers, that
man must achieve before he embarks on the Enjoyment of the world.
In Felicity itself he will ultimately achieve a higher "complacency",
a complete satisfaction, in communion and God-likeness.
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This constant recurrence of consideration of man's own Capacity
and powers is one index of the weight that Traherne attaches to
these. In terms of his writing any probing of his attitude to the
physical world as God's "Temple" returns to man, the inheritor of
the creation and image of its maker. For it is in man's mind that
things have real meaning or value: the power that God gives man
"to produce Things into Being" is reflected in man's experience
of Enjoyment in his pursuit of Felicity in that it determines the
perception of objects as the creations of God and thus releases
the Capacity of man into the activity of Enjoyment. This is only
one possibility. Man's Capacity can be misused and misapplied, as
in the obscuring of the child's natural intuition in experience
of the false world. In the true exercise of human power, in the
pursuit of Enjoyment as the means to Felicity, man enters a new
and valuable world. "By studying felicity we are brought to the
Delineation of God's kingdom ... I was brought it seems to the
House of wisdom where all Things appear with a new face" (SM III.53)•
How "Things appear" is determined by the way in which man exerts his
"power to produce Things into Being". This power is not that of
idealism, but rather a means of active perception by which all
things are placed in a particular perceptive context: it is a
certain way of seeing or thinking about actual things rather than
any more fundamental creative act. For Traherne things exist
materially (as "Dead things") without human perception or
reflection, but their real, true existence (as living images of
God) is only realised or produced by man by means of this power.
Correspondingly, there may be a dull, "Dead", human means of
perception that sees but does not enhance physical objects.
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"Bare knowledge gives no man a Title to Heavenly Joys: It is
the Light onely in which they are Enjoyed" (SM IV.22). Here
"the Light", the true, partially creative perceptive act, must
be distinguished from "Bare knowledge" although this can be
valuable within its limitations. The "Light" as the "true" aspect
of perception is inevitably associated with God. "Bare knowledge"
is the mechanical exercise of material minds.
Traherne uses several models for his notion of perception.
Among the most clearly explained and explainable is one derived
from Plato. This is explored in terms of Plato's list of the
necessities to vision: "An Ey rightly Disposed, an object seated
at a convenient Distance . . . [andl . . . Light" (SM III.16).
What applies to vision is applied also, by Traherne, to
understanding, the result of perception: perception is always,
for Traherne, much more than the mere "seeing" of objects. "A
faculty of Knowledg ... an Intelligible object . . . £and[] an
Intelligible light" (SM III.16) are therefore necessary to
"perfect understanding" (SM III.16). Clearly the "object" and
the "faculty" are given, in creation and in man; God, comparable to
light in all senses, is the "light" ("without the knowledge of god
we can see nothing", SM III.16) whereby "perfect understanding" can
be achieved:
Nothing can truly be Apprehended but it must be
Apprehended as Treasure and Interest. Because
every thing to God and his Image is soe . . .
all the things in Heaven and Earth are Infinit
Treasures: And axe never Enjoyed but when truly
seen: nor ever indeed truly seen, but by a wise
man they are truly enjoyd.
(SM III.6).
God, and man his image, have pure and true apprehensions, seeing
256
things as "Treasures" by perceiving a form of Platonic value in
them. The Enjoyment of this value is essential to man's Felicity
and. to his Platonic ascent to God-likeness. The "Intelligible
light", however, the key to perfect understanding, may not be the
means by which man's perceptive power is exercised. If it is not,
things will not be seen as "Treasures": "To some the world is a
kingdom, to Others a Dungeon a wilderness a prison. Because some
have pure and bright Apprehensions, others rude vulgar and
Deformed" (SM III.6). The "rude" apprehensions axe comparable to
the "Ignorance" which makes man "unwilling to perceiv the Good"
(SM II.67). The world and its objects are neither inherently good
nor inherently bad: they are simply "Dead things" with a potential
for the Good. As material but spiritually dead things they await
the coming of man, the link between spiritual and material things,
to "contemplate" them and return them to God by thanksgiving as
objects enhanced by his own Capacity and realised in their own
capacity for the Good. The relationship of all things is, ideally,
one of mutual benefit, for it is in this system of spiritual
enhancement of material things that man achieves his Felicity and
God-likeness and that God himself benefits in the praises offered
to him. The spiritual enhancement of things is man's Enjoyment,
and he should never cease to express his wonder "That God should
give us soe Divine a power! To Transfigure all Things, and be
Delighted!" (SM II.71). The "Things" that he must "Transfigure"
are not in themselves to be despised but known for their own
"Treasure" and usefulness in the utilitarian emphasis that
underlies the spiritual transcendence: man must learn about "the
fabrick of the world" and the "uses of . . . creatures" (SM 11.88),
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for "The Terrestrial Services of Heaven and Earth [[arel Exceeding
Great, as they serve our Bodies" (SM 11.87). These indeed are
the material bases of the spiritual transcendence, which does not
displace or deny them but surpasses them in the special process of
knowing that leads to Felicity: all things and all aspects of all
things can be held within this. The material and spiritual man,
with his infinite Capacity, is presented with an infinite variety
of objects to Enjoy. Enjoyed rightly they will lead him to Felicity
and God-likeness. His problem is the avoidance of "false
Apprehensions". He must "know all Things" and "prize" them (SM IV.56)
in the most complete sense:
Wisdom is the Light in which Happiness is
Enjoyed ... It is the very Possession of
felicity . . . Happy are they that are not
troubled with the false Apprehension of
Things ... to know all Things and not to
prize them is the Greatest folly in the whole
world, to . . . enjoy them all is the Highest
wisdom, wisdom includes knowledg, and the
Improvement of it.
(SM IV.56).
Felicity contains "Happiness" in many senses, but also, particularly
and vitally, "Wisdom", "knowledg, and the Improvement of it". The
means to this realisation of "Wisdom", "Happiness" and improved
knowledge is the "prizing" and Enjoyment of "All Things" in the
"Adspectable world". "The Articles of our faith are the objects
of Enjoyment proposed to Speculation" (SM III.58).
The Enjoyment of the "Adspectable world" in the context of
man's pursuit of Felicity is also associated with the love of God
and man and their whole mutual relationship. There is a
"Hypostatical union" between God and man (SM 11.92), connected
with the idea of man as an image of God and as the material and
spiritual link between God and his creation. It is in the idea
of "Lov" that all things, including man and God, cohere and
approach an ideal "Oneness". The "Lov" of the "Hypostatical union"
involves man not only as image of God and the only truly material
and spiritual being but also causes God to make man heir of the
world. The physical world, the work of God, is the clue to God's
"Lov", for "we are all now to live in friendship with God,
Admiring at the Riches which He hath Given: but most at the Lov,
whose Greatness . . . [isl . . . seen in the Vastness of His
works" (SM 11.88). Creation, then, remains of central importance
to man's conception of God, formed through speculation and meditation
on the things of the physical world. The utilitarian aspect of
"Heaven and Earth" is significant, but is "nothing in comparison of
the service they do us in Exhibiting [God's^ Lov" (SM II.8?). Man
is in a position of almost impossible endowment: the creation
exhibits God's love and it is through this love that the creation
itself is Enjoyed. "How much . . . doth it concerne us to know the
Nature of that without which nothing is Enjoyed" (SM 11.84).
Typically, a limitation (the creation is only Enjoyed by means a
specific concept of "Lov") becomes a benefit (the creation itself
is "Lov" and demonstrates the means by which it is Enjoyed). Further,
"Lov is the means by which God is enjoyed" (SM 11.87): the "Lov"
exhibited in creation and by God towards man is the means by which
man can Enjoy God. This inter-involvement hints at an ultimate
sense of the "Oneness" of all things. "Naked Lov is the cause of all
things, and naked Lov is the End of all Things" (SM 11.84).
"Oneness" is the end of all things and the beginning of all
things. "Lov" is its medium and the evidence for its ideal
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existence. "Oneness" is comparable to the ideal primal unity-
sought in all Plato's dialogues. For Traherne, man can Enjoy not
only the objects of creation but also God himself. This implies
that he can understand God and know Him completely, and that in
this knowledge he himself becomes as God, or becomes God himself.
This is the aim of the striving for the ideal as embodied in the
idea of God: "communion with God is the End of the creation"
(SM 11.87 —it is also the beginning of creation). "Oneness"
represents for man the attainment of this end, the final ability
to "rest with complacency in God" (SM II.51)# when man and God
and the whole creation will be inseparable and indistinguishable.
It is am undefined, and perhaps undefinable, absolute. It can be
recognised and known only in the writing as it presses towards
and upon the (comm)union of "Oneness": "All! all all the souls
in Heaven and earth shall Dwell in [Man]], and He in them, and




"An Empty Book is like an Infants Soul, in which any Thing
may be Written. It is Capable of all Things, but containeth
Nothing" (C I.l). Both empty book and infant's soul, in their
given emptiness, are yet capable of all things. They are images of
the infinite Capacity of the human mind or soul. In the experience
of a growing child there is an analogy for the development of the
writing undertaken by Traherne and, similarly, for the exercise of
all human Capacity. Any particular experience or inscription is
only one possible realisation of infinite potential. One of the
parables of the Centuries ("I will open my Mouth in Parables",
£ 1.3) will trace the growth of awareness from the intuition of
the "Infant Ey" (M 11.86-87) to the rational perception of the "Ey
of Reason" (£ I.25). The Centuries represent one particular
experience and inscription, one realisation of infinite Capacity.
The writing articulates aspects of the progress from emptiness to
fulfilment in one man and urges fulfilment upon the reader: "I
will teach ... by Experience" (C III.l). To read the Centuries
is to witness the filling of the book (literally, as it is written)
and the fulfilling of the individual soul, which grew from infancy
to reason and grows again in the writing/reading of the book. The
result is only one possible realisation of the potential of the
book and of the man, for both potentials are infinite. The reader
is confronted, in effect, with an empty book (it is empty for him,
until he begins to read) and the empty soul of the writer: both are
capable of all things and will be (ful)filled only in reading, as
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once they were (ful)filled in writing. The reader encounters in
the text at once a trace of the writer's own fulfilment, the
realisation of his "Soul", and an exhortation to realise his own,
the reader's, "Soul" in the same or similar manner. The writer and
his empty book are capabilities mutually exercised and (ful)filled.
The reader is invited to share in this and to fulfil his own
infinite Capacity: the realisation of the empty book, of the
infant soul in the writing, suggests and seeks to provide means to
the realisation of all the "infinit Space in our Understandings"
(C 11.82).
The opening words of the Centuries propose the filling and
fulfilling of both book and soul. The aim is to teach: there is
"some Great Thing" which must be communicated (C 1.2), there are
"Truths", "Profitable Wonders", "Enriching Truths" (C I.l) that
can lead to this dual fulfilment. The educative process is the
book's purpose, the writing's motive. Traherne sees his writing
as being composed of "Parables" from which the reader is urged
to learn (C I.3). He will "unfold" these "in ... a Plain maner"
(C 1.3) and "teach ... by Experience" (C Ill.i). The Centuries
may have been written for Susanna Hopton, but this does not
undermine the fundamental purpose: every reader approaches the
book "Empty . . . [butl . . . Capable of all Things" and will
similarly witness the plain unfolding of Traherne's parables, his
"Enriching Truths": he will learn "by Experience".
The methods of communication reveal something of the nature of
the "Truths" to be communicated. The writer chooses the "Ways of
Peace and Lov", the "Ways of Eas and Repos", to explicate notions
of "Contentment and Thanksgiving": "all Envy, Rapine, Bloodshed,
262
Complaint, and Malice shall be far removed" (C 1.4). This is a
deliberate turning aside from what is recognised as "the true
Estate of this World" (C IV.20), an "Estate" the problems of
which -will be explicitly dealt with when "Practical Happiness"
(C IV.1) is considered in the fourth of the Centuries. Here recent
events are specifically referred to: "the Nois of Bloody Wars, and
the Dethroning of Kings" (C 1.4), the Civil Wars and the death of
"King Charles the Martyr" (C I.6l). The immediate concern is not
yet with "Practical Happiness" in "the true Estate of this World"
but with more abstract "Enriching Truths" as these touch upon
attitudes to rather than experience within this world. From this
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the "Nois of Bloody Wars, and the De&broning of Kings" can be
temporarily excluded.
The "Great Thing" that the Centuries aim to communicate is
that every individual is an "Heir of the World" (C 1.3)- The
writing seeks to convince the reader that he is a "possessor of
the Whole World" (£1.3), a world made by God for him and for all
men and women equally. Through a true and thorough realisation of
this, man can achieve "A Communion with [God^ in all His Glory"
(C 1.5)• This "Communion" is offered as one aspect of the process
of fulfilment that the Centuries seek to inspire, but its
relation to more strictly theological notions of "Communion" is
distant. The "Contemplation of [God'si Lov in the Work of
Redemption" is indeed "Wonderful" (C I.5) but, ultimately,
secondary. This is contemplation of the means of redemption.
What is to be stressed here is "the End for which we are Redeemed"
(£ 1*5)• Later, the reader is assured that "the End is better then
the Means" (£ II.90), and the crucifixion will be considered as an
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example of God's love to man (C I.56 ff.) rather than as the
culminating act of "His Divine Wisdom" in His salvation of man
(C 1.5)J as means rather than end. It is precisely "His Divine
Wisdom", in fact, which must "be "made ours" (£ 1.5) in the progress
towards true "Communion"; and man may finally overgo even God's
own "Wisdom" by his insistent subservience of means to ends. Such
insistence in the face of the sacrifice offered by orthodoxy as
the ultimate end of God's "Wisdom" might imply an atheistic
arrogance. An uncertainty as to the absolute integrity of a God
entirely independent of man's concept of an ideal Godhead is
secretly present throughout Traherne's writing. More importantly,
however, God's "Wisdom" cannot be passively received by man: it is
"our Fruition of it" (£ I.5) which matters. The use of apparent
ends as merely means to man's own "Communion" and fulfilment must
be justified by a thorough and active realisation of their full
significance. If "nothing but Felicity is worthy of our Labor,
because all other things are the Means only which induced unto it"
(C III.56), the importance of a rigorous and extensive "Labor",
the active "Fruition" of man's potential, to the achievement of
an ultimate Felicity should be stressed. The passive gospel of
redemption will be transcended by the active gospel of Felicity,
striven for and won by the radical exercise of man's Capacity.
This "Labor" is represented by the process of Enjoyment
(C 1.25), the "Fruition" of God's "Divine Wisdom being made ours".
The process is more rigorous and serious than its name might
suggest. Enjoyment has its own morality —lay means of true
Enjoyment man will become "Holy . . . Divine . . . Righteous . . ,
[andl . . . Just" (C 1.12) — and involves both "thinking Well"
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(C 1.8) and a full appreciation and understanding of the "Whole
World" (C 1.6). The world is "made to be Enjoyed" (C 1.10) and
"in Enjoying the World . . . you accomplish the End of your
Creation" (C I.11). "All Things were made to be yours. And you
were made to Prize them according to their value: which is your
Office and Duty, the End for which you were Created, and the Means
whereby you Enjoy" (C 1.12). The conjunction of "thinking Well"
and a thorough understanding of the "Whole World" is fundamental
in Traherne's writing. The "Whole World" is in fact a misnomer,
as the notion of "thinking Well" should imply: before the process
of Enjoyment can begin much of the "Whole World" has been
deliberately excluded from the project. Essentially, "there are
two worlds" of which "One was made by God, the other by men"
(C 1.7). The "Whole World" of Enjoyment is that of God. That of
men has been excised, like "the Nois of Bloody Wars". That
excision does not imply a lack of awareness of the world of
men: later, this will seem only too keenly present. It is "a
Babel of Confusions: Invented Riches, Pomps and Vanities,
brought in by Sin" (£1.7). If the world made by God is "Great
and Beautifull. Before the Fall, it was Adams Joy, and the
Temple of his Glory" (C I.?) this paradise has only been
regained after an individual fall by an arduous task issuing from
immediate experience. "To Contemn the World, and to Enjoy the
World" (C 1.7) may appear to be the ambivalent privilege of an
over-articulate mystic, but this real duality has a meaning
defined in the written trace of actual experience.
The idea of the Centuries as "Parables" is important. There
is a limited value in regarding the Centuries as no more than
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unmediated autobiographical reflection. Their true impulse is
elsewhere. The account of aspects of Traherne's particular
experience of childhood in the early part of the third of the
Centuries need not be read too literally. In fact this account
may find a definite purpose within a larger scheme. "Abov all
things", Traheme "desired to see those Principles which a
Stranger in this World would covet to behold upon his first
appearance" (C IV. . The urge to "teach ... by Experience"
is fundamental. With the desire to see the world as a "Stranger"
might "upon his first appearance" the significance of the tabula
rasa proposed in the opening words is reaffirmed. "An Empty Book
. . . an Infants Soul", a "Stranger . . . upon his first
appearance" are similarly "capable of all Things". It is through
the example of experience within this infinite potential that the
"Parables" of "Enriching Truths", of benefit to all, are offered,
and the infinite potential itself affirmed and celebrated. Those
things "which a Stranger in this World would covet to behold" are
the works of God's world, the world experienced and spontaneously
Enjoyed by the "Infant Ey" and vital to the Enjoyment still
possible by the "Ey of Reason". This Enjoyment cannot be
understood, however, unless, by parables of experience, the
reasons for and nature of the rejection of man's world are
recognised.
Felicity will be achieved by Enjoyment of the world that
"Before the Fall . . . was Adams Joy". This world is still
available to man as a paradisal resource for his fulfilment. It
is the world as seen by the "Infant Ey", the "Stranger . . . upon
his first appearance": "Certainly Adam in Paradice had. not more
266
sweet and. Curious Apprehensions of the World, then I when I was
a child" (C III.l). Just as "thinking Well" must accompany a
full appreciation of the world in Enjoyment, so the world as
A~p f>r utfVo
perceived by the "Infant Ey" requires "Curious Apprenhonsions".
"Those Pure and Virgin Apprehensions I had from the Womb and that
Divine Light wherewith I was born, are the Best unto this Day,
wherin I can see the Universe" (C III.l). These "Apprehensions"
are recommended as the means to a thorough Enjoyment of the world.
"All appeared New, and Strange at the first, inexpressibly rare,
and Delightfull, and Beautiful ... My Knowledg was Divine . . .
I seemed as one Brought into the Estate of Innocence ... I was
Entertained like an Angel with the Works of GOD in their Splendor
and Glory" (C III.2). The "Infant Ey" was, intuitively, "Heir of
the World" and so, as the Centuries aim to show the reader himself
as "Heir of the World", something can be learned from the intuition
of the "Infant Ey". "He must be Born again and becom a little
Child that will enter into the Kingdom of Heaven . . . all our
Thoughts must be Infant-like and Clear" (C III.5). This, however,
is a simplification of both the experience that produced the
recognition and of its significance as a parable. A continuation
of the quotation makes this clear: "all our Thoughts must be
Infant-like and Clear: the Powers of our Soul free from the leven
of this World, and disentangled from mens conceits and customs
... we should be as very strangers to the Thoughts Customs and
Opinions of men in this world" (C III.5). The intuition of the
"Infant Ey", however, was admirable, but is now inadequate. "I
knew by Intuition those things which since my Apostasie, I
Collected again by the Highest Reason" (C III.2). It is "the
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Highest Reason" that is to be the basis of the "Apprehensions",
the "thinking Well", essential to Enjoyment. This was
developed only after a personal "Apostasie". It was this
"Apostasie" that produced the reaction against the world of men
and their "Riches of Invention" (C III.9) and the decision to
explore the world of God by Enjoyment of the "Riches of Nature"
(C III.9).
In his own "Apostasie" Traherne "was corrupted; and made to
learn the Dirty Devices of this World" (C III.3). "My Thoughts
. . . were blotted out"; "The first Light . . . was totally
ecclypsed" (C III.7). The intuitive perception of the "Infant
Ey" was destroyed as the riches of invention replaced those of
nature:
If you ask me how it was ecclypsed? Truly by
the Customs and maners of Men, which like
Contrary Winds blew it out: by an innumerable
company of other Objects, rude vulgar and
Worthless Things that like so many loads of
Earth and Dung did over whelm and Bury it: by
the Impetuous Torrent of Wrong Desires in all
others whom I saw or knew that carried me
away and alienated me from it.
(C III.7).
"Gold Silver Houses Clothes &c", the riches of invention, provide
no basis for true Enjoyment but are heaped upon the growing child,
burying his intuitive perception: "Barbarous Inventions spoyle
your knowledg. They put Grubs and Worms in Mens Heads: that are
Enemies to all Pure and True Apprehensions, and eat out all their
Happiness" (C 111.13). Before the process of real Enjoyment can
begin the principles of "the Highest Reason" must be adopted and
the effects of "Apostasie" resisted and overthrown. There is an
urgent need to "Conquer the Customs and Opinions of Men" (C IV.38).
Only then, when "our Thoughts must be Infant-like and Clear", can
the lessons of the former intuitive insight that produced
spontaneous Enjoyment be applied on the level of the highest
reason. Unless this process of rethinking is attempted Felicity
is impossible and Enjoyment meaningless, as it always is if
concerned only with the false riches of invention. The "outward
Bondage of Opinion and Custom" (C III.8) must be thrown off, the
riches of invention replaced by the riches of nature, or the
"absurdly Barbarous . . . Christian World" (C III.12) environs
the potential heir of the world in a parody of Enjoyment that
issues in no Felicity:
Being Swallowed up therfore in the Miserable
Gulph of idle talk and worthless vanities,
thenceforth I lived among Shadows, like a
Prodigal Son feeding upon Husks with Swine.
A Comfortless Wilderness full of Thorns the
World was, or wors: a Waste Place covered
with Idleness and Play, and Shops and
Markets and Taverns.
(C III.14).
It is the "Apostasie", characterised by the vain pursuit of
"Barbarous Inventions", "rude vulgar and Worthless Things" which
riddle men's minds with "Grubs and Worms . . . that . . . eat out
all their Happiness", that forms the starting point for the
course in Felicity that the Centuries propose. The intuition of
the child is offered as an example, a parable, to provide an
image of spontaneous natural apprehension — "Evry Man naturaly
seeing those Things to the Enjoyment of which He is Naturaly Bora
(C III.5) — but, in recovering from the alienation from his
natural inheritance brought about by his "Apostasie" man must
redirect this intuition and re-appropriate the riches of nature
on the principles of "the Highest Reason".
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The world, then, as it is "made by God" (C 1.7) is to be
Enjoyed on the principles of the highest reason. Equally, there
is a world, made by men, in which true Enjoyment and Felicity
become impossible, a "Miserable Gulph of Idle talk and vanities
. . . A Comfortless Wilderness". Reason will guide man to true
Enjoyment of the true world as the child was guided by intuition,
but he must be capable of "thinking Well". If "by Nature, nothing
0-po.Sl-ouyu
is so Difficult as to Think amiss" (C 1.8) the individual apostac^-
means that nature has been deserted: thinking amiss becomes the
custom and manner of men in their world. Just as the customs and
manners of men have eclipsed the intuitive natural perception of
the infant eye, so "an Evil Habit, and Custom hav made it
Difficult to think well" (C 1.8). The "Difficulty of thinking
well proceedeth from our selvs" (C 1.8) and, as the apostacy must
be overcome by pursuit of the highest reason in all things, so
must "thinking Well" be established as an attitude to the true
world. Thinking well about the true world of nature, man can
strive for Felicity by avid Enjoyment of God's creation. Thinking
ill, or following the riches of invention, he will be alienated
from his inheritance as heir of the world and consigned to the
comfortless wilderness of the false world. Enjoyment, however,
as it involves thinking well and the highest reason as guides to
Felicity, also involves a responsibility to mankind and to God.
Enjoyment includes a thorough understanding and appreciation of
the natural world and all natural things: "you were made to
Prize them according to their Value" (C 1.12), so Enjoyment is
a duty.
The natural world as it is available for man's Enjoyment
has two main aspects. Man must "conceiv the World in [hisl
Mind", including the sun, earth, air and sea, and contemplate
both its "Use and Value" and, in more abstract terms, its
"Wealth and Glory" (C 1.9). There is, in the need to appreciate
"Use and Value" a practical, utilitarian emphasis: "Is not [[the
air[] a marvellous Body to Breath in? To visit the Lungs: repair
the Spirits, revive the Senses: Cool the Blood" (C 1.21). Indeed
"The WORLD is unknown, till the Value and Glory of it is seen:
till the Beauty and Serviceableness of its Parts is Considered"
(C 1.18). An appreciation of "Value and . . . Serviceableness"
has a place in Enjoyment with that of "Glory . . . [[and! . . .
Beauty". Enjoyment, "Prizing", is a natural but not an easy
process. If "you know your self, or God, or the World, you must
of Necessity Enjoy it" (C 1.16); but this necessity depends on
knowledge of self, of God and of the world. Knowledge, in a
very thorough and elaborate sense, is vital to Enjoyment,
"Neither can any thing but Ignorance Destroy your Joys" (C 1.16)
True Enjoyment leads to a state of holiness, but "To be Holy is
so Zealously to Desire, so vastly to Esteem, and so Earnestly to
Endeavour it, that we would not for millions of Gold and Silver,
Decline, nor fail, nor Mistake in a Tittle" (C I.13). Holiness
itself implies resemblance to God, and by true Enjoyment,
neither declining, failing nor mistaking "in a Tittle", man will
indeed become literally God-like:
we Pleas God when we are most like Him. we are
like Him when our Minds are in Frame, our
Minds are in Frame when our Thoughts are like
his. And our Thoughts are then like his when
we hav such Conceptions of all objects as God




Enjoyment requires thinking well, thorough knowledge; it is
having "such Conceptions of all objects as God hath".
The infant eye had been "Inquisitive" (C III.15), "Engaged
with Enquiries" (C 111.17) about the nature of the world: "Evry
New Thing Quickened my Curiosity and raised my Expectation"
(C III.22). After the apostacy the eye of reason was to be
satisfied only with "the Highest Reason in all Things" (C III.18),
with "Emanations of the Highest Reason" (C III.22) which were still
connected with the world that had produced only intuitive wonder
in the child. The man, then, "Having been at the University"
(c 111.36), was "led to the Study of the most Obvious and
Common Things", such as "Air, Light, Heaven and Earth, Water, the
Sun, Trees, Men and Women" (C III.53). He perceived "a Real
Valuableness in all the Common Things" (C III.53)» a practical
use and value as well as a metaphysical wonder, and was aided in
his study by "Natural Philosophy", the "Diligent inquisition into
all Natures ... so far forth as by Nature and Reason they may be
Known" (C III.44). Natural Philosophy, itself "Nobly Subservient
to the Highest Ends", includes "all Humanity and Divinity" and
"openeth the Riches of Gods Kingdom ... in a Wonderfull Maner,
Clearing and preparing the Ey of the Enjoyer" (C III.44) : it
contributes directly to Felicity.
The world, the world of nature, is a major resource for this
I
activity. By "Diligent inquisition" into God's creation man begins
to see and understand God, nature, and all His works. Man must
therefore engage diligently in "the Contemplation of GODS Works,
wherin all the Riches of His Kingdom will appear" (C II.2): "we
may see a little Heaven in the Creatures" (C 11.12), In relation
to the world "A Noble Spirit . . . can survey it all, and
Comprehend its Uses" (C 11.12). He will find by contemplation
and diligent inquisition that the world satisfies his physical
curiosity and his metaphyscial longing: it contains, as it were
hieroglyphically, "Truth", "a great Part of which is That the
i
World is ours. So that indeed the Knowledge of this is the very
real Light, wherin all Mysteries aire Evidenced to us" (C_ II.2).
Natural Philosophy contributes to the diligent inquisition by
which man's knowledge of God's world will be advanced and
"Mysteries . . . Evidenced to us".
"GOD, THE WORLD YOUR SELF" are the "Objects of your Felicity"
(£ II.IOO). The diligent inquisition of the eye of reason into
God's world contributes to Felicity. The "Mysterie of Felicity"
(C III.55)» too, is "Evidenced to us", made plain and clear, by
means of the study of the world. Men are easily discouraged in
the study of Felicity, but "nothing but Felicity is worthy our
Labour, because all other things are the Means only which conduce
unto it" (C III.56). All knowledge contributes to Felicity, as
divinity and humanity can be seen as parts of Natural Philosophy.
It is because of this that man are discouraged: "the Labor
required to^o^] much Knowledg" (C III.55) • "Aristotle describeth
Felicity, when he saith Felicity is the Perfect Exercise of
Perfect Virtu in a Perfect Life" (C III.68). Aristotle's
definition provides an abstract idea of what is necessary to
Traherne's Felicity — perfection in all senses — but here the
full realisation of the practical implications of "Perfect
Exercise", "Perfect Virtu" and "Perfect Life" is sought. Felicity
is a rigorous "Labor" which for most men "required to^ol much
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Knowledg". It is difficult to define precisely because it is a
"Labor", not an abstract philosophical notion. It is, vitally,
"Life", "Exercise", the "Perfect Exercise" of all man's faculties
in relation to the entire potential of "GOD, THE WORLD YOUR SELF".
Thus "whosoever will Profit in the Mystery of Felicity, must
see the Objects of His Happiness, and the maner how they are to be
Enjoyed, and discern also the Powers of His Soul by which he is to
enjoy them" (C II.IOO). The "Objects of . . . Happiness" are
essentially the objects of the world of nature created by God and
the triple involvement of God, world and self. Knowledge and
understanding of these is part of the "maner how they are to be
Enjoyed". The "Maner", however, is "in evry thing of greatest
Concernment" (C III.38). Study of the objects of Felicity is
important but "it is not Sufficient for us to Study the most
excellent Things unless we do it in the most Excellent of Maners"
(C III.38). Given the perfection of the world as made by God
there is "nothing wanting to Felicity but mine own Perfection"
(C III.30). For this too the world offers a resource, if known and
used in the right "Maner". God himself demonstrates the activity
that is necessary to this form of perfection. God created the
world, but that creation has to be re-affirmed at every moment of
existence: the world is sustained in God from moment to moment as
an idea or essence. "If He would but suspend his Power . . .
Heaven and Earth would strait be abolished which He upholds in
him self" (C II.87). Creation has not been in static existence
since an initial divine fiat. It is upheld as a physical reality
only by the continual exercise of God's creative faculty. Man
possesses a comparable faculty which he too must exercise to the
full. God "upholds in himself" heaven and earth "as we do the
Idea of them in our own Mind" (C 11.87). The "Maner" in which
the objects of creation are to be enjoyed is by direct
participation by man in the exercise of a creative faculty that
he shares with God. He does not create physical and material
objects as such, but he maintains, creatively, an "Idea" of them,
thus effectively "creating" them because it is only in this
"Maner" (by having ideas exercised about them) that physical
things attain their true significance, as images of God. The
"Maner" is then the means both of the making real or realisation
of the physical world as it was intended by God as a resource
for man's understanding of Himself. It is also part of the exercise
which helps man to perfection and his own God-likeness:
[God^] is all Ey and all Ear. Being therefore
Perfect, and the Mirror of all Perfection, He
hath Commanded us to be Perfect as He is
Perfect: And we are to Grow up into Him till
we are filled with the Fulness of His GODhead.
We are to be Conformed to the Image of His
Glory: till we becom the Resemblance of His
Great Exemplar. Which we then are, when our
Power is Converted into Act, and covered with
it we being an Act of KNCWLEDG and Wisdom as
He is. When our Souls are Present with all
Objects, and Beautified with the Ideas and
figures of them all. For then shall we be
Mentes as He is Mens.
(C 11.84).
The ultimate union and communion with God is achieved by "an Act
of KNOWLEDG", by activity and exercise applied to the Platonic
conception of an "Idea" of all physical things, the physical
things that God creates and re-creates continually and which man
too creates for himself in knowing and understanding them. "Dead
i
Things are in a Room containing them in a vain amner; unless they
are Objectively in the Soul of a Seer" (C 1.100). The objects of
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creation are "Dead" unless known and appreciated by man, who
sees in them an "Idea", a vital spiritual significance and
essence. "An Object Seen is in the Faculty seeing it, and by that
in the Soul of the Seer, after the Best of Maners" (£ I.lOO). The
objects of man's happiness are to be enjoyed only as man perfects
himself as "the Living TEMPLE and Comprehensor" (£ 1.100) of all
things, knowing them thoroughly both as the objects and "Ideas"
of God. Thus "GOD, THE WORLD YOUR SELF" are known as objects of
Felicity, a Felicity that man creates by creating for himself ' *~-
the objects of the world (of nature) and "thinking Well" about
them.
Man is equipped for and capable of this, but he must always
recognise and realise, make real in activity and use, "the Powers
of His Soul by which he is to enjoy" (C II.IOO). He is "Insatiable":
"It is the Nobility of Mans Soul that He is Insatiable" (C I.22).
He is so great in Capacity that "the WORLD is but a little Centre
in Comparison" (C I.19): "Your Understanding comprehends the
World like the Dust of a Ballance, measures Heaven with a Span
and esteems a thousand years but as one Day" (£1.19). In enjoying
the world his potential for knowledge of the value and
serviceableness of the world and his sense of wonder at its glory
and beauty must be exercised to the full. He must "break the WORLD
all into Parts, to examine them asunder . . . [and! . . . restore
the Pieces to their Proper Places, being Perfectly Pleased with
the whole Composure" (£ 1.23). The heir of the world must strive
for a thorough and detailed knowledge of God's world and
actually has a duty to fulfil his "Insatiable" ambition.
The individual, as heir of the world, is not alone. Everyone
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is heir of the world equally. God made one man, Adam, to Enjoy
the world, but every man may yet Enjoy the world as Adam did
(C 1.14): "as He maketh one, so He maketh evry one the end of the
World" (C 1.15). Thus "all the World is yours" (C I.16). One man's
Enjoyment of the natural world does not trespass upon that of all
other men. Rather, there is a possibility of individual Enjoyment
within a communal Enjoyment of equals, each contributing to the
Enjoyment of all others (C 1.15). "The Services of Things . . .
are Spiritual" (C 1.26), so to "Prize in evry Thing the Service
which they do you" (C 1.27) is a possibility for all men,
individually, all at once. In Enjoyment it is necessary to "lov
Men so as to Desire their Happiness, with a Thirst equal to the
zeal of your own" (C 1.20). It is thus that
You never Enjoy the World aright, till the Sea
it self floweth in your Veins, till you are
Clothed with the Heavens, and Crowned with the
Stars: and Perceiv your self to be the Sole
Heir of the whole World: and more then so,
because Men are in it who are evry one Sole
Heirs, as well as you.
(C 1.29).
The insatiable individual must appropriate the spiritual uses of
all things for the purposes of his own Enjoyment, but the nature
of Enjoyment is such that this does not preclude the equal
Enjoyment of all other men. "Wine by its Moysture quencheth my
Thirst" (C 1.27), it has a recognisable "Use . . . and
Serviceableness" that can be appreciated in itself, but to Enjoy
it more thoroughly is to "consider it", to "Drink it Spiritualy"
(C 1.27) and see both its "Glory . . . [andl . . . Beauty" and
the common good and Enjoyment it promotes in this individual
Enjoyment. "Rejoice in its Diffusion . . . be of a Publick Mind
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. . . take Pleasure in all the Benefits it doth to all" (C 1.27).
Thus to Enjoy, to appreciate natural objects as God's creation,
as both useful and wonderful in themselves as part of both an
individual and a common Enjoyment, is to be "Divine and Good"
(G 1.27).
Most men, however, neither know of nor care for this
Enjoyment. They might, in childhood, have experienced the intuition,
perception and Enjoyment outlined in the third of the Centuries, but
they then submit for the remainder of their lives to "Apostasie" and
its results: they "invent Ways to make them selves Miserable in the
presence of Riches" (C 1.32) and never attain the life of the
highest reason. Men commonly pursue only the riches of invention,
creating for themselves a world of darkness. "The Riches of
Darkness are those which Men hav made . . . C^bey! • • • lead us
from the Lov of all, to Labor and Contention Discontentment and
Vanity" (C 1.33). Pursuit of the riches of darkness produces
"Repining, Envy, Malice, Covetousness, fraud, Oppression, Discontent
and Violence" (C 1.33) in the world of invention, in "the true
Estate of this World" (£ IV.20) of deceived and deceiving men who
"are ready to Eat and Devour one another" for the sake of
"Particular and feeble Interests, fals Properties, Insatiable
Longings" (£ 1.33). "There is so much Blindness and Ingratitud,
and Damned folly" that this world of invention and darkness must
be shunned, although the need to "hate the Abominable Corruption
of Men in Despising" the world of nature is balanced by a need to
Enjoy the real world while living in and surrounded by the false
world (C 1.31). There are "two worlds" (£ 1.7)» or more truly two
aspects of or two ways of looking at one world, one world which is
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"both a Paradice and a Prison to different Persons" (C I.36).
The "Prison" of men blindly pursuing the riches of darkness
and invention is ever present and often difficult to escape
from — "having made a Combination they seem Wise; and it is a
hard matter to persuade them to either Truth or Reason" (C 1.33) —
but escape must be attempted. It may succeed. Certainly, it is
"a Great Part of Happiness ... to be freed from . . . Seducing
and Enslaving Errors" (C I.36). That "Happiness" helps to make
the world seem a "Paradice" rather than a "Prison" and involves
"The Riches of Light" (C 1.35)» not those of darkness. It will lead
to a genuine "Understanding of our Mutual Serviceableness to each
other" (C I.35). In the world of light "we are all knit together"
(C 1.35) and retain an awareness of men "Toyling and Lamenting in
Hell" (C I.36) in the prison of darkness. At a point of rest within
the false world of "Idleness and Play, and Shops and Markets and
Taverns", "in a Lowering and sad Evening" when "all things were
dead and quiet", the young apostate felt "a certain Want and Horror
. . . beyond imagination" (C III.23). "The unprofitableness and
Silence of the Place dissatisfied me, its Wideness terrified me,
from the utmost Ends of the Earth fears surrounded me" (C III.23).
Only in realising that he was "concerned in all the world" (C III.23)
did the real nature of Felicity become apparent. The riches of
darkness "lead us from the Lov of all" but the riches of light offer
a "Paradice" in which "the Understanding of our Mutual
Serviceableness to each other" makes a "Liberal Soul Prone to
Delight in the Felicity of all" (C I.38). Freedom from "Seducing and
Enslaving Errors", from the "Customs and maners of men", is an
initial step towards Felicity. The true Enjoyment of the heir of the
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world becomes possible when the riches of nature replace those
of invention, although, ultimately, "it more concerneth you to be
an Illustrious Creature then to hav the Possession of the whole
C r
World" (C I.38). Enjoyment and Felicity themselves help man in his
escape from the "Prison" of darkness. They free him from "seducing
and Enslaving Errors" and help him to see the world as a "Paradice",
forming in the process an "Illustrious Creature" who will be truly
God-like, "Holy . . . Divine . . . Righteous . . . []and7 . . .
Just".
That man is "Insatiable" means that he has "Wants" which must
be satisfied with "Supplies" (C 1.40). These form a major link,
the "Bands and Cements" (C 1.51), between man and his creator,
God, mainly through the medium of the world. "Felicitie [is^
composed of Wants and Supplies" and "Insatiable" men were made to
"Want like GODS" that "like GODS ftheyl might be satisfied"
(C 1.41). "You must Want like a GOD, that you may be Satisfied
like GOD" (C 1.44). There is a continuous circulation of wants
and supplies: "all things proceeded from God to Man, and by Man
returned to God" (C 1.40). God offers man supplies in abundance —
he "overfloweth Eternaly" (C 1.42) — but the circulation demands
that these should be gratefully accepted in fulfilment of man's
wants. Nothing is truly Enjoyed unless it was truly wanted. Wants
can be innumerable but must be fully appreciated when supplied, so
that "Infinit Want is the very Ground and Caus of infinit Treasure"
(C 1.42). "Be Sensible of your Wants, that you may be sensible of
your Treasures" (C I.45). To "be Sensible" is to be fully and
urgently conscious of the real significance of things. So, if
wants axe to be infinite "This is a Lesson long enough: which you
may be all your Life in Learning" (C I.45). To be sensible of
treasures supplied is part of knowledge and appreciation, of the
thinking well that accompanies Enjoyment, and it is by thinking
well that Felicity and God-likeness can be achieved. "He is most
like GOD that is sensible of evry Thing" (C 1.45). It is important
that "His Wants always Delight Him, His Treasures never Cloy Him"
(C 1.44): wants, when supplied, are wasted if not recognised as
treasures, if man is not thoroughly "sensible" of them — "they
that Prize not what they hav are Dead" (C 1.49). To endow
everything with the life of the sense, thorough knowledge and
appreciation, Enjoyment, is to create "Paradice": "To hav
Blessings and to Prize them is to be in Heaven; To hav them, and
not to Prize them, is to be in Hell I would say upon Earth: To
prize them and not to hav them, is to be in Hell" (C 1.47). Thus
"the World is both a Paradice and a Prison to different Persons"
and it is the "prizing" of "treasures" that defines and determines
this. Not to prize them is to be "vicious and . . . Irrational"
(C 1.47) as "Customs and maners" oblige men to be; but when "freed
from . . . Seducing and Enslaving Errors", "To Prize what we hav
is a Deep and Heavenly Instruction, It will make us Righteous and
Serious, Wise and Holy, Divine and Blessed" (C 1.50). The true
prizing of wants and supplies, connected with Enjoyment and the
"Maner" in which "Dead Things" are made real, is a serious and
complex process ("which you may be all your Life in Learning"),
making a vital contribution to Felicity.
The notion of wants and supplies as the "Bands and Cements
between God and us" (C I.51) produces another important
consideration. God himself has wants, as is implied when man is
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urged to model his "prizing" on that of God (C 1.44). Among these
wants was man himself: "[^God^ wanted the Communication of His
Divine Essence, and Persons to Enjoy it" (C 1.4-1). "He Wanted
Spectators" (C 1.4-1), so he made man. In the circulation by which
all things come from God and aire returned to him by man, God and
man occupy an equal schematic position. Man himself seems almost
to create God: "Be present with your Want of a Diety, and you shall
be present with the Dietie" (C 1.4-5). To want something and to be
truly "sensible" of it is in effect to create it as an actual
treasure, almost to create it — or at least to realise it, endow
it with its full meaning, as "Dead Things" are given "Life". The
circulation is a dialectical relationship, the reciprocity of which
unsettles distinction between God and man. "What would Heaven and
Earth be Worth, were there no Spectator, no Enjoyer?" (C II.90).
Man is essential to God, for without the "Idea" of the world that
he creates all its objects are only "Dead Things". Man must
maintain this "Idea", as must God: "creation" is the full
realisation, making real, of objects in a mutual process. The
"Idea of Heaven and Earth in the Soul of Man, is more Precious
with GOD then the Things them selvs" (C II.90). The "World within
you is an offering returned" (C II.90), for man's knowledge and
idea of the world shows his appreciation of it to God; but as "All
Objects in all Worlds" are "seen in [God'si Understanding" (C II.84-)
so may man, as objects are "turned into the figure and Idea of them"
(C II.78), "convert fhis^) Soul into a Thought containing Heaven and
Earth" (C II.8?). He may become, quite literally, God.
Without "an Act of the Understanding" (C II.76) all things are
"Dead Things": it is in "Understanding" and its exercise, the
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maintaining of "Ideas", that things have real existence.
Ultimately man knows God only as he actively sustains his "Idea"
of God ("Be present with your Want of a Diety, and you shall be
present with the Dietie"). God is presented as the sum of the
(Platonic) "Ideas", the very realisation of the Platonic feidost,
towards which man should strive in his pursuit of Felicity. Man can
himself achieve that Felicity, that God-like state where his "Soul"
may become "a Thought containing Heaven and Earth", "a Thought"
identical to that by which God sustains creation. If "we lived the
true life of Nature according to Knowledg", "we were to live the
life of God", for then "the Objects of our felicity", "God's
Treasures", would be "ours" (C III.58). To achieve Felicity is to
"Enjoy the Treasures of God in the Similitud of God", for "the
Treasures of GOD are the most Perfect Treasures and the Maner of
God is the most perfect Maner" (C III.59). To achieve Felicity is
to live fully in the image of God, "All Act, Pure Act, a Simple
Being. Whose Essence is to be, Whose Being is to be Perfect"
(C III.63). Thus able to "see more Clearly with the Ey of . . .
understanding, the Beautie and Glories of the whole world", man
will "hav Communion with the Diety in the Riches of GOD and
Nature" (C III.67).
It is "Lov" that motivates God to make such possibilities
available to man. "Lov" is the motive and means both of the
granting of Felicity by God and the Enjoyment of it by man. "The
very End for which GOD made the World was that He might Manifest
His Lov", for "Lov is the true Means by which the World is
Enjoyd" (C 11.62). This establishes a "Divine Fellowship" (C 1.53)
between God and man, so that while "You are Created to be his Lov"
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and "He is Afflicted in all your Afflictions", "in GOD you are
concerned" (C 1.53). "GOD is LOV" (C I.53) but man participates
in this love as he does in God's knowledge. Knowledge and love are
closely connected ("Knowledge and Love are so necessary to Felicity,
that there can be no Enjoyment or Delight without them", CE 36). As
man must know the world, so should he love it, for love is the
essential complement to knowledge in the process of Enjoyment. By
"Loving all as [Godl doth" men will "be as GODS" (C II. 52). The
sacrifice of God's son in the crucifixion is an example of God's
love for man, but still the means of redemption rather than "the
End, for which we are Redeemed", the "End" itself being, in fact,
Enjoyment and Felicity. Christ's "Lov to GOD and Man, in this Act,
was infinit and Eternal" (C 11.37)» so "How vile are they, and Blind
and Ignorant, that will not see evry one to be the Heir of the World,
for whose sake all this was done:!" (C 11.3*0 • While in the first of
the Centuries man is urged to "the Contemplation and Serious
Meditation of [Christ'si Bloody Sufferings", for by considering
the cross "we enter into the Heart of the Universe" (C I.56), such
meditation remains subsidiary to the main theme. The crucifixion,
redemption, is accomplished: man must celebrate and offer thanks
for it as a supreme example of God's love but his real duty is to
the end and not the means of redemption, the Enjoyment of the world
which is a further comprehensive gift of God's love. "We should be
all Life and Mettle and Vigor and Lov to evry Thing" (C 11.68) in
this avid pursuit of Felicity.
Such is God's love that he has given man complete "Liberty"
(C IV.36): "He has given men freedom, and adventured the Power of
Sinning into my Hands" (C IV.52). Man, in relation to God, is
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placed in a position of absolute trust sustained by mutual love.
Man deserves this trust because he returns God's love, and because
he is so remarkable and insatiable a creation, himself the very
image of God. "God made Man a free Agent for his own Advantage;
and left him in the hand of his own Counsel" (C IV.42). To give man
the "Power to displeas" (C IV.43) is to provide further evidence of
God's love, and of his respect for his own creation. Pico della
Mirandola and Hermes Trismegistus have celebrated the nature of
man, but inadequately. The Hermetic concept of man as "a Great
and Wonderfull Miracle ... of all other the Greatest Miracle"
(C IV.74,81) is true but only a part of the truth, for as Pico
observes God made man entirely free with "neither a certain seat,
nor a Private face, nor Peculiar Office" (C IV.76). Thus, God told
Adam, "'Whatsoever seat or face or office thou dost desire, thou
mayst Enjoy'" (C IV.76). Man has no "'Nature bounded within certain
Laws'" but may be, should be, "the Honoured Former and Framer of
Chinf] self'": "'thou mayst shape thy self into what Nature thy
self pleaseth'" (C IV.76). Insatiable man, given liberty, was to
exercise his Capacity as he pleased or thought best, bound only by
the mutual love of God and man. He might be conceived as,
A Messenger between the Creatures, Lord of
Inferior things and familiar to those abov;
by the Keeness of his sences, the Piercing of
his Reason, and the Light of knowledg, the
Interpreter of Nature, A seeming Intervall
between Time and Eternity and the Inhabitant
of both, the Golden link or Tie of the World,
yea the Hymenaeus Marrying the Creator and
his Creatures together.
(C IV.74).
Man does stand at the head of creation, the bond between creation
and its creator. He is part of nature but endowed with the "Sences
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. . . Reason . . . and . . . Knowledg" that make him an image of
God. For God, man is "the Image of all his Work" and the
"Contemplator of the Universe" (£ IV.75)« is "the "Interpreter
of Nature" (C IV.7^). It is in these ways that man must exercise
his infinite Capacity.
God set man in the world as the "Interpreter of Nature" and
it is by Enjoying nature that man attains his own Felicity and
advances his understanding of God. Therefore it might be asked
"whether it were for his own End that God created the World or
more for ours?" (C IV.63). This is a "Gordian Knot" (C IV.63)
which cannot be unravelled. But the fact that the question can be
asked is aui essential reflection on the writing. Man "of all other
the Greatest Miracle" is urged to exercise "the Infinit Extent of
[his] Understanding" to the full, to realise and make real his
own God-like Capacity. "Practice and Exercise is the Life of all",
so man's "Life must be full of Operation" (C IV.95): ""by frequent
Meditation" he may become familiar with "celestial Things"
(C IV.96) and with all the objects of creation in their idea
and essence. Thus, Enjoying his own Felicity, he will become
God-like, achieving "A Perfect Indwelling of the Soul in GOD,
and GOD in the Soul" when "the fulness of the GODHEAD . . . shall
dwell in us" (C IV.lOO). The "Contemplator of the Universe" and
"Interpreter of Nature" exercises with complete liberty his
infinite and insatiable Capacity and can actually be seen to
achieve the God-like ideal for which he strives, becoming "All
Act, Pure Act" as the ideal God is supposed to be. The question
must be asked not only whether God created the world for himself
or for man but also whether "God" does truly have independent
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existence other than as a realisable potential within the mind
of man, a mind "Capable of all Things". There is in man "a World
of Lov to somwhat, tho we know not what in the World that should
be" (C 1.2) : "we know not", that is, until Felicity has been
actually achieved and the God-like man has such conceptions of
the world, such an understanding of nature, as he conceives the
(Platonic) Godhead to have. "Do you not feel yourself Drawn with
the Expectation and Desire of some Great Thing?" (C 1.2). That
"Great Thing" may be no more and no less than man's literal
God-likeness, the ultimate realisation of his own infinite and
insatiable Capacity to know and understand and Enjoy; in effect
to realise or effectively create in absolute liberty "All things",
whether seen as "GOD, THE WORLD YOUR SELF" or simply as the
overabundant and ever perceptually present "Objects of your
Felicity" (C 11.100). The writing of the text itself — similarly
"Capable of all Things" — may be seen as a parable of this
creative process of fulfilment.
The "true Estate of this World" (C IV.20) makes the practice
of Enjoyment and the achievement of Felicity crucially difficult:
"we are here upon Earth Turmoiled with Cares and often Shaken
with Winds and by Disturbances distracted" (C 11.89). The customs
and manners of men increase this difficulty, a difficulty further
complicated by the weakness of the individual, who finds it less
trying to follow these customs and manners than "to be freed from
. . . Seducing and Enslaving Errors". Thus "Men being mistaken in
the Nature of Felicity, and we by a strong inclination prone to
pleas them, follow a multitud to do evil" (C IV.44). Felicity,
however, while remaining a metaphysical ambition as to its
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ultimate goal, does have a practical aspect, "Practical
Happiness" (C IV.l), which may offer a solution to this
problem: "besides Gontemplativ there is an Activ Happiness"
(C IV.1). It is this active, practical happiness which is
offered to men in "the true Estate of this World" (C IV.20).
This "true Estate" must be accepted, must be seen and
recognised. "Here upon Earth" love is "under many Disadvantages
and Impediments that maim its Exercise" (£ IV.60). That exercise
must, however, be continued under whatever disadvantage or
impediment. Indeed, "it is in this world the more Glorious, if
in the midst of these Disadvantages it exert it self in its
Operations" (C IV.6o). This is to re-affirm the metaphysical
ambition but also to imply a more practical advantage. For Plato
too the pursuit of the abstract ideal (ever, to him, only the
more real) was essential to the ideal development of the
actual individual, and also of the state. So too the seeker of
Felicity will become "a Glorious friend to all Persons, a
concerned Person in all Transactions, and ever present with all
Affairs" (C IV.69). He "must ever be filled with Company, ever in
the midst of all Nations" (C IV.69). The seeker of Felicity, while
rejecting the world of invention as a resource for his happiness
and fulfilment, should bring his experience of the world of
nature to bear upon and relieve the state of man in the actual
estate of the false world. "Here therefore is the Place of Trial"
(C IV.60); there are, to both active and contemplative happiness,
"hard lessons, in a pervers and Retrograde World to be practiced"
(C IV.52). Love and Felicity are deeply involved in this world as
in the metaphysical realm of ideals. Indeed "to love Mankind . . .
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is the comprehensive Method to all felicity" (C IV.55)« Practical
happiness is as essential to the ultimate ideal as is contemplative
happiness. Love exercised here under disadvantages and impediments
enhances the value of the ultimate Felicity. As a "Place of Trial"
this world is as important as any other to the attainment of
Felicity by the practice of Enjoyment, part of which is the
realisation of the highest potential in practical and immediate
benefit to mankind as a whole. "This Life is the most precious
Season in all Eternity, becaus all Eternity dependeth on it"
(C IV.93). This is a significant emphasis:
There are Christians, that place and desire all
their Happiness in another Life, and there is
another sort of Christians that desire
Happiness in this. The one can defer their
Enjoyment of Wisdom till the World to com: And
dispence with the Increas and Perfection of
knowledge for a little time: the other are
instant and impatient of Delay; and would fain
see that Happiness here, which they shall enjoy
herafter.
(C IV.9).
In fact "they that put of£f] felicity with long delays, are to be
much suspected" (C IV.9). They are curtly dismissed: they "that can
defer their felicity may be contented with their Ignorance" (C IV.9).
To deny the possible achievement of Felicity even in this seductive
but enslaving world of invention is to commit a heretical
dereliction of human responsibility. "Philosophers are not those
that speak, but Do great Things" (C IV.12). Contemplation must
issue in activity, in practical happiness exercised to the benefit
of all: "all men would be Brothers and Sisters throughout the
whole World" (£ IV.22). The naive happiness of the contemplative man
isolated by his meditation in a paradise of abstract felicity is to
be shunned, for "That knowledg which would make a man Happy among
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just and. Holy persons is unusefull now" (C IV.20). He "that
would be Happy now must be Happy among Ingratefull and
Injurious Persons" (C IV.20). "This is the true Estate of this
World":
On every side we are environed with Enemies,
surrounded with Reproaches encompassed with
Wrongs besieged with offences, receiving evil
for Good, being disturbed by fools, and invaded
with Malice ... To think the World therfore
a General Bedlam, or Place of Madmen, and one
self a Physician, is the most necessary Point
of Present Wisdom: an important Imagination,
and the Way to Happiness.
(G IV.20).
The pursuit of Felicity is thus to be conducted in "a General
Bedlam, or Place of Madmen", in an actual and specific human
society; in Hobbes' state of nature, the war of all against all
in ignorance and evil; in that world and that society in which
"the Nois of Bloody Wars, and the Dethroning of Kings" had been
recently known. The "Ways of Eas and Repos" can be pursued and
offered as an ideal, but that ideal must also issue in practical
happiness that can be applied in the "General Bedlam" of actual
life. The philosopher — "He is a Philosopher that subdues his
vices, Lives by Reason, Orders his Desires, Rules his Passions,
and submits not to his sences, nor is guided by the Customs of
this World" (C IV.18) — is in "this world" like "a Physician"
applying his remedies to a diseased society. Like Plato's
philosopher emerging from the cave of shadows ("having seen the
Secrets, and the Secret Beauties of the Highest reason", C IV.18)
he can demonstrate to men the folly of their customs and manners,
their habitual behaviour in society, and offer them a "Divine
Philosophy" (C IV.3) that shows them the way to practical
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happiness in this world and, as a result, an ideal happiness in
an ideal world beyond.
The analogy of the physician is useful. The philosopher's
practice, like that of the doctor, requires a long and rigorous
training. "Is not a Philosopher a Lover of Wisdom?" (C IV.5).
Enjoyment demands wisdom — man must "travail towards it by
learning Wisdom" (£ IV.9) — a wisdom that must be exercised.
"Get Wisdom . . . get understanding" (C IV.7), then exercise that
wisdom and understanding. "Wisdom is the Principal Thing yet all
neglect her" (C IV.7). Only by doing, as well as by saying, "great
Things" does a man become a philosopher; and only thus, supplied
with wisdom and understanding, can he practice the active
Enjoyment that will lead to Felicity and make it available also
to other men. The pursuit of Felicity is no easy undertaking.
"People are tickled with the Name of it, and som are persuaded to
Enterprize a little, but quickly draw back when they see the
trouble" (C IV.13). "A man that studies Happiness must sit alone
like a Sparrow upon the Hous Top" (£ IV.13), but he does not
obscure his view of the real world in which he lives. The simple
image of the sparrow itself implies the immediacy of practical
happiness, a form of Felicity sought in a world in which a
naked woman may image the ultimate Felicity: "Felicity is amiable
under a Vail, but most Amiable when most Naked ... It is som
Part of Felicity that we must seek her" (C IV.13).
The practising philosopher must bring his wisdom and
understanding to bear upon the pursuit of both active and
contemplative happiness in individual and communal senses. He
will be "ever in the midst of all Nations" (C IV.69) and must
"like a GOD, "bring Light out of Darkness, and Order out of
Confusion" (C IV.21). Applied to "the true Estate of this
World", the metaphysical God-likeness of ultimate metaphysical
unity acquires a practical aspect. The possibility of the
Enjoyment of all by all mutually and at one and the same time
means that the philosopher as "one of the most Illustrious
Creatures in the World" (C IV.3) is himself to be Enjoyed by
others in this world. The notion of the philosopher being
"like a GOD" must reinforce the uncertainty about the absolute
integrity of a God independent of man's conception of an ideal
Godhead that runs through the writing. Traherne tells of an
interesting experience which related to this (C IV.22-37).
Seeking that, for the best purposes of both active and
contemplative happiness, "all men would be Brothers and Sisters
throughout the Whole World", the philosopher once thought that
"the Cheapness of commodities, and the natural fertility of the
. . . ground" should supply "enough for . . . all" (C IV.22). It
is a fact of this world that man has "a Body to provide for,
necessities to reliev" (C IV.60), and Felicity itself, as part
of a whole "Divine Philosophy", must satisfy these, just as it
deals also with the use and serviceableness of all "Common Things"
This primitive communism was inadequate, however, for the earth
became "cursed and Barren" and "there was danger of want, a
necessity of Toyl and labor and Care, and Maintainance of
Servants" (C IV.22). Faced with this the philosopher turned to
the assumed natural "Charity of Men" but found, as he showed in
the first part of the third of the Centuries, that "mens hearts
are Cursed and Barren as the Ground" (£ IV.22). So he turned to
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God: he "fled unto God as his last Refuge" (C IV.22), or, rather,
to the world of nature as created by God (C IV.23). The idea of
God became the "last Refuge" of the God-like philosopher. Thus he
"conceived it his Duty and much Delighted in the Obligation; That
he was to treat evry Man in the Whole World as the Representativ
of Mankind" (C IV.27). As the representative of mankind certainly,
but also as the representative of God, each equally the heir of
the world and image of God. Each has a Capacity capable of
thorough realisation as Felicity, the ideal Good and the Perfect
Life, is pursued by Enjoyment in activity and contemplation.
"Glorious Principles well Practised . . . establish Heaven in the
Life and Soul" (C IV.37).
The empty book was "Capable of all Things" and in it would
be realised the "infinit Space of our Understandings" (C 11.82),
the infinite Capacity of both writer and reader, exemplified in
the infinite Capacity of the infant's empty mind. In the reading
of the book may be learned the "objects of Felicitie, and the Way
of enjoying them" (C V.l). Thus exercised "our Thoughts expaciate
without Limit or Restraint" (£ V.2) and, momentarily perhaps, man
becomes God, replete in his ultimate God-likeness, achieving in
complete communion with the Godhead a displacement of that
Godhead as man himself seems able "to live the life of God"
(C III.58). Finally, however, the life of God is lived in mutual
amity, by man in God and God in man; and by all men at once in the
ultimate Felicity. In the communion of Oneness with God man
achieves "Bliss and Happiness", being "wholly Busied in all
Parts and places of his Dominion" (C V.10). Man is "a Great and
Wonderfull Miracle" (C IV.7^) but it is to the external and
absolute God., who simply and necessarily exists, that he owes
his creation and the creation of the world made to be Enjoyed
by him. Thus, finally, God remains inviolate, "In him, the
fountain, in him the End" (C V.l). "God is the Object, and God
is the Way of Enjoying" (C V.l). The realised Capacity of mind
and book are dedicated to Him, and the book, filled in essence




The title Christian Ethicks suggests little of the book's
actual nature. Traherne deliberately turns away from more
conventional seventeenth century treatises on morality. Although
he later quoted from The Whole Duty of Man (I6585 attributed to
Richard Allestree), among the most popular works of the century,
he states that, because of the existence of this and presumably
other similar works, he "need not treat of Vertues in the ordinary
way" (CE 3)- Similarly, "the French Charron" (CE 3) has presented
a sceptical view of the world, showing the necessity of "Wisdom"
to the maintaining of a man's individual integrity. So Traherne
speaks not of the "Duties enjoyned by the Law of GOD", nor of the
"Prudential Expedients and Means for a man's Peace and Honour on
Earth" but rather of "the reality, force and efficacy of Vertue
. . . its Beauty, Dignity and Glory" by way of the "advantages"
he "gained in the nature of Felicity (by many years earnest and
diligent study)" (CE 3)« It is this "Felicity" that is the true
subject of the book, while "Ethicks" is one important manifestation
of the "advantages" integral to the study and experience of this.
Felicity is a guiding principle behind Christian Sthicks because
"Vertue" and "Felicity" are connected. Felicity is an aid and
authority in the discussion of "Vertue"; and as all the chapters
of the book represent some of the aspects of "Vertue", so this in
turn is bound up with the striving for Felicity. The true weight
of meaning that Felicity carries for Traherne is, as ever,
difficult to realise. A religious discipline or practice in which
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moral and intellectual qualities are brought to bear upon the
whole activity of life, it represents a state of mental and
physical attainment that involves knowledge, understanding and
appreciation of many or all of man's powers and potentials
particularly as these are used in what is conceived as his
dynamic relations with God and His creation, and by implication
with other men. This practical or social aspect is by no means
negligible: "The reality of Religion consists in the solid practice
of it among the Sons of men that are daily with us" (CE 246). The
inclusive aspect of Felicity in Christian Ethicks should be
stressed, most positively as it concerns Traherne's idea of
Capacity, man's Capacity in all senses, but here notably that of the
intellect. "Vertue", for example, as a manifestation of Felicity,
the fundamental theme of the book, is conducive to "Glory"; it
leads to the "Temple of Bliss" and is "immeasurably transcendent
... in all kinds of Excellency" (CE 3)• It is also "full of
Reason" (CE 3), which suggests that "all kinds of Excellency
includes forms of "Vertue" more thoroughly fulfilling that any
easy definition of Felicity may imply. Traherne has said that
Felicity requires "many years earnest and diligent study" (CE 3).
An attempt to define Felicity may provide some insight into
Traherne's motivation in Christian Ethicks and the way in which
this notion, proposed as an ultimate end of human attainment,
involves many aspects of thought and action. "Felicity is rightly
defined, to be the Perfect fruition of a Perfect Soul, acting in
a perfect Life by Perfect Virtue" (CE 19). This derives from
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics and repeats the formal definition
of Felicity given in the Centuries (C III.68)J* it is linked with
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a Platonic concept of the pursuit of the ideal in all things,
of perfection in an absolute sense. In the Commonplace Book
"Beatitude", the "BLESSEDNESS" of the title of Christian Ethicks
and a form of Felicity, is defined as "the operation of the
rational Soul, according to the best virtue in a perfect life"
(CB 21V); this too is from Aristotle, via Theophilus Gale. In
the Early Notebook the source was Elustachius: "felicitas formalis
est operatio animae rationalis secundum virtutem perfectissimam in
vita perfecta" (EN 9). Traherne's own synthesis of Aristotelian
and Platonic elements in the definition of Felicity as the
fulfilment of man's life is not original but is parallel to
similar statements in contemporary writing. "That the End of Man's
Life is Felicity; all men most readily allow: and, if you ask him,
no man will deny, that he aims at that End": thus Walter Charleton
in 1656.^ For him, too, "Ethicks" helps man to Felicity. "By
Ethicks, or Morals, we understand that part of Philosophy, which
hath for its proper Object the End, or Final and main scope of
Mans Life; containing certain Directions, and Precepts, for the
right information of his Understanding, and (consequently) the
conduct of his Will, in the Election of real Good, and Avoidance
of Evil, in order to his attaining the true Etad of his life, the
3
Supreme Good, or Felicity". Traherne's subject, "Ethicks", has
an esential inclusiveness and centrality as a contribution to
seventeenth century thought: it is against this background that
his own originality may be studied. "Ethicks", then, is a part of
"Philosophy" concerned with "the End, or Finall and main scope of
Man's Life", the "right information of his Understanding" and the
attainment of a Felicity which is still the "Supreme Good" over
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ana above, but including, these other concerns. Felicity, then,
the "Supreme Good" in a Platonic sense, links Aristotelian and
Platonic elements in Traherne's thought and, more importantly,
can be seen as an inclusive, all-inclusive, philosophical notion
about man's life — his thought, actions and beliefs — and the
ends towards which this is directed. There is, futher, a
fundamental emphasis on reason and rationality, and on intellectual
attainment, as aspects of the pursuit of Felicity as the inclusive
end of ethical behaviour.
Traherne's own definition, particularly his insistence on the
perfection of "Soul", "Life" and "Virtue", demonstrates the
inclusiveness of Felicity. So do his concerns with "fruition" and
"acting". The degree of ambition that this implies may be seen in
the following passage, expanding on one part of the definition of
Felicity:
Perfect life is the full exertion of perfect
power. It implies two things, Perfection of
Vigour, and perfection of intelligence, an
activity of life, reaching through all
Immensity, to all Objects whatsoever; and a
freedom from al Dulness in apprehending: An
exquisite Tenderness of perception in feeling
the least Object, and a Sphere of activity
that runs parallel with the Omnipresence of
the Godhead.
(03 20).
If the "Supreme Good" to which a study of "Ethicks" leads is
Felicity, the pursuit of which has as part of its object "Perfect
life", which in turn involves "perfection of intelligence",
"activity of life", "all Objects" and apprehension of them, it is
clear that Traherne's book should not be considered as an
enclosed moral or theological treatise. Rather, he is engaged in
exploring a philosophical and metaphysical universe. Knowledge
cannot be refused. Traherne claims as his object "to make the
Glory of GOD appear, in the Blessedness of Man" (CE 3)« "Man was
made in GODS Image, that he might live in his Similitude" (CE 16).
In this context, Aristotle's Felicity is only temporal in
comparison with "that felicity which is here begun, and enjoyed
for ever" (CE 58)5 a Felicity, the "Supreme Good" of a broadly
based philosophy, which is "here begun" less by introspective
meditation ("There is a Glory in the Work which the Silent Habit
is uncapable of", CE 191) than by vigorous expatiation in
thought and language over the whole of creation. "Deus me solum
dedit toti mundo, toto Mundum mihi soli, GOD gave me alone to all
the World, and all the World to me alone" (CE 58). Where moral
effect is sought it is seen as the secondary result of a perfected
"Life", a perfected and active awareness of and response to all
and actual phenomena.
"It is the Prerogative of Humane Nature to understand it
self, and guide its Operations to a Known End" (CE 13)• These,
the opening words of the first chapter of Christian Ethicks,
reflect an emphasis fundamental to Traherne's thought: "the
Prerogative of Humane Nature to understand". To understand not
only itself but as much of knowledge of all things as is possible:
"How ambitious we ought to be of Knowledge, which is the Light
wherein we are to adorn and compleat our selves" (CE 63-64).
Quoting Proverbs III.13-19»21 (notably "The LORD by wisdom hath
founded the earth; by understanding hath he established the
heavens"), Traherne insists on the need to "get Wisdom, and. . .
Understanding", "For the same Wisdom which created the World, is
the only Light wherein it is enjoyed" (CE 184). The idea of man's
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ability to share or participate in God's creation in a very
direct sense continues Traherne's thorough stress on the mutual
aspect of "Wisdom". Creation can, and must, be known by man by
way of a "Wisdom" the same as that of God. Then "the Glory of
GOD" will appear "in the Blessedness of Kan".
Similar to the mutual human and divine participation in
"Wisdom" is that in "Reason". Reason is "the formal Essence of
the Soul of Man", which guides him towards "those Things, which
are absolutely supreme" (CE 14). It is "a transcendent faculty,
which extendeth to all Objects, and penetrates into all misteries",
questioning the "Use and End of . . . things" (CE 109). Traherne
insists, like the Cambridge Platonists, that "Faith is by Reason
confirmed, and Reason is by Faith Perfected" (CE 112) and he
quotes the much-cited text, 1 Peter III.15 (which he translates
"be ready always to give a reason of the Hope that is in us",
CE 109), to this effect. "Faith" and "Reason" are reconciled and
complementary. Of scholastic derivation, suggesting a traditional
inheritance through formal education, this reconciliation between
two areas, the apparent conflict between which provoked
considerable doubt in the seventeenth century, shows an attempt
to retain the possibility of something like the scholastic summa,
a comprehensive view of the whole of attainable knowledge and
truth, whether theological or scientific. The manner in which this
is expounded, however, in combination with original and other
contemporary ideas, is sympathetic and indeed conducive to
inquiry into all aspects of thought and experience, including
the detailed research into natural phenomena that was to develop
from and through Natural Philosophy: theological and scientific
truth axe, like faith and reason, reconciled and complementary.
Traherne's discussion "Of Knowledge" is found in Chapter
Five of Christian Ethicks. "Knowledge and Love are so necessary
to Felicity, that there can be no Enjoyment or Delight without
them" (CE 36). "Knowledge" and "Love", like "Wisdom", are seen as
abstract realms shared by man and God, but here the mutual
participation is extended beyond "Knowledge" itself. Knowledge
is abstract, and its shared aspect is important. But its
abstract importance is of less concern than its realisation as
a power, That function of the mind of God or man which can be
called "Knowledge", that faculty whereby the known is retained,
is less significant than the faculty of knowing itself, which is
an active exercise:
He that would not be a stranger to the Universe,
an Alien to Felicity, and a foreigner to himself,
must know GOD to be an infinite Benefactor . . .
and his own Soul the Possessor of all, in
Communion with the Deity . . . the knowing Man
is the friend of GOD.
Tce kl-Wf.
The "Divine Amity" (CE 42), the communion with the deity, is
attained actively, not simply by the possession of a mutual
faculty: "if we would be perfect, as our Father which is in 3
Heaven is perfect, our Power of Knowing must be transformed (into
Act,) and all Objects appear in the interior Light of our own
understanding" (CE 36-37). This stress on activity, and the
importance of the appropriation of things known ("Objects") to
"our own understanding", connects with Traherne's notions about
perception, ways of seeing and knowing, and his idea of the
transformation of "Dead Things" (C 1.100) into living images of
God. "Knowing" can be part of man's striving towards perfection,
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but also represents a more thorough striving towards this
communion with the deity than a state of passive "Knowledge".
It is also part of an activity less directly concerned with
this communion, because in the insistence on man's part in the
participation of knowing (on "our own understanding") the
striving towards perfection turns back on itself — or, rather,
completes a circle. The emphasis falls on man the knowing subject,
the conceiver of his own Capacity and its potential realisation.
"Knowing" is one of man's fundamental links with either his
conceived world or his conceived God, with the life he realises
outside himself. One way in which communion with the deity is
achieved, it is also the means by which this communion can be
conceived as an idea and that idea acted upon.
Traherne also considers the "Power of Knowing" as it relates
only to the man's "Soul" and without reference to the "Divine
Amity". "The Power of Knowing is vain if not reduced into Act;
and the Soul a melancholly and Dreadful Cave, or Dungeon of
Darkness, if void of Knowledge" (CE 36). Further, "It is not to
be denied, that every Being in all Worlds is an Object of the
Understanding" (CE 40). God's "very Essence is seated in infinite
Knowledge", so "GOD himself, without Knowledge and Love, could not
well exist" (CE 36). If "every Being in all Worlds is an Object
of the Understanding" may there not be a more fundamental sense
in which "GOD himself, without Knowledge and Love, could not well
exist" ?
GOD himself and his holy Angels are Objects of
the Understanding . . . their Fruition depends
upon that Act of the Understanding by which
they are considered . . . Whereupon it follows
that the infinite value of all these is seated
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in the intellect; and as the Power, so
the Act of Knowledg, on which their
Fruition dependeth, is of infinite use
and Excellency.
(CE 38).
The emphasis on the "Act" of understanding and the way this leads
to the "Fruition" of objects is important, and is developed most
powerfully in the context of Traherne's insistence on the human
power of knowledge. The importance of the "Act" of the
understanding that leads to the "Fruition" of objects, their
realisation in the human mind, could be seen as an emphasis that
leads to a version of the universe in which "God" is a mental
realisation (an "Act" of "Fruition") of a form of Platonic Ideal.
This view is resisted, the scheme of Traherne's notions about
perception being based on a three-fold system including the "Eye",
the "Object" and the "Light", God. "God", however, must still be
regarded as an essentially Platonic function in a world centred
very much on man's ability to know, his "Power of Knowing". "GOD
as he is the Life and fountain of all Felicity, the End of all
Perfection, and the Creator of our Being ... is most fit to
be Known. Plato makes him the very Light of the understanding"
(GE 41). "God" as the Ideal, as "the End of all Perfection", is
that thing "most fit to be known", to be brought to "Fruition"
by man's "Power of Knowing".
It is man's Capacity, and his curiosity and insatiableness,
that are so often stressed. "I know that Men are the greatest
Treasures, and that your interest is extended through all worlds,
and your Possessions illimited" (CE 249) •* "It is the Glory of man,
that his Avarice is insatiable, and his Ambition infinite, that his
Appetite carries him to innumerable Pleasures, and that his
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Curiosity is so Endless, that were he Monarch of the World, it
could not satisfie his Soul" (CE j&)• "Magnificence" is a means
of participation in the "Divine Amity" (CE 247-57)• God, by
"Loving", gives his "Wisdom, Goodness and Power", doing with them
"all that we could devise . . . had they been our own" (CE 249).
As this is God's magnificence, so should man be magnificent and
give, or return, all to God. God "infinitly desires to be loved
of [man!" so he must return God's love, his "Wisdom, Goodness and
Power"t through his own understanding. "Upon this Return all the
sweetness of the rest dependeth" (CE 250-51) fo^" without it "all
the Creation is vain and frustrate" (CE 252-53)- Thus God's
"Wisdom, Goodness and Power" depend for their realisation on man
and on his Capacity and "Magnificence". The products of man's
activity, though, are ultimately re-appropriated by God: "Could
we make millions of Worlds . . . they should all be his" (CE 252-53).
It is in this way that Traherne's thought is amenable to all
forms of intellectual pursuit. Man's "Magnificence must be shewn in
something [God^j cannot do" (CE 252-53)- Philosophically, "It is the
Prerogative of Humane Nature to undertsand it self", but it is also
man's duty to realise his Capacity in activity, active knowing and
discovery: "man can see, and know, and love any object" (CE 48).
It is perhaps in this area that many of Traherne's notions
coalesce into the central importance of knowledge and appreciation,
Enjoyment, of God's creation: "man can see" any object by way of
the complex of perception elaborated by Traherne; he can "know"
by way of his intellectual Capacity; and he can "love", Enjoy,
know thoroughly and appreciate, realise and give thanks for the
thing through his whole life and being, all his powers. "Outward
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Security, and inward Contentment" are necessary to Felicity"
(CE 198): "contentment" is "the full satisfaction of a Knowing
Mind" (CE 216), the complete fulfilment of man's active
Capacity. "Knowing" is the thoroughly worked realisation of the
plenitude of "Knowledge" ("Never so much clear Knowledge in any
Age", CE 283). "Love" is comparable to "Knowledge" in its
importance to Felicity, seen again as a divine attribute in which
man participates, another all pervading medium in which things are
seen to exist and to be capable of having meaning given to them.
For man himself "Love" implies and includes also the sense of
Enjoyment that is a close approach to Felicity itself. Man "can
love any object": any research into God's creation can be
accommodated within Traherne's philosophy. "There is a Wisdom
above us, and a Wisdom within us, that maketh all things to work
together for good to them that love GOD, and nothing is able to
hurt us but our selves" (CE 221). Traherne continues the emphasis
on the self and the possibility of choice this offers once the
partly subjective process of perception is recognised: "God" is
proposed or at least fully realised only by the "Knowing" man,
so if man chooses (and it is assumed that he will choose — he must
choose because of his "Reason") everything can be contained in a
system which will continue to include God and man. This system is
always based upon the world, man and God (corresponding to the
object, eye and light of Platonic "Vision", CE 41) and the
relationship between these, the circulation of the world and
its objects from God to man and from man to God.
Knowledge cannot be refused, because it leads to understanding
of God's works in God's greatest work, man, his image. The world is
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a basic resource through which this knowledge and understanding
is acquired. "To see beyond all Seas, and through all interposing
Skreens and Darknesses, is the Gift of the Understanding, and to
be able to Love any Object . . . any Thing that is Good ... is
the Property of the Soul" (CE 5^)• God is the cause and end of all
things, and includes all things in himself. He is inevitably the
"Best of all possible Ends", so anything that man discovers is
inevitably part of God: it is "Good" ("If it be wonderful, admire
and adore it", CE 86). Man is not restricted by any limits. He
may, and is even required to, attain God's own knowledge:
"Possibilities are innumerable, so that nothing less than
infinite Wisdome can find out that which is absolutely the Best"
(CE 65). The licence by which anything may be included in man's
relation with God is basically two-fold. God made everything, so
man's knowledge of anything and everything should help his
knowledge of God (and this he may attain in the most complete
sense); and the partly subjective nature of perception means that
any knowledge can be incorporated or melted into the over-riding
"Idea" of "God", the means by which "all things work together for
good". So what is known becomes less important than the way in
which it is known, "the way in which things are known" or "knowing
all things to be of God", being one possible definition of
"religion":
To Know that we are Men, encompassed with the
Skies, and that the Sun and Moon, and Stars are
about us, with all the Elements and Terrestrial
Creatures is matter of Sence and Reason; as it
is also, that we have the dominion and use of
them . . . But their utmost Perfection is
discovered only by the Truth of Religion; that
alone discloses their first Cause, and their
last End, without which all their Intermediate
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Uses are Extremely Defective.
(CE 112).
This "religion" is the doctrine of Enjoyment, essential to man's
ultimate achievement of Felicity.
Traherne's thought is circular: everything, every aspect of
everything is essentially and ultimately connected. The main
aspects of the thought converge in ideas of "ways of seeing" in
relation to knowledge and Enjoyment. Everything is significant,
connected, involved ("there is a certain kind of Omnipresent
greatness in the smallest action", CE 242): "There is a certain
kind of sympathy that runs through the Universe, by vertue of
which all men are fed in the feeding of one . . . All are touched
and concerned in every one" (CE 241). This is another aspect of the
participation of all men in powers and potentials shared by God,
but the realisation of man's Capacity and the attainment of
knowledge of all things is achieved only by retaining the notion
of seeing "in the right manner", of "thinking Well" as the basis
of all knowledge and all knowing. This too should properly be
seen to derive from God. "A confused Apprehension makes us blind"
(CE 190), but "A mind in Frame is a Soul clothed with Right
Apprehensions" (CE 26): there is a need for the "clear and
perfect apprehensions" (CE 3?) of the man whose mind is attuned
to that of God in order that things may be seen or known
correctly. "Vertuous Love" proceeds from "a well governed
understanding" and exists only in a "Will" which is "guided by
Reason" (CE 49)s a "clear Beholder" will see God's wisdom,
goodness and glory in God's kingdom (he will Enjoy God) as "one
Intire Object, and every Thing in it a Part of that Whole"
(CE 69). The "Soul" and. its powers can be applied "rightly" or
"wrongly". When "well exerted" they become "vertues" and it is
only by this "Exertion" and by the recognition of man's place in
the circulation of the world from and to God through man himself
that "we attain . . . Happiness" (CE 27).
Here again is the insistence on the individual "Exertion"
and the need for the "clear and perfect apprehensions" that lead
to true knowledge and Enjoyment:
the Soul being made in the Image of GOD, who is
Love by his Essence, must needs be like him in
Power and Inclination, and is made for nothing
else but the Attainment of its perfection, so
that it can never rest, till it actually love
after his similitude. Some operation it must of
Necessity have. For as all Life, so all
pleasure is founded in Action.
(CE 48).
Exertion and activity are continually stressed as fundamental
aspects of man's striving, and through the emphasis on this
Traherne demonstrates his awareness of the difficulty, actual
and experienced, of the task he proposes: "our present Estate" is
one of "Labour" not "Reward", of "Trial" not "Fruition" (CE 191)•
He emphasizes the need for "Toyl, and Sweat . . . for the
promised Wages" and, although the "Triumph" will be "attended with
ornaments and trophies fax surpassing the bare Tranquillity of
idle peace", "we must expect some blows" (CE 19). So inactivity
and "wrong" apprehension and "Use" are the source of all faults,
and it is the responsibility of the individual to set these right:
"We rail on the World when the fault is in our selves. The most of
Men professing Virtue are but Children in Worth . . . Vertue is
base and not Vertue, while it is remiss: It never shineth
gloriously and irresistibly, till it be acted in a desperate
manner" (CE 281). The stress on activity returns to the
consideration of the nature of perception, the way in which
things become evident to the human mind and the way in which this
then reacts to them. "Matter" is the "Dreg of Nature, and Dead
without Power", while "Act is the Top and Perfection of Nature, it
is the fulness of Power, the fountain and the means of all that is
for Power by transforming itself into Act, becometh an act, and by
that Act produceth and perfecteth all its Work both outward and
inward; so it is the Means of all its Productions" (CE 68). God
is the sum of all "Operations", and his "Power" is exerted as "Act
(CE 69). "In God, to Act and to Be, are the same Thing. Upon the
suspension of his act, his Essence would be gone" (CE 76). While
"it is his eternal Act that gives us a Being" (CE 267) it is
yet true that "in the acts of our Understanding we shall eternally
be with him" (CE 268). "Act" is another part of the mutual
participation of the human and the divine. "Act" "produceth and
perfecteth all . . . Work both outward and inward; so it is the
Means of all . . . Productions". God's "Act" creates, but so too
does man's. God made the world, but he made it for man. Only in
the activity and the mind of man is the created world fully
realised, made real:
To make Visible Objects useful it was
necessary to enshrine some Spirits in
Corporeal Bodies, and therefore to make such
Creatures as Men, that might see, and feel,
and smell, and taste and hear, and eat and
drink by their Bodies, and enjoy all the
Pleasures of the World by their Souls: And
by their Souls moreover know the Original
and End of all, understand the design of all,
and be able to celebrate the Praises of the
Creator ... It was expedient also to make
their Bodies finite, that they might
converse together: but their inward
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Intelligences of endless reach . . . that
they might also be able to search into the
depth of all Things, and enjoy Eternity; Nay,
that they might be fit Recipients for the
infinite Bounty and Goodness of GOD, which is
infinite in all its Communications.
(CE 182).
i
Here is the true "Magnificence" of man, his place in creation,
sustaining and re-creating by way of his "Act" those things which
he conceives as being the results of the "Act" of God. "Man seems
to be the Head of all Things visible, and invisible, and the
Golden clasp whereby Things Material and Spiritual are United.
He alone is able to beget the Divine Image, and to multiply
himself into Millions ... by him alone GOD and his works are
United" (CE 104). It is from this that the insistence on man's
importance issues, complementing the continued emphasis on man's
aspiration towards God-likeness, "our Inclination to be like GOD,
to Please him, and to Enjoy him". Man, the Golden clasp" uniting
the material and the spiritual, able to reproduce the divine
image, is able to "aspire after . . . the very throne of GOD"
(CE 122). "Nothing less than the Wisdom of GOD will please the
GOD-LIKE Man" (CE 285) • Traheme looks towards the realisation of
"The fulness of the GODHEAD in the Soul of Man, the Perfection of
the Divine Image, a Transformation for Glory, to Glory . . . where
all Regions, and Ages, and Spaces, and Times, and Eternities shall
be before our Eys, and all Objects in all Worlds at once Visible,
and infinitely Rich, and Beautiful, and Ours!" (CE 123). Such
emphasis on man's individual Capacity culminates in a form of
self-love, which, carefully distinguished ffom that of Hobbes
(CE 26l), is also love for others:
the very reason why [the soul[ enjoys it self
and all its own Treasures, is because it loves
it self: And the more it loves him the more it
will be delighted with his functions. It is
more concerned, it feels more, it sees more, it
tastes more, it possesses more, it rejoyces more
in its Object than it self. The imagination and
fancy that is in Love frames all the thoughts of
its Beloved, in it self; it has an exquisite and
tender sence of every change and motion in the
mind of its Beloved.
(GE 27^-75).
The "imagination and fancy that is in Love", capable of "framing"
thoughts, is parallel to the process by which "Dead Things" are
realised as vital aspects of God's creation, in which God's love
is itself immanent (C I.lOO).
For Traherne, man's "Power" becomes "Act" which "produceth and
perfecteth all its work both outward and inward: so it is the Means
of all its Productions". Thus "it was necessary to enshrine some
Spirits in Corporeal Bodies" in order to "make Visible Objects
useful". Things are "Dead" ("Matter" is the "Dreg of Nature, and
Dead without Power") and come to life, are realised and made real,
only in the mind of man ("They are not conceived, unless they are
quickened with the Life of the Receiver", CE 270). So man has a
responsibility to seek out all knowledge, to know, realise and
Enjoy all things, and aspire to the knowledge of God. "A Grateful
Soul" who acknowledges all things in this practice "holds
Intelligence with GOD" (GE 271). He becomes one with God:
if we excite and awaken our Power, we take in the
Glory of all Objects, we live unto them, we are
sensible of them, we delight in them, we transform
our souls into Acts of Love and Knowledge ... We
are not divided from, but united to ^Godl, in all
his Appearances, Thoughts, Counsels, Operations;
we adorn our Souls with the Beauty of all Objects
whatsoever, are transformed into the Image of
God, live in communion with him, nay live in him,
and he in us.
(CE 52-53).
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Once the initial fiat is accomplished, man is as much
responsible for creation as God, for he is the only means by which
all things can be held together and realised in life. Traherne
does not propose a Berkeleyan idealism. For him physical objects
do have a material existence, but only as "Dead Things". These
"Dead Things", however, form the basis of man's enhancing and
realising activity, making them fully real, giving them an ideal
significance, in his understanding and Enjoyment of them and his
thanksgiving for them. The objects of creation were made for man,
and for man to return them to God realised as ideals of Enjoyment.
Thus man discovers God, the world and himself. Christian Ethicks
ends by asserting that "GOD is, and is a Rewarder of all them that
diligently seek him" (CE 286). In this seeking, however, man also
achieves his own Felicity and God-likeness, the satisfaction of
an insatiable Capacity to Enjoy all things. The reward, perhaps,
is rather in this fulfilling activity as it traverses and transcends
every aspect of known and knowable experience in the ideal pursuit
of an ideal good, Felicity, the "Perfect fruition of a Perfect
Soul, acting in a perfect Life by Perfect Virtue". Seeking this
"Perfect fruition" man is propelled, propels himself, towards his
own ideal realisation as heir of the world and image of God;
towards his own literal C-od-likeness.
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Postscript
"There is a certain naivete about all this; it is too
simple",^" Carol Marks, perhaps Traherne's most sympathetic
commentator, betrays an impatience many have felt with some of his
more convoluted notions — in this instance the idea of
"communication" by which all men Enjoy equally all others'
Enjoyment:
In the end, that simplicity diminishes our
faith in Traherne's sincere but facile
professions of practicality. His conviction
of man's goodness can inspire us to
admiration, perhaps to envy, but not to
assent. Opposed in his own day by the
theology of Original Sin, Traherne's
joyful optimism crashes today against the
Berlin wall, the Vietnamese war. The
[Church's3 Year- Book, with its exhortations
and "Motivs to Hope", leads us to a
melancholy recognition that most of the
seventeenth-century expression of devotion
is for us dry bones, and that, however much
we long to believe, Traherne's strong and
loving faith is for us but a dreaa.^
What is in question here, surely, is not the naivete or otherwise
of Traherne's writing but the naivete of a certain attitude to
reading. It is unreasonable, and arguably pernicious, to raid
texts of the past in search of a still viable "faith". This is,
it seems, a thorough perversion of any sensitive textual study,
or at least an absurd reduction of it. Yet this reaction is
common: it haunts attention to Traherne's writing and has indeed
made Traherne's "naivete" a critical embarrassment.
This thesis provides no answer to this or any other problem
and draws no specific conclusions. The thesis seeks rather to
direct or re-direct a train of thought than to establish a
triumphant prospect. Leaving aside such questions as those raised
for some by "the Berlin wall, the Vietnamese war" — in relation
to Traherne, surely, of extreme irrelevance — the apparent
naivete of his critical reputation may again be measured through
the words of his contemporary, Rochester. In "A Satyr against
Reason and Mankind" (c.l675) Rochester berated the philosophy of
a divine like Traherne. In a final cynical gibe he pretends to
take back his words:
If upon earth there dwell such God-like men,
I'll here recant my paradox to them.
Adore those shrines of virtue, homage pay,
And, with the rabble world, their laws obey.-^
This thesis seeks to suggest that, in so far as any full and
coherent image of Traherne has emerged from it, the "rabble world
of criticism may itself have a paradox to recant. For through
Rochester's poem — as through the words of many contemporary
writers examined here — Traherne can be seen as the Restoration
writer and philosopher he truly was. His "naivete" for modern
readers is that of many others in his own time, whether John
Everard, Theophilus Gale, Robert Boyle or Isaac Barrow. His
writing demands full and serious attention both as writing and
as it traces and develops a "Divine Philosophy" (C IV.3) in
relation to "the true Estate" of the contemporary world (£ IV.20)
It is an attempt to accord it such attention that this thesis
represents, seeing Traherne's life at Oxford and in London, his
interest in contemporary natural philosophy and his intellectual
ambition and accomplishment as the basis for a reading of his
three major prose works as "real" in the sense of being not
derivative models of meditative practice nor sincere but facile
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attempts to formulate an eternal "faith" hut as writings issuing
from and relating to both a real life in a real world and the
activity of an acute and comprehensive mind. The writings are
serious attempts to expound a "Divine Philosophy" which encompasses
the whole realm of human thought and action in so far as this was
understood by this one man in his own time and place. Felicity,
as the aim of "Divine Philosophy", is a comprehensive ideal that
seeks to absorb all that is good in the world of thought and
action in an attempt to achieve an ultimate and absolute Good.
In conclusion it can only be said that the affirmations and
speculations now drawing to a close are the product of an
exploration of Traherne's life and writing in the contexts of
the "Divine Philosophy" thus produced and the specific contemporary
world from which this emerges and to which it relates.
No more definite or definitive conclusion is possible, for
this is no place to define or limit the experience this thesis
seeks to urge upon the reader. Traherne himself did not conclude
two of the three writings examined here: it is part of the very
nature of what he says and the way in which he says it that
conclusions are impossible. There is only life and activity, the
life of Enjoyment striving continually for the fruition of Felicity
and God-likeness, "the Perfect fruition of a Perfect Soul, acting
in a perfect Life by Perfect Virtue" (CE 19)• The writing, like
Traherne's "Thoughts", must "expaciate without Limit or Restraint"
(C V.2) and will achieve its own "fruition" only in a thorough and
responsive reading of it. It is to provide material for such a
reading and to suggest something of the possible direction and
depth this might have that this thesis has been written.
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FIRST REFORMER of the DEVOTIONS IN The Ancient Way of OFFICES;
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John Philoponus (sixth century; seven books); George of Pisidia
(seventh century; 1,910 lines); Bede (673~735> four books) (1717
Collection A7r ).
^ Meditations and Devotions upon the Life of Christ (1717
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Catalogues, 1668-1709 A.P.. vol.1 (London, 1903), pp.184-85.
2
Bodleian Ms.Eng.th.e.50. The first edition was Centuries of
Meditations, ed. Bertram Dobell (London, 1908).
3
Louis L. Martz's belief in the importance of formal
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creation); The Church's Year Book (following the feasts and festivals
of the church year); Commonplace Book (notes arranged under
alphabetical headings")"]
^ See WFB 11.323-680. The collection was edited after Bacon's
death by William Rawley.
g
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21
Marks in PBSA. 58 (1964), p.459.
22
Marks in PBSA, 58 (1964), p.462.
23
The Divine Pymander of Hermes Mercurius Trismegistus . . ■
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(London: By S. and B. Griffin for Jonathan Edwin, 1673)• See
A Transcript of the Registers of the Worshipful Company of
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29
John Milton, Of True Religion, Haeresie, Schism, Toleration
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Charles II, 1667 (London, 1866), p.457 (11 September I667).
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See also "The King's Vows" (Poems on Affairs of State: Augustan
Satirical Verse, 1660-1714. vol.1, ed. George de F. Lord, New
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